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Foreword and Acknowledgements
A good story is rarely completely linear or makes perfect sense. Imperfections, 
inconsistencies, and disagreements breathe a sense of humanity. There must be 
suspense and excitement but also pitfalls, desperation, and deviations from the 
path that would be the most logical. It is these things, whatever stands out from the 
normal state of affairs, which grabs our attention either positively or negatively. As 
my imaginary mentor Michael Scott put it concerning workplace meetings,
People expect a lot from these … laughter, some twists, surprise endings, you need to be 
Robin Willians and M. Night Shyamalan. You need to be Robin Shyamalan. … don’t 
think about the stakes, it’ll freak you out.I
The academic path I have treaded has contained many such deviations. Public 
international law, which I took in 2012, was the first field of law that struck a chord 
with me. This resulted in a desire to take several advanced courses therein. As fate 
would have it, the course book for the law of the sea was unavailable, so I took air law 
instead—a fateful incident, one might say. Albeit I later sailed the high seas as well, 
the airspace retained its primacy. Successfully completing my bachelor’s and master’s 
theses led me to the opportunity of doing an LLD: a PhD in law. As it seemed like an 
interesting thing to do, I accepted the challenge without really understanding what 
it would entail.
Yet as many have previously observed, doing an LLM is quite different from doing 
an LLD, given the expectations attached to the latter. Hence, originally ( January 
2015) I begun working on a book on the sovereignty of states in airspace—a 
grandeur topic, as my supervisor put it. After several years of struggling with the 
concept, though, I realized that what I would have to write was a new theory on 
sovereignty minus the airspace dimension, which would regardless take a few years 
to finish. Scrambling to retain my sanity, I decided to continue my work on another 
topic, which would—over the span of two years—become the present dissertation. 
So here I am, after some twists and surprise endings, with a finished thesis. The 
following words could hardly fit better:
And I broke my promise on a very sharp rock
And I was possessed by something quite unfriendly
I  The Office (US), season 5, episode 3.
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And I was haunted by a demon in my sleep
And that’s how I learned how to surviveII
Even more important than finishing this thesis is, however, the experience of 
learning. Through writing, discussing, and publishing, I feel as if I have begun to 
understand what the academia is about, what scholarship is about, and what it is 
all worth. I started with much doubt about the potential of legal scholarship to 
say anything about anything meaningful at all; much of its issues appeared trifling 
technicalities unable to touch anyone’s heart or soul. I identified with a sentiment 
of Juha Karhu who once remarked on the question as to what the most important 
thing in life is: “Certainly not jurisprudence!”III—although Juha’s remark, I think, 
stemmed not out of cynicism but rather of his love of life. To be sure, I do retain 
some of my cynicism regarding many legal topics. However, I have come to realize 
that law has potential for great and interesting debates when its examiner lifts the 
veil of bureaucratic formalism off their face. The discussion in this dissertation on 
law and sociotechnical change, I hope, vindicates me. As for drones, well, I hope I 
am forgiven for ending up with such a techno-industrial topic.
*
During my journey, I have greatly enjoyed the help of the community of legal 
scholars at the University of Lapland. First and foremost, I want to thank my 
supervisor Lotta Viikari whose sheer professionalism in all legal research I noticed 
already when writing my bachelor’s thesis in 2013. Whatever topic beyond her own 
research interests I decided to tackle, her support was unwavering. When writing 
grant applications, I could always rely on her recommendatory letter. She is also 
the one to thank for my involvement in unmanned civil aviation, starting with our 
research project with the Geological Survey of Finland in 2015.
The vacancy for the second supervisor remained unfilled to the very end. In the 
very beginning I had no idea whom I could ask, perhaps reflecting the difficulties 
with my original topic. Meanwhile, the present thesis was almost finished before I 
even considered going for another supervisor. Whether the quality of my work is 
severely impacted by a lack of cross-examination, which I of course hope it is not, I 
leave for the legal academia to decide.
Still, the combined efforts of many peers could be viewed as the unofficial 
second supervisor. Tomi Tuominen, who defended his excellent thesis in 2017, 
has greatly aided me in becoming a member of the academic community. Our 
extensive discussions over lunch, joint draft paper workshop, and joint teaching in 
II  Andrew Jackson Jihad, Survival Song. In People Who Can Eat People Are the Luckiest People in the 
World, track 3. Monte Sereno, CA: Asian Man Records (2007).
III  “Ei ainakaan juridiikka!” In an interview to Digesta, the publication of the Lappish law student 
organization Artikla. The exact number of the issue escapes me.
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international and EU law have always inspired me to push further on the academic 
path. Tomi has, of course, been quite the role model in academic pursuits, given 
his persistent approach to writing, reading, and discussing. Given our similar age, 
the term Doktorvater appears outlandish; perhaps Doktorbruder would be more 
appropriate. I also thank Tomi for serving as the custos in my dissertation’s halfway 
examination in 2018.
Concerning academic brothers, I extend much gratitude to Juhana Riekkinen and 
Anssi Kärki who begun their LLD project at around the same time as I did and 
who have since both defended their superb dissertations. Through these years, our 
solidarity has grown beyond the sphere of work onto a personal level, of which I 
am extremely glad. I expected to have colleagues when starting in the academia, but 
having made friends is all the more worthwhile. We seem quite like the 3 idiots, being 
able to co-author a piece on video games and a casual legal podcast. Here, I feel it 
is appropriate to also thank my closest friends outside the academia: Antti Hietala, 
Ville Rask, and Vili Tuominen. I am exceedingly thankful for your friendship and 
hospitality over the years.
Of the community of LLD students at the University of Lapland, Jenna Päläs 
and Kaisa-Maria Kimmel have also been tremendously helpful in clarifying what 
I want to say with my thesis. The dedication of both for conducting the highest 
quality of scholarship as well as their concern for the well-being of the Faculty and 
its people has always impressed me. Insightful comments by Anuradha Nayak, Olga 
Pushina, and Iiris Kestilä have been decisive in directing my focus at various stages. 
Outside the faculty, two academic professionals, Malte Krumm and Benjamyn Ian 
Scott, deserve much gratitude for having helped me step into the community of air 
law from the niche academic standpoint. Thanks also go to Jukka Hannola from the 
Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (Traficom) for the discussions on 
drones.
Three academics have served as my opponents during the journey. Matti Tupamäki 
(also from Traficom) conducted the halfway examination, while Anna Masutti 
(University of Bologna) and Riikka Koulu (University of Helsinki) conducted the 
final (pre-)examination. The comments provided by all three have been very valuable 
in finalizing the work, for which I am grateful; I am equally grateful for the superbly 
prompt responses to all requests and the timely fashion in which the comments were 
issued. Particularly, I extend my gratitude to Riikka who has agreed to act as my 
opponent in the defense.
I am glad to have served under two inspiring deans during my time at the Faculty 
of Law at the University of Lapland. When I started in 2014 (or, as a matter of fact, 
already when I started working on my LLB in 2008), Juha Karhu provided us all with 
plenty of inspiration to imagine legal realities beyond the doctrinal groundwork. He 
was followed in 2017 by Soili Nystén-Haarala whose encouraging words have aided 
me in completing the thesis and also understand the academia. In this context, I 
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find it only appropriate to thank the library of the University of Lapland, which has 
always acquired me the material I need.
Besides the University, several other institutions have generously helped me 
pursue a doctorate in law. Past teachers at all levels of education deserve my gratitude, 
as without a doubt their influence still echoes in everything I do. Regarding the LLD 
process itself, I thank the Olga and Kaarle Oskari Laitinen Foundation (Laitisen 
säätiö), the Finnish Lawyers’ Association (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys), the 
Association of Finnish Lawyers (Lakimiesliitto), and the March 25th Fund 
(Maaliskuun 25 päivän rahasto). In particular, the grants by the given institutions 
enabled me to spend several months in Leiden, The Netherlands, at the International 
Institute of Air and Space Law. The visit was also made possible by the welcoming 
attitude of Pablo Mendes de Leon and other staff at the Institute, of which I am 
thankful.
Ultimately, there are two people without whom I would not be writing this. My 
parents, Pirjo and Erkki, and by extension my grandparents and other relatives, have 
always guided me to strive for goodness, keep an open mind, and appreciate setbacks 
as learning opportunities. All three values have played a key part in this project, as 
the discussion above suggests. I suppose one final quote is in order here:
弁護士はね。ピンチのときほど ふてぶてしく笑うものよ。IV
While at times the inner workings of the academia and the nature of my work 
therein might have appeared esoteric to the two of you—which might as well be for 
us all—your support for my career and life in general has been unwavering. For this 
I sincerely thank you both.
Rovaniemi, on a calm September afternoon, 2020
Mikko T. Huttunen
IV  Translates officially as “The worst of times are when lawyers have to force their biggest smiles.” 
Recurring phrase in the Phoenix Wright: Ace Attorney game series.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Manned and Unmanned
The international and European system of civil1 air law2—the ”body of rules governing 
the use of airspace”3—like any field of law, has been developed in accordance with 
certain facts, policies, and principles. By the first, I refer to physical, economic, and 
other kinds of facts; by the second, to standards that set out a goal that is desirable in 
terms of its economic, political, or social effects; and by the third, to standards that 
should be observed because of justice, fairness, or another dimension of morality.4 
These three have served as a basis for air law as a body of rules, the use of such rules 
in professional practice, and the examination thereof in legal scholarship.
This constitutes air law as a universally recognized human achievement, the 
existence of which is based on its sufficient divergence from other professional and 
scientific structures5 and its unsolved, open-ended problems.6 In other words, air 
law is a field with its own structures and questions that are distinct from, say, the law 
of the sea, though similarities and connections exist. Air law, in its entirety, can also 
be regarded as a regulatory environment in which aviation related technologies are 
situated. It is a context that codes which acts are allowed, prohibited, encouraged, 
discouraged, incentivized, and so forth.7
One of the most central facts of modern civil aviation has been that it is virtually 
always manned aviation: the aircraft are operated from within the aircraft.8 In other 
words, one of the legal subjects of air law, the pilot, has commonly been located 
aboard the aircraft. The kind of aircraft that are designed to operate without a 
1  This study only focuses on civil aviation, as opposed to state aviation. See in detail below.
2  Air law has interchangeably been called aviation law, aerospace law, aeronautical law, law of airspace, 
and so forth. See Scott & Trimarchi 2020, p. 1. As described below, the present study focuses on aviation 
safety and security law, a subset thereof.
3  Diederiks-Verschoor 1983, p. 1. The same definition persists in later books based on the original one. 
See Mendes de Leon 2017, p. 1.
4  Dworkin 1967, p. 23.
5  The distinct nature of air law is often discussed in general studies of the field. See, e.g., Cooper 
1951/1968, p. 3; Haanappel 2003, pp. xiii–xvi; Havel & Sanchez 2014, pp. 5–6; Keenan, Lester & Martin 
1966, p. 25; Matte 1981, pp. 36–48; Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 1–2; Milde 2012, pp. 1–4; Scott & 
Trimarchi 2020, pp. 2–3.
6  See Kuhn 1962/1996, pp. x and 10.
7  See Brownsword & Somsen 2009, pp. 4–5.
8  For an overview, see, e.g. Grant 2017.
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pilot on board (unmanned aircraft systems, UAS—or drones9) and the use of such 
aircraft (unmanned aviation) have existed as kind of an anomaly10 on the fringes of 
modern aviation. The history of drones extends far further than manned aircraft, as 
some rudimentary devices were already created in classical antiquity11 and ancient 
China,12 and many early designs of aircraft were tested as unmanned.13 However, 
the age of modern aviation has been the age of manned aircraft rather than drones: 
manned aircraft have been the primary subjects and objects of aviation. One could 
say that the sociotechnical system of civil aviation is built on the premise of manned 
aviation.14 Indeed, the traditional perspective of unmanned aviation limits itself to 
radio-controlled model aircraft15 and military drones.16
The reason behind this is simply sociotechnical: it has to do with aviation 
technology and its related practices. The greatest benefits of aviation, besides the 
sheer pleasure of flying, lie in air transport and aerial work. Thus far, it has not been 
possible to reliably and safely, in terms of technology, conduct most such missions 
without having a pilot on board the aircraft. Unmanned aviation technology has 
been relatively expensive, difficult to operate, unsafe, and lacking useful applications. 
Available technology limits the kinds of aircraft and aviation infrastructure that can 
be manufactured and the kinds of operations that are possible using such equipment; 
accordingly, new technology creates new possibilities.17 For a long time, it has been 
difficult to find a use for drones on a large scale.18
Because of this, air law has focused on creating rules for manned aviation and 
solving the problems caused by such aviation; conversely, drones have not caused 
notable legal problems and therefore there has been little need to legislate them. 
This can clearly be seen by looking at legal materials, case law, and legal scholarship: 
the “normal science” or research tradition of air law.19 Consider, first, the very 
foundations of international air law. The 1919 Convention Relating to the Regulation 
of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention), the first multilateral Convention on aviation 
(drafted under the auspices of the League of Nations), originally concentrated only 
on manned aircraft. This is testified to by the amendment of the Convention in 
9  On terminology, see below and the first article of this dissertation (Huttunen 2017).
10  Kuhn 1962/1996, pp. 52–65.
11  See, e.g., Huffman 2005, pp. 82 and 570–579.
12  See, e.g., Needham 1965, pp. 568–602.
13  See, e.g., Gillispie 1983.
14  Civil aviation as a sociotechnical system is discussed in Vermaas et al. 2011, pp. 67–81.
15  See, e.g., Bowden 1946.
16  See, e.g., Sloggett 2014. For an early take on military drones, see also, e.g., Armitage 1988; Munson 
1988.
17  Bennett Moses 2003, p. 394; 2007a, p. 594; 2007b, p. 245.
18  There are some individual cases of drone use prior to the recent boom. For example, in Japan since the 
1990s, unmanned helicopters have been used in limited fashion in agriculture. See Sato 2003.
19  See Kuhn 1962/1996, p. 10.
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1929, when a single separate provision referring to aircraft “capable of being flown 
without a pilot” was added to the text.20 Convention on Commercial Aviation 
(Havana Convention), an early Pan-American treaty, was similarly created for the 
purposes of manned aviation. Though this was not explicitly stated, a giveaway is 
that it referred to aircrew being “employed on the aircraft”.21
The same goes for the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
Convention), which is a now universally accepted22 treaty, a kind of constitution of 
international aviation.23 Aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot (“pilotless 
aircraft”) have their own provision that requires such aircraft to obtain an authorization 
prior to flight (Article 8).24 The provision is the same as the one in the amended 
Paris Convention, which the Chicago one superseded. The development of safety 
(and security) standards, which the Convention designates to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO),25 has so far concentrated on creating the minimum 
requirements for manned rather than unmanned aviation. This goes for, inter alia, 
the Resolutions adopted by the ICAO Assembly, the safety and security related 
standards and recommended practices (SARPs), other documents, and programs 
which all significantly influence the development of air law.26
In the European Union (EU), the main expert body in the field of civil aviation is 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This Agency, which has been tasked 
with assisting the European Commission (the legislative body in aviation matters) 
in developing rules on the safety of civil aviation,27 has also focused its efforts on 
manned aviation. To date, the vast majority of EU rules on matters like airworthiness, 
air operations, aircrew, and so forth, are tailored for manned aircraft.28 Similarly, in 
domestic air law unmanned aircraft have been treated as an exceptional case. They 
have been regarded as being outside the realm of real aviation, operated virtually 
always by model aircraft hobbyists in a controlled environment. The operation of the 
few civil UAS has usually been designated to restricted environments rather than the 
shared, non-segregated airspace. Such lack of serious legislation testifies to the status 
of drones as outliers in air law.
20  Protocol Relating to Amendments to Articles 3, 5, 7, 15, 34, 37, 41, 42, and Final Clauses of the Aerial 
Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919, Art. 15, para. 2. See also Fiallos 2019, pp. 43–45.
21  Convention on Commercial Aviation, Art. 13, para. 2 (emphasis added)
22  The Convention has been ratified by 193 states. See Status of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation.
23  See generally, e.g., Abeyratne 2014; Havel & Sanchez 2014, pp. 28–68; Mendes de Leon 2017; Scott 
& Trimarchi 2020, pp. 31–56.
24  My take on the wording of the Article (“pilotless” and “without a pilot”) is critical. See below and 
Huttunen 2017.
25  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 37 et seq.
26  See the ICAO documents in the References.
27  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, ch. v.
28  See the EU documents in the References.
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The central role of manned aviation is also visible from how air law, as a field 
of science, is systematized and presented to the legal community. Treatises are 
drafted about the rules on manned aircraft, while rules on drones are treated as an 
afterthought, if at all. For example, one leading treatise makes no mention of the 
possibility of unmanned aviation.29 Another high quality introductory volume only 
discusses UAS on a few of its over five hundred pages.30 I do not consider this a 
shortcoming on part of these superb books; after all, writing a general treatise on a 
particular field of law regardless entails abridging material. The fact that drones are 
left without much attention merely goes to show the paradigmatic status manned 
aviation holds in air law.
1.2. The Rise of Drones
Air law has been a very cumulative enterprise as a profession and normal science. By 
this, I here refer to how it has enhanced the ability of professionals and academics 
to solve practical legal puzzles pertaining to aviation. It has created a precise and 
convincing way of arguing about questions relating to, for example, flight safety, the 
liability of air carriers, and the jurisdiction of states. Yet the approach and scope of 
air law has remained largely uniform and unchanged in its focus on manned aviation. 
This has to do with its paradigmatic nature, in which existing facts as well as adopted 
policies, principles, and rules form the substantive and methodological limits that 
are commonly followed.31
In recent years, however, the amount and functionality of unmanned aviation has 
greatly increased. In other words, the practical capabilities of humans have extended 
through the development of drone technology.32 This has rendered less obvious 
some of the facts and policies on which the system of air law ultimately relies on. 
During the first two decades of the 21st century, drones have turned from a gimmick 
of a few enthusiasts into viable products with mass appeal. Already a few years ago, 
millions of consumer grade drones were being sold every year around the world.33 
New aviators are thus entering the airspace on a daily basis.
The massive increase in unmanned civil aviation represents a sociotechnical 
change34 in civil aviation. On the side of the technical, the technology employed 
in aircraft has become more functional, smaller, and cheaper. Chief technological 
innovations, which have aided in enabling the mass production of easy to fly drones, 
29  Havel & Sanchez 2014.
30  Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 13, 312–313, 347–349, and 360.
31  See Kuhn 1962/1996, pp. 35–42 and 52; Laudan 1977.
32  Cf. Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 245–246 (cit. Schön 1967, p. 1).
33  See, e.g., European Drones Outlook Study, p. 8.
34  The meaning of this concept is explained in the following Chapters.
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include the lithium polymer battery (lightweight and durable), brushless motor, 
miniature scale electronic stabilization, and global positioning system (GPS).35 At 
the same time, the smaller size and improved quality of digital cameras and sensors 
have advanced the use of drones in photography and other types of imaging. As two 
authors have pointed out, drones seem to have led aviation into the third industrial 
revolution. This revolution emphasizes miniature digital technology, particularly 
the acquisition, processing, transport, and exploitation of data, rather than the sheer 
movement of physical objects.36 Finally, in a globalized economy, it has become easy 
for manufacturers to introduce their products directly into a worldwide market at a 
low price point. The drone market is indeed expanding extremely rapidly.37
On the side of the social, the use of unmanned aircraft has become popular among 
consumers, which signifies a change from the idea that operating in the airspace is an 
exclusive activity. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in highly professional 
and commercial drone applications, some of which are completely new to civil 
aviation. This is due to some of the characteristics of drones, such as small size, built-
in interfacing with mobile devices, nimble maneuvering, and automation.
Pursuant to a study conducted by the Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR), applications of drones discussed in media include public safety and 
security, aerial imagery, agriculture, mapping and surveying, energy industry, real 
estate, and delivery. Among other applications, it has become possible to use drones 
to inspect infrastructure, conduct aerial surveys, analyze the health of crops, deliver 
parcels and medicine, and transfer information when a natural disaster occurs.38 
Drones also have potential to be used in air transport.39 This has made them an 
intriguing tool for various business sectors. The diverse applications of drones lead 
to a great number of scenarios with their own benefits and risks.40
1.3. Legal Challenges and Reactions
The rise of unmanned aviation has posed a major challenge to legal systems around 
the world: how should the legislator react to such a sociotechnical change? Some 
of the issues with drones have to do with the law on privacy and data protection. 
Within the European Union, drones equipped with cameras or other sensors 
have the potential to violate Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection 
35  For a detailed description of the development, see Desmond 2018, especially p. 182 et seq.
36  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 14 and 17–19.
37  See, e.g., DRONEII Drone Market Report 2019–2014; Drones 101; EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 
5 and 27–28; European Drones Outlook Study, passim.
38  Ibid., pp. 8–9.
39  Fiallos 2019, pp. 34–35.
40  See Marchant 2011b, p. 199.
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Regulation, GDPR). This is because they can collect information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person, which is regarded as personal data.41
In the context of air law, however, perhaps the most pressing issues have related 
to aviation safety and security.42 How should drone operators be approved, if at all? 
How should we legislate the airworthiness of drones, remote pilots, or the use of 
airspace? How can we prevent drones from causing harm to property, humans, and 
other things external to the aircraft, including acts like terrorism and smuggling?43 
How can we protect drones or their payload from physical and cyber interference, 
like hijacking, weaponry, and jamming?44 Are there applicable existing rules, and 
what kind of issues does their potential application raise?
These concerns have overshadowed those pertaining to the organization of 
domestic and international air carriage, such as whether existing bilateral agreements 
on air carriage allow unmanned aviation, and whether treaties on air carrier liability 
should be applied to drones. This is because air carriage using UAS is still only a 
developing industry. In fact, it has been argued that, without savings provided by 
automation or autonomy, using drones for the given purpose may not come to 
fruition at all.45 Safety rules, on the other hand, also concern aerial work (special 
operations) and leisure flying which are the most widespread applications of drones 
thus far and do not involve air carriage. Furthermore, safety, if anything, is the most 
traditional and critical interest46 that air law aims to protect.
From the perspective of drones, the problem with existing aviation safety 
and security law lies in the factual assumptions on which it is based. It has 
been designed for aircraft that carry a human on board, are usually a long-time 
investment, commonly operate from an aerodrome, can be identified visually, can 
only be operated by trained personnel, and can carry particular kind of equipment. 
This can be seen in nearly all its aspects. In contrast, drones have no pilot on board 
and many of them are cheaper, have a much shorter lifespan, can operate from any 
location, are difficult to identify from afar, can be operated by laymen, and can 
only carry a limited amount of extra equipment. Existing rules, hence, display a 
lack of concern for the characteristics of drones and the possible transformations 
unmanned aviation may bring about in the future. The rules carry with them 
their “operational and ideological baggage.”47 In matters like airworthiness and 
operational approval, the traditional procedures appear unsuited for consumer 
41  See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 4, para. 1.
42  On the distinction between aviation safety (also known as flight safety) and aviation security, see 
below. Here, I generally refer to the relevant rules as “aviation safety and security law”.
43  See Rassler 2016, pp. 13–60.
44  See Altawy & Youssef 2016, pp. 8–14.
45  Havel & Mulligan 2015, pp. 114–116.
46  See Cockfield 2004, passim; Cockfield & Pridmore 2007, passim.
47  Stokes 2012, p. 94.
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grade UAS. Security-wise the airport-centric model fails to address threats coming 
from elsewhere.
The problem is not that existing safety and security rules are designed for 
outmoded technology48 per se. Manned aircraft are constantly being developed 
and their latest models in many aspects represent the pinnacle of modern aviation 
technology. Furthermore, air law has been continuously under development 
throughout its existence. It did not spring out of the minds of lawmakers in an 
instant and complete fashion;49 rather, it has responded to many changes in 
aviation technology, including for example the introduction of airships, airliners, 
and helicopters, as well as the development of the turboprop and the jet engine, air 
traffic control, fly-by-wire, and supersonic flight. The problem is rather that drones 
present many unique features and scenarios that do not neatly fit the preconceived 
notions of the existing system.
There are many ways to perceive the problem. One might call it the problem of 
regulatory disconnection: technology advances too fast for law to keep up. UAS 
have emerged quite quickly as a mainstream platform and have certain controversial 
characteristics, which has caused a mismatch with existing rules.50 One could 
equally call it a case of the well-recognized “pacing problem”.51 There are also more 
specific typologies to describe the situation, including concepts like uncertainty, 
over-inclusiveness, and obsolescence.52 In summary, the legislator has been forced to 
tackle two problems. First, to what extent does or could existing aviation safety and 
security law apply to unmanned aviation, and what kind of issues does or would it 
entail? Second, what kind of legislative action must be taken to fix the issues?
The situation could hardly be described as a crisis, as the problems created by drones 
appear to be solvable through means of positive law.53 Accordingly, legislators at the 
international and regional level54 have taken steps to bring drones within the scope 
of aviation safety and security law. The International Civil Aviation Organization has 
primarily been interested in the very highest end of operations, since its mandate is 
generally limited to international aviation.55 Its legislative project on UAS is largely 
48  See Bennett Moses 2003, p. 396.
49  See Tranter 2017, p. 6.
50  See Brownsword 2008, pp. 160–166 (cit. Barlow 1994).
51  Marchant 2011a; 2011b. But see Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015, p. 4 (cit. Jasanoff [ed.] 2004).
52  See Bennett Moses 2003, pp. 396–401; 2007a, pp. 594–595; 2007b, p. 248; Drahos 1985, p. 280.
53  See Tranter 2017, pp. 8–9. See also Bennett Moses 2013a, p. 40.
54  As explained below, examining the national responses to drones mostly falls outside the scope of this study.
55  Pursuant to Article 44 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the “objectives of the 
Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation” (emphasis 
added). However, ICAO has not established a clear distinction between international and domestic civil 
aviation. Recommendations on domestic operations may be issued and international standards have a 
spillover effect, despite the lack of clear competence. See Huang 2009, pp. 66–69 and 227–228. In more 
abstract terms, this has to do with the normative pluralism of aviation safety and security law. See below.
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explained in the 2015 ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems. The Organization had already prior to the Manual amended some of the 
safety rules annexed to the Chicago Convention and, at the time of writing this, is 
working to issue more amendments.
European Union, meanwhile, has sought to legislate all kinds of drones flying 
within the territory of its Member States (MSs). One of the most crucial steps was 
taken in 2015, when the European Aviation Safety Agency issued EASA Advance 
Notice of Proposed Amendment 2015-10. In the document, the Agency suggested 
creating rules for drones in a risk and performance-based manner in three categories: 
open, specific, and certified.56 Since then, the plans have come into fruition, as in 
2018 the new EASA Basic Regulation laid down essential requirements for drones,57 
and in 2019 the Union adopted operational as well as design and manufacturing 
regulations for the first two categories.58 The current focus of EASA is on developing 
rules on the certified category and the management of unmanned air traffic 
(U-space). Drafts for legislating the latter topic went into circulation in early 2020, 
which anticipates their impending adoption, albeit airspace and defense industries 
have voiced some criticism.59
On the face of it, legislating drones appears simply a matter of drafting new 
rules. However, on a closer look, the project has been much more complex. In the 
undertakings of ICAO and the EU, we can detect several approaches to legislating 
unmanned aviation. For long, the legislators decided to remain passive, not doing 
anything to address the problem. More recently, though, there has been an explicit 
attempt to replicate and emulate existing aviation safety and security rules and 
instruments in the legislation of drones.60 However, with regard to certain subject 
matters, it has been necessary to create altogether alternative rules and instruments 
that deviate from existing ones. Finally, though least commonly, legislators have 
hinted that the existing system could at some point be transformed altogether to 
better reflect contemporary digital technology. Often the adopted solutions represent 
a mix of these approaches. This variance in legal approaches to the sociotechnical 
change caused by civil drones gives interesting insight into the relationship between 
law and technology.
56  See below for details.
57  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Annex IX.
58  See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/947.
59  See ASD Position Paper: The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) Regulation.
60  By instrument (in the last two articles: institution) I refer to, for example, airworthiness certification, 
which is a distinguishable collection of rules that serve a unified set of purposes.
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1.4. Existing Studies
In recent years, the increase in unmanned civil aviation has provoked several legal 
treatises and dozens of academic legal articles on the topic.61 From the perspective 
of European air law, two volumes in English62 stand out. The first of these is the 
2016 collection of essays edited by Benjamyn Ian Scott, titled The Law of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems: An Introduction to the Current and Future Regulation under 
National, Regional and International Law. The second and more recent one is the 
International Regulation of Non-Military Drones, written by Anna Masutti and 
Filippo Tomasello, published in late 2018.
From the viewpoint of law and society in general, drones are under focus in The 
Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 
edited in 2016 by Bart Custers. A similar perspective is taken in Drones and 
Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications for Security and Surveillance, 
edited in the same year by Aleš Završnik. In 2019, Fernando Fiallos defended his 
PhD thesis titled Legal perspectives on the cross-border operations of unmanned aircraft 
systems, which deals with the application of the Chicago regime and the regime on 
international air transport to UAS.
German jurisprudence likewise offers several treatises. Perhaps the first modern 
dissertation on civil drones was done already in 2012 by Claudia Kornmeier, focusing 
on UAS and data protection. Wolfgang Kutschera discussed the law on the use of 
drones in Austria and the EU in his 2016 dissertation, while Milan Plücken’s 2017 
dissertation concerned the ICAO and EU rules on drones. Other books include 
Silvio Hänsenberger’s thesis on civil liability for damages caused by drones according 
to Swiss law, and Benedikt Groh’s comparative study on drone rules in Germany and 
the United States of America.63 Two non-dissertational books on drones have also 
been authored: the first by Elmar Giemulla, Heiko van Schnydel, and Achim Friedl,64 
and the second by Markus Christen, Michel Guillaume, Maximilian Jablonowski, 
Peter Lenhart, and Kurt Moll.65
Outside Europe, several volumes have been drafted. Donna Dulo’s 2016 
Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace: Critical Issues, Technology, and the Law 
is a comprehensive take on a wide range of legal issues. The discussion focuses chiefly 
on the federal and state law of United States of America. The same goes for Timothy 
Ravich’s 2017 Commercial Drone Law: Digest of U.S. and Global UAS Rules, Polices, 
61  A vast number of legal and non-legal studies on military drones, falling outside the scope of this 
dissertation, have also been conducted on drones.
62  Due to linguistic limitations, a comprehensive overview of all legal studies on drones unfortunately 
cannot be provided in this section.
63  See Groh 2019; Hänsenberger 2018; Kornmeier 2012; Kutschera 2016; Plücken 2017.
64  Giemulla, Schnydel & Friedl 2017.
65  Christen, Guillaume, Jablonowski, Lenhart & Moll 2018.
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and Practices. Meanwhile, Henry Perritt’s and Eliot Sprague’s Domesticating Drones: 
The Technology, Law, and Economics of Unmanned Aircraft (2017) is drafted from a 
more global perspective. Two Australian authors, David Hodgkinson and Rebecca 
Johnston, authored in 2018 a book called Aviation Law and Drones: Unmanned 
Aircraft and the Future of Aviation, which deals with the topic in various ways.
When it comes to articles, drones have been under serious legal discussion at least 
since 2009. In that year, the North Dakota Law Review devoted a special issue to the 
regulation of UAS.66 In 2015, the DePaul Law Review did the same on the basis of 
a symposium.67 Several pieces have appeared on air law journals, such as Journal of 
Air Law and Commerce68 and Annals of Air & Space Law.69 In Europe, drones and 
law have been analyzed in, most notably, Air & Space Law,70 Zeitschrift für Luft- und 
Weltraumrecht,71 and The Aviation and Space Journal.72
While the aforementioned studies are valuable contributions, they are somewhat 
lacking when it comes to what I consider the two key issues with drones: first, the 
exact problems with existing safety and security rules in relation to unmanned 
aviation; and second, the types of solutions the legislators have presented to solve 
the problems. Furthermore, the studies do not much reflect on the new rules enacted 
by the EU. This is only natural, as most of the studies were published before there 
was any definite indication about the upcoming rules. On a theoretical level, the 
aforementioned studies do not attempt to systematically understand the relationship 
between legislation and the changes in civil aviation.73
1.5. Research Questions and Arguments
The core elements of this article-based dissertation are the increase in unmanned 
civil aviation and the considerations it entails in terms of law and sociotechnical 
change. On an overarching level, the study deals with two questions:
I. What issues can sociotechnical change cause in relation to existing law?
II. What legislative approaches can be used to solve the issues caused by 
sociotechnical change?
66  See Jenks 2009; Marshall 2009; Rapp 2009; Ravich 2009; Vacek 2009.
67  See Havel & Mulligan 2015; Marshall 2015; Niemi 2015; Ross 2015; Wexler 2015.
68  See, e.g., Bellows 2013; Fox 2017; Kapnik 2012; Migala 2017.
69  See Archambault & Mâzouz 2015; Castillo-Ruiz 2015; Schubert 2014.
70  See chronologically Masutti 2009; Kaiser 2011; Michaelides-Mateou & Erotokritou 2014; Straub, 
Vacek & Nordlie 2014; Abeyratne 2016; MacPherson 2018.
71  See chronologically, e.g., Kaiser 2006; Giemulla 2007; Maslaton 2018.
72  See chronologically Roma 2014; Scott 2015; Carta, Senatore & Tomasello 2018; Masutti 2018.
73  See, however, Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 7–13 (discussing the disruptive nature of drones).
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To discuss these questions, I look into several issues that the increasing use of 
drones has presented and the legal changes such issues have initiated. In other words, 
I use drones as a case to provide insight into the general questions. Hence, the given 
questions are dealt with in the study in a more specific form:
I. What issues has the increase in unmanned civil aviation caused in relation to 
existing aviation safety and security law?
II. What legislative approaches have ICAO and the EU used to solve the issues 
caused by the increase in unmanned civil aviation?
In other words, I first assess existing law on aviation safety and security from the 
viewpoint of drones; second, I analyze the legislative solutions enacted to solve 
the issues caused by drones. This is an effort in systematizing aviation safety and 
security law, and the relationship between manned and unmanned civil aviation. In 
addition to the main questions, the study also seeks to provide some insights about 
the advantages and shortcomings of the new rules. However, these insights are not 
emphasized nor generalized, as the new rules have not been sufficiently tested in 
practice. The arguments of the dissertation are as follows:
1) Existing aviation safety and security law has primarily been designed for 
manned civil aviation.
2) Recently, the quality and quantity of unmanned civil aviation has increased, 
causing a sociotechnical change.
3) The change has caused the following issues in relation to existing aviation safety 
and security law: vacuity, misclassification, over- and under-inclusiveness, and 
ineffectiveness. The change may also cause some rules to become irrelevant in 
the future.
4) In solving the issues, ICAO and the EU have used the following legislative 
approaches: passivity, replication, emulation, and alternative rules. The 
approach of transformation may be used in the future.
5) Examining the case of unmanned civil aviation improves our understanding 
of the general relationship between law and sociotechnical change.74
6) As the legislative project is still ongoing and as the new rules are not 
completely without issues themselves, aviation safety and security law must 
continue being developed to address the change.
74  The meaning of the aforementioned issues and approaches will be explained below.
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1.6. Structure and Content
The dissertation consists of the present synthesis and four research articles. 
The synthesis provides an overview of the argument as well as the underlying 
philosophical, theoretical, and methodological premises of the study. The synthesis 
both summarizes and builds on the articles, adding details and contextualizing their 
findings. Particularly, the synthesis develops the arguments and thus the theory 
concerning law and sociotechnical change.
Chapter 2 explains the philosophical, theoretical, and methodological 
foundations of the study. It outlines how the study understands the concepts of law, 
legislation, and regulation, including law’s epistemological and ethical connections. 
The distinction between rules, standards, principles, and recommendations and the 
significance thereof to the study is also discussed. The Chapter continues with an 
explanation of the research methods involved in the dissertation, including the use of 
the doctrinal method of legal scholarship and the inspiration gained from case study 
methodology with regard to the theoretical contributions of this synthesis. As will be 
explained, the study involves both theoretical testing and development concerning 
law and sociotechnical change, using the increase in unmanned civil aviation as a case. 
The aim is to create a basis for all the arguments of the study, particularly the fifth 
argument, which is that examining the case of drones improves our understanding of 
the general relationship between law and sociotechnical change.
This argument is also the centerpiece of Chapter 3, which presents the theoretical 
framework of the study: a model of legislation and sociotechnical change. The 
Chapter begins with an explanation of the model in its entirety, starting with the 
question concerning the existence of sociotechnical change. Second, it presents the 
ways in which existing scholarship has understood the legal problems created by 
sociotechnical change. Particularly, the focus is on the four reasons for legal change 
presented by Lyria Bennett Moses in several articles. This is followed by an analysis 
of how her typology can be developed. Thereafter, the Chapter establishes a five-
sided typology of the approaches available to legislate sociotechnical change. The 
limitations of the typology are then examined with regard to, inter alia, overarching 
theories about technology governance.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus of the study onto drones. It begins by analyzing two 
key concepts of the study, namely aviation safety and security, followed by a section 
that compares the characteristics of manned and unmanned civil aviation. The 
discussion is rather cursory, since it is impossible and unnecessary for the purposes 
of this study to comprehensively explain all the details of civil aviation. The objective 
of the Chapter is to provide a sufficient basis for the first three arguments: the way 
existing aviation safety and security law has been designed, the sociotechnical change 
caused by the rising quality and quantity of unmanned civil aviation, and the legal 
issues caused by the change. These arguments are substantiated by contrasting the 
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characteristics of drones with the approach of the existing rules, highlighting the 
types of issues that arise. The subsections are based on different subfields of aviation 
safety and security law.
The fifth Chapter focuses on international and European legislative responses 
and approaches. The Chapter begins by giving a chronological outline—up to how 
it is at the time of writing this—of the legislative situation. This is followed by an 
analysis of how the new rules attempt to solve the issues identified in Chapter 4. 
In particular, Chapter 5 substantiates the fourth argument, which concerns the 
legislative approaches used by ICAO and the EU. Additionally, the examination of 
the new rules provides evidence toward the sixth argument, which calls for legislators 
to continue developing law to address the sociotechnical change.
Chapter 6 reiterates and completes the discursive arc of the study. This includes 
the research questions, the discussion seeking to answer the questions, and the 
conclusions drawn from the discussion. The Chapter is chiefly a summary of the 
core aspects of previous Chapters, but it is structured in accordance with the model 
of legislation and sociotechnical change rather than the substantive subfields of 
aviation safety and security. The Chapter thus seeks to finalize the study of drones as 
a case the relationship between law and sociotechnical change. In this, the Chapter 
primarily serves the fifth and sixth arguments, advancing slightly beyond the 
discussion in the previous Chapters.
The synthesis is followed by the references and, most importantly, the research 
articles. The first article is called Unmanned, Remotely Piloted, or Something Else? 
Analysing the Terminological Dogfight.75 It was published in Air & Space Law in 
2017 and deals with the theme of the study on a fundamental level. Several different 
terms have been used to describe and legislate drones throughout their existence: 
drone and unmanned aircraft system, as employed here, but also unmanned aerial 
vehicle, remotely piloted aircraft, remotely operated vehicle, and so forth. Various 
legislative bodies have not been able to come up with a single, definitive term that 
would encapsulate the kind of aircraft we are talking about. It would appear irrelevant 
which term is used, but on a closer look a problem appears: different terms have been 
assigned different meanings, which leads to differences in their scope of application. 
By introducing a misplaced concept, legal gaps may be formed and solving drone-
related problems may become more difficult. Ultimately, like in this dissertation as 
a whole, I favor the term “unmanned aircraft systems”, since it encapsulates all types 
of aircraft that are operated without a pilot on board, and since it properly reveals 
the distributed nature of drones. However, I equally point out that the term “drone” 
must be accepted as part of the public discourse and can be used to communicate 
with the general public. This has led me to employ it as a shorthand in other parts 
of the study, too.
75  Huttunen 2017.
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The first article is an outlier in that it does not devote much attention to discussing 
the substantive provisions of traditional air law or the new rules for drones, as is done 
in the other three articles. Despite this, the paper clearly falls within the ambit of the 
study. It begins from the observation that while terminology for manned aircraft is 
established, this is not the case with drones; sociotechnical change can thus cause 
issues already on a conceptual level. Furthermore, the paper is an indispensable 
contribution as the starting point for the study. Without first understanding the 
object of study, writing on the substantive law on drones would have been hindered 
by conceptual confusion. Indeed, all the following articles make an immediate 
reference to the first one.76
The second article, The U-space Concept,77 was published in Air & Space Law 
two years after the first one. It moves on to discuss the theme of the study on a 
substantive level. It is based on the observation that the integration of drones 
into the airspace has been challenging. It is difficult for drones to follow many 
requirements pertaining to manned aviation because, for instance, they are so 
numerous, easy to fly, and inexpensive. Furthermore, as mentioned, the operational 
functions and environment of drones differ from those of manned aviation. Hence, 
drone traffic is prone to create issues relating to safety, airspace management, and the 
enforcement of law—issues which the existing rules are unfit to tackle. In Europe, 
EASA’s solution has been to embrace the concept of U-space, on which the article 
focuses. The core argument of the paper is that the digital, flexible, interoperable, 
and automatic character of U-space is necessary in the handing of large amounts 
of low level air traffic. Still, the implementation of such a system on a massive scale 
requires solving quite a few issues.
The third article, Drone Operations in the Specific Category: A Unique Approach 
to Aviation Safety,78 was written during the spring of 2019 and published in 
The Aviation & Space Journal in the same year in August. The approach of the 
paper follows the structure of the thesis, as it deals with the conflict between 
the traditional rules of air law and UAS; substantively, the article deals with 
operational aviation safety. The main point of the article is to compare how safety 
elements, including the authorization of operators, the airworthiness of aircraft, 
and the competency of pilots are legislated in existing air law and in the European 
Union’s new specific category of drone operations. Particularly, the article focuses 
on the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) method. I argue that the 
SORA differs greatly from the traditional multilayered approach, since it seeks to 
holistically incorporate various elements into one process. On the positive side, 
the method is flexible and understandable for drone operators; on the negative 
76  Huttunen 2019a, p. 70; 2019b, p. 2; 2019c, p. 83.
77  Huttunen 2019a.
78  Huttunen 2019b.
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side, the method might be too simple, permissive, and case-specific. Despite these 
shortcomings, though, I argue that the safety approach of the specific category 
represents a laudable legal innovation that will aid in integrating drones into the 
shared airspace.
At the very end of the dissertation, we arrive at the question of security. Written 
before but published after the third article, the fourth paper (Civil unmanned aircraft 
systems and security: The European approach79) discusses the given issue in the Journal 
of Transportation Security. The purpose of the article is to analyze how the new 
EU rules on UAS affect the intentional misuse of such aircraft as well as unlawful 
interference targeting them. I conclude that the latter threat is better handled by the 
rules than the former. The overarching problem with regard to intentional misuse, 
like terrorism and smuggling, is that the rules assume compliance: rogue pilots can 
simply ignore their obligations. However, enforcement is hindered by the fact that 
most drones are operated from outside aerodromes and that the pilot is separate 
from the aircraft. To these issues, I propose increasing security through the adoption 
of anti-drone technology, which indeed has been already done at multiple locations. 
While I suggest the EU to consider making such technology mandatory at airports 
exceeding a to-be-decided threshold, the most important takeaway is for states to 
recognize the importance of protecting critical locations for the sake of national 
security.
1.7. Inclusions and Exclusions
This dissertation excludes discussion on several themes pertaining to the law 
on unmanned aircraft systems. In accordance with the title and the very first 
sentence, the focus is solely on civil aircraft, excluding state aircraft. Whenever 
the study refers to aircraft or aviation, whether manned or unmanned, it means 
civil aircraft or civil aviation.80 State aircraft include at least, per Article 3 of the 
Chicago Convention, “[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services”. In 
accordance with ICAO’s position, the study regards civil aircraft simply as aircraft 
other than state aircraft, that is, aircraft used in other than the given government 
services.81 Obviously, the exclusion stems from the fact that state aircraft are 
not principally subject to the international and European rules that the study 
examines. Unless a state decides to subject its aircraft to such rules, they fall under 
somewhat different ones. These rules, which encompass the whole sphere of safety 
79  Huttunen 2019c.
80  At certain key points, the concept of “civil” is regardless used to emphasize the scope of the study.
81  ICAO Working Paper LC/29-WP/2-1: Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, p. 17, in fine. See 
also, e.g., Abeyratne 2014, pp. 51–73. In the context of drones, see Fiallos 2019, pp. 58–67.
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and security, are based on national law and standardization by military bodies 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), depending on each state’s 
military arrangements.
Perhaps the most noticeable theme omitted from the study is privacy and data 
protection.82 The exclusion is noteworthy because some of the problems with 
civil UAS have to do with their capability to collect personal data. The exclusion 
may appear unsatisfactory from the perspective of drone operators. In order to 
comprehensively grasp what is permitted in operations that can invade privacy or 
utilize technology that collects personal data, one must also be aware of rules that 
are outside the ambit of aviation safety and security law. Additionally, as hinted 
above, increasing the capability of civil aircraft to collect personal data is part of the 
sociotechnical change caused by drones.
Despite the importance of the issue, the reasoning behind the exclusion is justified 
in terms of scope. Systematically speaking, aviation safety and security law is a field of 
law clearly distinguishable from the law on privacy and data protection: the purpose 
and scope of these legal regimes is different, which allows treating them separately.83 
The choice to focus on the safety perspective is supported, first, by its primacy: as 
noted, the primary legislative challenge with drones has been their safe use among 
manned aircraft. The second reason for focusing on the safety perspective is its broad 
scope: it also encompasses (the many) use cases in which privacy or personal data is 
of no concern.
Another factor to consider is the strength of the arguments presented in the study. 
Given the limitations of writing a dissertation, discussing privacy and data protection 
would essentially entail less emphasis on the substantive topics of safety and security. 
This could result in a more expansive but less convincing case both doctrinally and 
theoretically. Finally, the privacy and data protection implications of drones have 
already been discussed in legal literature and reports in a doctrinal manner.84 This 
leaves us with examining them theoretically as part of the sociotechnical change in 
civil aviation, which could be seen as an opportunity for future studies.
This dissertation focuses on the legislating of UAS at the international and 
European85 level. The dissertation only examines written law, as opposed to case law, 
for a very simple reason. At the international or EU level, there have been to my 
knowledge no legal cases concerning aviation safety and security law. While there 
probably have been such disputes at the national level, attempting to discover any 
82  See Privacy Code of Conduct: A practical guide to privacy and data protection requirements for drone 
operators and pilots. See also, e.g., Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 219–228.
83  Whether upholding these regimes as separate (in the context of drones) is the optimal legislative 
strategy is a meta level question worth considering but simply did not fit within the scope of this study.
84  See above regarding existing studies.
85  By European, I here refer to the Member States of the European Union in addition to the non-Member 
States who have and possibly will adopt the drone rules developed by EASA and adopted by the Union.
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such cases from all the Member States would have been an effort beyond the scope 
of this study.86 While the case studied is the increase in drone aviation in European 
airspace in particular, it is necessary to investigate international rules, too, as they 
guide legislation at the regional level.87 Internationally, the focus is on the Chicago 
Convention and, more specifically, documents enacted by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization:88 SARPs, a few drone-specific recommendatory documents, 
and a few other documents like Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS). The 
last are only explored cursorily.89
The choice to examine such documents is obvious, as ICAO is the most central 
party in developing international rules on aviation safety and security. While the 
Chicago Convention recognizes the sovereignty of states in their airspace,90 it 
also mandates the Organization to adopt and amend, as may be necessary, SARPs 
and procedures dealing with nearly every aspect of civil aviation.91 This is based 
on the necessity of having minimum safety and security rules at the international 
level, which enables states to recognize each other’s competency to ensure safety 
through documents like airworthiness certificates. The broad mandate of ICAO 
has resulted in a large variety of instruments that should be taken into account in 
every discussion on aviation safety and security. Besides ICAO, the study considers 
some of the work of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems 
( JARUS), to the extent such work has been or has the potential to be adopted 
by ICAO or the EU. JARUS is, per its own words, an international expert group 
that consists of national authorities and industry stakeholders, which has created 
recommendations on several aspects of operating drones.92
The choice to focus on European rules, as opposed to those of another regional 
arrangement or some major jurisdictions, like the US or China, comes primarily 
from the fact that I conducted this study in Finland, a MS of the Union. The choice 
to focus purely on European Union rules, as opposed to including European states 
86  Finding such cases is burdensome for several reasons. First, there are differences in how MSs handle 
legal disputes, making it hard to find the body in charge of such cases; second, accessing court documents 
as a foreigner is a challenge in itself; and third, I lack the linguistic skills to understand the decisions of 
the vast majority of jurisdictions. It is also worth noting that none of the national cases discovered in this 
manner may have had anything to do with unmanned aviation.
87  See Chapter 2 for a short note about the normative pluralism of aviation safety and security law.
88  On ICAO generally, see Havel & Sanchez 2014, pp. 55–68 and 177–182; Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 
34–37 and 291–324; Scott & Trimarchi 2020, pp. 57–81.
89  ICAO also ensures safety through guidance material, the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme 
(USOAP), the Universal Security Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA), 
safety and security management programs, and by instituting safety oversight responsibilities on states. 
See Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 296–297; Fiallos 2019, pp. 151–152.
90  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 1.
91  Ibid., Art. 37.
92  JARUS: Who We Are. JARUS’s recommendations by themselves are not legislation, and this study 
does not regard them as such.
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that are not MSs, comes from the fact that the Union comprises the vast majority 
of European states. Furthermore, one must recall that the safety (and, to an extent, 
security) rules are developed by the European Aviation Safety Agency, membership 
in which is open to European non-EU states that have made an accession agreement 
with the Union.93 This, for now, includes states parties to the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA): Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. The first 
three have accessed EASA through membership in the European Economic Area 
(EEA),94 while the Swiss have their own arrangement.95 Certain other states, like 
Ukraine, also implement EU aviation rules through working arrangements as Pan-
European Partners (PANEP) of EASA.96
There are also other reasons to focus on EU rules. The EU rulemaking effort 
affects hundreds of millions of potential end users, consolidates the viewpoints 
of divergent states, and contains many legislative innovations. It is a particularly 
worthwhile framework to examine. An interesting prospect would be to study how 
the pan-European rules are ultimately implemented at the national level, but such 
a project is only possible once national practice concerning the new drone rules 
begins to emerge.
In terms of EU documents, the most important one is the EASA Basic Regulation. 
It provides the Agency with its mandate to develop implementing and delegated 
regulations, and it contains numerous essential safety standards. Besides it, the 
study explores Commission regulations on matters central to the topics studied: 
airworthiness, air operations, airspace, licensing, and of course drones, on which 
the most recent regulations focus on. Since the study has been conducted during the 
Union’s legislative process for drones, at times it refers to the drafts of and proposals 
for rules that have since been adopted.
As international and European rules are under focus, the synthesis and the articles 
largely disregard national legislative, administrative, and judicial action on drones. 
Perhaps the most significant exception to this is the first article in which the practice 
of the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is accounted for when 
discussing the terminology surrounding drones. This is because the terminological 
discussion required comprehensively considering all the terms used for UAS. Some 
references to the regulating of drones by the FAA and other national administrative 
bodies can also be found in other footnotes. They illustrate the points being made 
but do not represent the main legal content under examination.
93  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 129.
94  See Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 179/2004; Decision of the EEA Joint Committee 
No 163/2011; Agreement on the European Economic Area, Annex XIII. The most recent EASA Basic 
Regulation is yet to be incorporated into the Agreement.
95  Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport.
96  Working Arrangement between the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the State Aviation 
Administration of Ukraine (SAAU).
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It is worth noting that the provisions of the Chicago Convention and SARPs 
need only be applied to international aviation97 per the scope of the Chicago regime. 
However, since safety and security SARPs are commonly followed in national 
aviation, too, the study does not make a consistent effort at distinguishing whether 
the drone operates nationally or internationally. Neither does the study discuss 
whether a drone operation is international if it takes place within the airspace of a 
single state but the remote pilot is located in another state.98 It is simply noted, at 
times, that some legal issues are not as pressing in international aviation as they are 
domestically, and that some approaches are more sensible when taking into account 
ICAO’s focus on international, high-end drone operations.
The exclusion of domestic law stems mainly from the high level of international 
and European standardization in aviation safety and, to an extent, security. At the 
international level, as explained below in more detail, states commonly adhere to 
ICAO’s standards and recommended practices. The SARPs, albeit quite tentative 
at this stage with regard to UAS, represent the big picture and dictate the course 
of national legislation. At the European level, the EU—as guided by EASA as the 
expert body—has uniformly created binding rules on nearly all aspects of aviation 
safety and security. Detailed and comprehensive rules have been the goal of the drone 
regulations, too. Since many such rules have already been enacted by the Union, to 
focus on national rules is to look backwards. Although thus far ordinances issued 
by national civil aviation authorities have been the primary measure of regulating 
drones, such have been superseded to an overwhelming extent by the developing 
EU framework. As noted above, many non-EU states follow EU aviation safety 
rules and thus most likely the developing drone rules, too. Paying attention to the 
national deviation from EU rules, which is allowed in some respects, is a perspective 
too fragmentary to be included in the thesis.
Despite focusing on aviation safety and security law, the study does not deal 
with the so-called conventions on aviation/aerial crime. The main purpose of these 
instruments, which include for example the Tokyo99 and Hague Convention,100 is to 
internationally criminalize acts harmful to civil aviation. Their other main purpose 
is jurisdictional: to ensure that the perpetrators of such acts face trial regardless of 
97  By “international aviation”, I refer to aviation in which the aircraft flies outside the airspace above 
the territory of the state of departure or in which the area of departure belongs to no state. Meanwhile, 
by “national aviation” or “domestic aviation” I refer to aviation in which the aircraft remains within the 
airspace above the territory of the state of departure. This is a slightly altered version of the definition I 
adopted in the second article of the study (Huttunen 2019a), and the one used by Fiallos (2019, p. 106, 
fn. 20). On the horizontal and vertical limits of airspace, see, e.g., Oduntan 2012. On territory in general, 
see, e.g., Shaw 1982.
98  Cf. Fiallos 2019, pp. 106–110.
99  Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.
100  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
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the location of the act.101 The main reason for excluding the conventions is that 
providing a systematic analysis of them in relation to drones could not be provided 
as part of the articles. Substantively, it is also worth pointing out that the conventions 
target acts that are mostly relevant in international passenger transport, which is 
not yet practiced in a noteworthy manner in unmanned aviation. Furthermore, as 
pointed out in the fourth article of this study, the conventions focus on punishing 
perpetrators rather than preventing incidents, the latter being the focus of this study.
Much of international and EU aviation law is dedicated to deciding on the 
liability of the air carrier for damages to passengers, baggage, cargo, and third 
parties.102 Aircraft financing, also known as rights in aircraft, is another major 
subfield of international air law.103 Here, such questions in the context of drones are 
left without attention because they fall outside the context of aviation safety and 
security law.104 The study also disregards rules that do not fall within the scope of air 
law. This exclusion might be obvious already from the onset. However, it is worth 
noting, since aviation security is affected by many measures outside air law. This 
includes laws on the police, military, and intelligence, to name a few institutions.105 
The picture the study provides on the numerous issues of aviation security is thus 
limited but inevitably so, as a comprehensive treatment is not possible nor perhaps 
even desirable.
101  See in detail Huang 2009 and 2017; Havel & Sanchez 2014, pp. 189–211; Mendes de Leon 2017, 
pp. 491–521; Scott & Trimarchi 2020, pp. 118–151.
102  See, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air; Havel & 
Sanchez 2014, pp. 251–324; Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 149–257 and 383–405; Scott & Trimarchi 2020, 
pp. 152–210.
103  See, e.g., Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment; Protocol to the Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment; Havel & Sanchez 
2014, pp. 325-391; Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 435–489.
104  On the application of tort law to emerging technology, see Morgan 2017.
105  See Huttunen 2019c, pp. 87 and 96 (cit., e.g., Sweet 2008, pp. 105–144).
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2. Philosophical, Theoretical,  
and Methodological Aspects
2.1. Legal Elements
2.1.1. Law, Legislation, and Regulation
In accordance with the typology introduced in Lawrence Lessig’s pathetic dot 
theory (The New Chicago School), this dissertation primarily focuses on law 
rather than other types of constraint (modalities of regulation). Hence, the 
study does not consider social norms whose regulative capability is based on the 
non-legal social standards of a community, nor markets that regulate through 
transactions. “Architecture”, the factual circumstances of the world—such as the 
physical characteristics of different aircraft—are discussed to the extent they affect 
the course of legislative action, but these characteristics are not discussed as rules 
themselves.106
This study thus deals with regulation in a relatively limited meaning, focusing 
on what Baldwin and his co-authors have described as a set of binding rules to be 
applied by a specific body. It does not discuss regulation in its broad sense, including 
all deliberate actions of a state that seek to influence human behavior, or even more 
broadly, all forms of social influence regardless of who exercises them.107 In other 
words, the study is interested in standard-setting, not all kinds of sustained attempts 
at altering behavior.108
More specifically, this study deals with law in a somewhat limited meaning. As 
the materials mentioned above imply, the focus is on written law, not administrative 
decisions nor court cases.109 “Legislation” is here employed as a shorthand for 
written law. This is the basis for describing the legal documents and efforts by ICAO 
as legislation, despite the concept may be used in a more restrictive sense in legal 
scholarship in general. For example, viewing ICAO SARPs as “legislation” could be 
criticized, since disregarding them is not punished in the same way as disobeying EU 
regulations or domestic laws on aviation safety.
106  See Lessig 1998, pp. 662–664; 2006, pp. 120–137. For an interesting rework of the modalities, see 
Dizon 2013, pp. 84–92.
107  Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, pp. 2–3. On the meaning of regulation, see also Bennett Moses 
2013b, p. 4; Black 2001; Parker & Braithwaite 2003; Selznick 1985.
108  See Black 2002, pp. 25–27. On the distinction and non-distinction between rules and standards, see 
below.
109  On the relationship between legal decision-making in courts and sociotechnical change, see Jasanoff 
1995.
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Threat of sanction is, however, quite a limited criterion to decide what falls 
within the ambit of (written) law.110 Furthermore, SARPs are written documents 
that authoritatively tell aviation practitioners how to behave, are enacted in a 
legally authorized manner, are generally considered as falling within the scope of 
air law, and have established legal significance, as is discussed below. They are not, 
for instance, mere guidelines created by the aviation industry or non-governmental 
bodies. Because of the given aspects, I find that describing the study as concerning 
“legislation” and “legislating” is the most accurate choice. Legislation is here viewed 
as a subset of regulation.111 The study acknowledges, though, that the influence and 
scope of ICAO and the EU is not limited to drafting written rules.112
Ontologically, by which I refer to the nature of law’s existence,113 this study 
draws upon legal positivism. This is not explicitly stated in the articles, perhaps 
due to the hegemonic status of such a position in mainstream air law,114 and thus 
any explanation now will ring rather hollow. Still, it should be pointed out that 
the underlying assumption behind the papers is the social thesis: law, at least the 
segment of air law this study concerns, is a social fact. In other words, the activities 
of human beings are the cause of air law, and air law is distinguished from what is not 
air law through social facts.115 The epistemological position of the study, by which 
I refer to how one may gain knowledge of law,116 follows from the ontological one. 
The process of identifying the existence and content of law, which I have relied on 
in this study, “depends exclusively on facts of human behavior”.117 The way the study 
gains knowledge of the segment of air law it concerns is through materials that have 
been enacted socially.
110  By this “Austinian” (see Austin 1832/1995) criterion, a notable amount of what is generally 
considered legislation would fall outside the ambit of legislation. For a classic rebuttal, see Hart 
1961/2012. For an argument in favor of Austin, see Schauer 2010.
111  See Kosti, Levi-Faur & Mor 2019, p. 175.
112  Both, for instance, engage in discussions with the aviation industry, the aviation community, and 
the general public for the purpose of communicating developments and promoting aviation safety. 
Within the EU, EASA is the Agency chiefly in charge of such activities. ICAO also has judicial powers. 
These activities, according to the terminology employed here, fall within the scope of regulation but not 
legislation.
113  Cf. MacCormick & Weinberger 1986, pp. 9–10.
114  This is quite obvious to anyone browsing the titles and abstracts of articles published in journals 
of air law (Air & Space Law, Annals of Air and Space Law, German Journal of Air and Space Law, Issues 
in Aviation Law & Policy, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, and The Aviation & Space Journal) as well 
as the content of books on air law. See, e.g., Abeyratne 2014; Havel & Sanchez 2014; Kean (ed.) 1982; 
Keenan, Lester & Martin 1966; Matte 1981; Mendes de Leon 2017; Milde 2012; Scott & Trimarchi 
2020. Overall, studies within air law reflect rather briefly on their dogmatic foundations.
115  See Raz 1979, pp. 37–38. See also Leiter, e.g., 1998, p. 534; MacCormick 1986, p. 129; Weinberger 
1986, p. 113. But see Toh 2008 (criticizing the social thesis as being the centerpiece of legal positivism).
116  Cf. MacCormick & Weinberger 1986, p. 37.
117  Raz 1979, pp. 39–40.
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Of course, the social thesis is shared by another school of legal philosophy: legal 
realism.118 Yet this study cannot be regarded as an example of legal realism, neither 
in the American nor Scandinavian sense to the extent these can be distinguished 
from each other. The former, after all, is characterized by a “descriptive claim 
about adjudication: in deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of 
the underlying facts of the case, rather than legal rules and reasons”.119 The latter, 
meanwhile, “demand[s] that the study of law must follow … observation and 
verification which animate all modern empirical science; and … that the fundamental 
legal notions must be interpreted as conceptions of social reality”.120
The articles presented here follow neither of the two realist doctrines, as the 
actions or motivations of courts or administrative bodies in the application of 
aviation safety rules are not examined. Why this is the case is quite obvious. The 
research themes discussed in the study—issues presented by drones to rules on 
aviation safety and security, and the approaches by which lawmakers have dealt with 
them—do not necessitate an empirical investigation into the application of air law. 
The analysis and the accompanying theoretical development, which both are limited 
to the context of written law, can be executed from a positivist viewpoint. Observing 
the new rules in practice can only take place once they are applied, which was not 
the case (indeed it was not possible) during the course of research.
The exact nature of the social process through which law is distinguished from 
non-law is naturally a complex one. Within positivism, the articles constituting 
this study hold no explicit position to the debate between various approaches. But 
even when considered post facto, how would the articles appear different, had they 
presented a choice, say, between the classic Kelsenian model of regression toward 
the Grundnorm121 and the Hartian rule of recognition?122 Would the content of my 
thesis be any different, had I regarded law as institutional facts123 or in accordance 
with any number of takes since based on the issues of positivism?124
The answer to these questions appears “probably not”. The solution that likely 
comes the closest is that the legality (validity) of the rules studied here can be 
imagined as resting simultaneously on many factors. The legality of rules is affected 
118  See Leiter 1998; 2001. See also Green 2019, p. 12.
119  Leiter 1996/2010, p. 252. For a recent critique of Leiter’s conception of American legal realism, 
however, see Dagan 2018. Often, American legal realism is also defined in accordance with Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s (1897, p. 461) famous statement: “The prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”
120 Ross 1953/1959, p. ix.
121 Kelsen 1960/1967, pp. 193–195. Kelsen would, of course, argue that the regression to the 
Grundnorm is not a social but a legal fact; here, however, I use “social” to refer to all human activities, 
which from Kelsen’s viewpoint includes both legal and social facts.
122  Hart 1961/2012.
123  MacCormick & Weinberger 1986.
124  See, e.g., Dworkin 1986.
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by their hierarchical position in the legal order: documents such as EU regulations 
represent valid law partly because they are created by competent authorities.125 But, 
legality is also affected by a generally accepted social rule about what is valid safety 
and security law in the context of aviation.126 There are other elements, too, such as 
the intersubjective belief by humans (“popular legal consciousness”)127 in validity 
and the regular application of norms (“sufficient grounds to assume that it will be 
accepted by the courts as a basis for their decision”).128 The latter two elements, 
although realist in that they refer to facts outside written law, may be compatible 
with an otherwise positivist view of law.
In this context, it is worth noting that the law on aviation safety and security 
is characterized by normative pluralism. This means that there are several legal 
orders that simultaneously claim authority on the safety and security of manned 
and unmanned civil aviation: the international order of ICAO, the regional orders 
(including, for example, the EU), and national orders. In the context of this study, 
normative pluralism means that the legal outlook on drones in Europe is based 
on overlapping legal sources: international agreements, ICAO’s standards and 
recommended practices, regulations issued by the European Commission and 
Parliament, preparatory documents issued by EASA, administrative orders issued 
by national aviation authorities, and so forth. One could thus say that aviation safety 
and security law is transnational: it is beyond international and national law, and it 
is defined functionally to aviation as an activity.129
The relationship between international and EU aviation safety and security 
rules—given that national ones are excluded from the scope of this study—is 
relatively unproblematic. International rules represent the minimum safety standards 
and recommendations particularly in the context of international civil aviation, 
while EU rules represent the mandatory level of safety and security in EU Member 
States and certain other European states.130 This aspect has been explained above 
concerning the inclusions of the present study, as supplemented by the discussion 
below on the legal nature of ICAO’s SARPs. Hence, the nature of the relationship is 
not analyzed further in the study.
2.1.2. Law and Values
As Joseph Raz has pointed out, the aforementioned social thesis alone is rather 
nebulous when it comes to the relationship between law and morality, which itself 
125  See Kelsen 1960/1967, pp. 193–195. 
126  See Hart 1961/2012, pp. 91–110.
127  Ross 1953/1959, p. 71 (calling this psychological realism).
128  Ibid., p. 72 (behavioristic realism).
129  See Tuori 2017, p. 36. On legal pluralism in detail, see, e.g., Schiff Berman 2012; Klabbers & 
Piiparinen (eds.) 2013.
130  These arrangements are discussed above.
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is an important issue. If I say that a collective belief (social fact) establishes the 
legality of particular aviation safety rules (law), I am not claiming that the belief 
makes the rules morally good or bad. One’s position on the moral connection 
of the rules ought to be established separately. Raz, being a positivist, vouches 
for a strong social thesis. Such a thesis explicitly maintains that the social facts 
must be first describable in value neutral terms and, second, applicable without 
relying on moral argument.131 An opposing viewpoint would maintain that social 
facts cannot be described in such terms nor applied without recourse to a moral 
perspective.
The underlying position of this study is, per the classic positivist dogma, that 
the content of law (what, for instance, the EU Regulation on the rules of the 
air132 says) can be separated from whether the law is “good” (whether such rules 
match particular standards of morality, efficiency, and so forth).133 This position 
is functional, since it distinguishes the act of describing law from its evaluation 
from an external perspective. Still, the study acknowledges that there is a necessary 
connection between law and values. By this, I simply mean that all the rules studied 
here echo a particular kind of ethos, ideology. They are not objective but have 
objectives: by their mere existence, rules promote and discourage, as well as include 
and exclude.134
What sort of values does aviation safety and security law espouse? As hinted above 
and as described in Chapter 4, most of the air law studied here has been motivated 
(in its drafting phase) by factual circumstances. Such include, among other aspects, 
the way aircraft have been designed as well as the policy of emphasizing safety over 
expediency and other objectives. While safety is indeed the most important value 
cherished explicitly in all of air law, it often overshadows certain more controversial 
values, such as the freedom of movement.135
Air law, even such pertaining to safety and security, fundamentally promotes the 
movement of persons and goods. The purpose of aviation is to establish physical 
connections around Earth, which is seen to “greatly help to create and preserve 
friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world”.136 The 
safety of civil aviation is one means by which the pursuit of such can be improved. 
All technical rules relating to aircraft, their operators and personnel, air traffic 
131  See Raz 1979, pp. 38–40.
132  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012.
133  Raz calls it the moral thesis (1979, p. 37) and Coleman the separability thesis (1982, pp. 140–141). 
134  Kelsen 1960/1967, p. 68 (though considering the function of legal science to be value-free 
description).
135  E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 12; Protocol No. 4 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 2; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Art. 13.
136  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Preamble, para. 1.
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management infrastructure, groundhandling, security measures, and so forth, 
encourage and improve rather than discourage and worsen movement. This is their 
primary purpose.
Other values promoted by air law include whatever special purpose an aircraft 
is used for. As elaborated on above, manned and unmanned aircraft have many 
applications like the monitoring of crops, industrial oversight, filming, geological 
surveying, humanitarian relief, and the like. In these cases, safety and security rules 
advance the underlying values of these missions, including for instance human 
agriculture, industrial production of goods, extraction of minerals, and aiding 
distressed populations. This goes particularly for drones, which thus far are not 
used for human transport in large scale but rather for transporting goods, observing 
the environment, and collecting data—which is, after all, part of their alleged 
revolutionary character.137
This may seem trivial at first but becomes relevant when we consider the costs of 
endorsing such values. The advancements in the freedom of movement and other 
activities (even humanitarian aid) introduced through civil aviation are largely built 
on the use of natural resources and inextricably linked to another value, which is 
economic growth. Economic growth in aviation has, of course, often been hindered 
by interests of safety, aviation or otherwise, which is the primary concern.138 
Regardless, both manned and unmanned civil aviation are fueled by the idea that 
the extraction of natural resources and thereby the creation and maintenance of 
industries for various purposes is good. Simultaneously, whatever emissions and 
waste produced in the process (such as carbon dioxide and discarded aircraft 
components) is acceptable, as long as it falls within acceptable parameters set forth 
in air law as well as other relevant law.139 These are the undeclared assumptions 
behind all air law discussed in this study, including everything from the Chicago 
Convention to the most specific safety standards concerning UAS. Indeed, it is 
important to notice that the legislative project concerning drones is also driven by 
a set of values.140
There is not much opposition to be found in written air law against the given 
values. Little discussion has been entertained within the field on how to choose 
between growth and the environment, to point out the most glaring dissonance. 
The freedom of movement using aircraft is dependent on an industry, the running of 
137  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 14 and 17–19. 
138  Consider the several cases where aviation safety bodies have suspended flight operations that use 
potentially hazardous aircraft. Recently, such a measure was targeted at Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 MAX 
aircraft. See EASA Safety Directive 2019-01. In recent years, air travel has also been suspended several 
times to curb the spreading of pandemic disease.
139  Other relevant law includes, for example, international environmental treaties, EU regulations on 
pollution and waste, and national environmental law.
140  See Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015, p. 5.
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which may ultimately cause environmental harm that actually limits our freedom of 
movement. The development of aviation technology, for now, expands our options 
but, in the end, might play a role in diminishing our legal or practical liberty.141 This 
issue naturally goes back to the Chicago Convention and the mandate of ICAO, 
which lack any mention of environmental interests. The system is thus normatively 
tinged and so has been the legislative process concerning drones. The environmental 
implications of mass unmanned aviation have not been fundamentally discussed in 
the process; if anything, drones have been sometimes seen as a more environmentally 
neutral alternative to legacy aviation and road traffic, in addition to the benefits 
drones introduce when used for environmental missions.142
Later on, in the work of ICAO we find initiatives favoring the environment.143 The 
latest EASA Basic Regulation, too, lists “high and uniform level of environmental 
protection” after safety in the very beginning of the Preamble. Yet, in comparison 
with the ever-growing amount of air transport,144 such an objective appears as a 
mere afterthought that can be taken into account but is unable to challenge the 
fundamental assumptions of the system. At worst, it serves as a mere reminder of 
the material costs of aviation. At best, to follow Dworkin’s triptych,145 it serves as a 
principle that can be used to balance out competing interests.
Here, too, observations concerning the cornerstones of air law come as an 
afterthought. The articles constituting this study, representing the positivist tradition, 
focus on substantive problems caused by drones to the prevailing legal system, 
instead of targeting the values guiding the process of legislation. The capacity of civil 
aviation to enhance the freedom of movement and other values at the expense of 
natural resources is therefore ultimately accepted. The object, the system of air law, 
is primarily seen as an expression of a democratic legislative process146 and a means 
of tackling the necessary challenges of aviation technology. The seemingly objective, 
liberal, and modern method of conducting legal scholarship147 thus prevails here, 
but with the present acknowledgement that such a method has been an implicit 
choice in itself.
Another critical perspective which is not at the forefront of the study is the 
conflict between the traditional aviation industry and the drone industry. Hints of 
141  See Brownsword 2017.
142  European Drones Outlook Study, p. 35. See also Stolaroff et al. 2018.
143  See, e.g., Annex 16: Environmental Protection; ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-5: Consolidated 
statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental protection.
144  Air transport, passengers carried.
145  Dworkin 1967, p. 23.
146  The drafting of international agreements on air law and the operation of ICAO and EASA (to the 
extent such are discussed) are thus viewed as processes of participation of representatives and officials 
from all member states, rather than from the perspective of a power struggle. The study thus does not deal 
with the power politics and possibly undemocratic characteristics of the sovereign state system.
147  See, e.g., Hunt 1986, pp. 4–8; Unger 1975, pp. 63–103.
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such a conflict definitely exist, as showed by the critical position of the European 
Cockpit Association toward the SORA risk assessment method148 and an industry 
group’s position paper on draft U-space regulations.149 On the other hand, several 
legacy stakeholders have embraced UAS by developing their own high-end drones,150 
or found other ways to extend their reach to the drone sector. Further knowledge 
could be gained by, for instance, studying various stakeholders’ responses to the 
proposals and opinions by ICAO and EASA.151 Despite not engaging in such a line 
of argumentation, this study can serve as a foundation to a more critical analysis of 
the players involved in the rise of unmanned aviation.
2.1.3. Rules, Standards, Principles, and Recommendations
At times, legal scholarship distinguishes between rules, standards, and principles. 
Recommendations are often mentioned, too. A commonly cited definition of the 
first two stems from Kaplow who distinguishes the concepts by “the extent to which 
efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act.” An 
effort to give content in advance is rule-like; an effort to do so afterwards is standard-
like.152 Similarly, according to Sunstein, the former “attempt to specify outcomes 
before particular cases arise”, whereas the meaning of the latter “depends on what 
happens when it is applied”.153
Yet there are other methods of distinction. Schlag establishes the difference as 
follows: rules have a hard empirical trigger (drones of a particular weight…) and 
a determinate response (…must be equipped with a particular safety feature). 
Meanwhile, standards have a soft evaluative trigger (in densely populated areas…) 
and a soft modulated response (…the drone pilot must exercise particular 
caution).154 From another perspective, standards are technical specifications,155 and 
types of standards can be categorized. Stewart, for instance, distinguishes between 
performance, specification, and engineering standards. The first specify the required 
performance or a particular technology, the second specify a particular input, design, 
148  See European Cockpit Association Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) Position Paper; 
Huttunen 2019b, pp. 15–16.
149  ASD Position Paper: The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) Regulation.
150  Airbus’ Skyways drone trials world’s first shore-to-ship deliveries.
151  See in the European context, e.g., EASA Comment-Response Document 2012-10; EASA Technical 
Opinion: Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of unmanned aircraft, Annex I – CRD. 
Curiously, the Comment Response Document (CRD) to the EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-
05 (A) and (B) remains unpublished, despite the promise in EASA Opinion No 01/2018.
152  Kaplow 1992, p. 560.
153  Sunstein 1996/2018, pp. 22 (“a rule can thus be defined as the full or nearly full before-the-fact 
assignment of legal rights and duties, or the complete or nearly complete before-the-fact specification of 
legal outcomes”) and 28.
154  Schlag 1985, pp. 382–383. The examples are mine and largely fictional; they merely illustrate the 
point made by the author in the context of this study.
155  See Hoenkamp, Vugt & Huitema 2013.
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or piece of equipment, while the third express a performance that can be achieved 
only by a specific technology.156
The differences between principles and the other two are even less clear. Principles 
are defined by Dworkin, whom I have now cited several times, as standards that 
should be observed because they represent a “dimension of morality.”157 More 
recently, though, the concept of principle-based regulation has been used to refer to 
law that focuses on outcomes.158
This study maintains the understanding of principles advanced by Dworkin. 
Between rules and standards, however, no distinction is consistently maintained. In 
general, the concept of a rule is used to refer to any legal provision included in the 
examined documents, although sometimes the concept of a standard is used in its 
place. The terms are thus used interchangeably, apart from cases in which the very 
name of the concept, like ICAO’s standards and recommended practices (SARPs), 
employs either term. This approach is based on the inherent difficulty of upholding 
such archetypes. In many cases, the legal commands discussed here assign legal rights 
and duties before the fact and their outcome can be read from the context, but at 
the same time they often leave the authorities some margin in their application. 
Certainly, some commands discussed here are more defined in their content while 
others require more interpretation, but to use a fixed distinction is not fruitful for 
the purposes of this study.
The futility of distinguishing the two in the present study can be illustrated with 
ICAO’s Annex 2: Rules of the Air. The Annex (to the Chicago Convention) contains 
SARPs, yet its title indicates that these are rules. Which are they ultimately?
In the very beginning of the Annex, a provision requires “the pilot-in-command 
[PIC] of an aircraft [to] become familiar with all available information appropriate 
to the intended operation” prior to a flight.159 The content of the provision’s first 
part is clearly determined in advance: it concerns the PIC of an aircraft, not for 
example “the person who controls the aircraft” who is, in some cases, the first officer. 
Meanwhile, the concept of “all available information appropriate to the intended 
operation” is contextual, depending on the location and type of the aircraft as well as 
the flight it is about to undertake. Furthermore, the concept is flexible in that what 
is regarded as appropriate information has changed over the years and will continue 
to do so through technological advancements and the application of the provision 
by national civil aviation authorities (CAAs).
Still, the concept is not flexible in that there are rules for pilots on what information 
156  Stewart 1981, pp. 1268–1269. See also Bennett Moses 2005, p. 564.
157  Dworkin 1967, p. 23.
158  Black 2008, pp. 434–446 (arguing, however, that there are actually three forms of such regulation). 
See also Carter & Marchant 2011, p. 158.
159  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, para. 2.3.2.
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is necessary for a safe flight. Furthermore, if a pilot fails to comply with the provision it 
may indicate responsibility and liability for an occurrence caused by ignoring available 
information such as maintenance records or weather data—when so determined 
through national legal procedures in conjunction with other relevant provisions. Since 
the content of much aviation safety and security law is such a hybrid160 of ex ante and 
ex post, keeping track of each provision’s character appears a fruitless exercise.161
When it comes to the obligatory nature of the rules discussed here, the following 
must be pointed out. First, it is obvious that rules enacted in EU regulations are of 
binding legal character.162 Second, however, asserting the legal character of ICAO’s 
SARPs necessitates a bit more elaboration. They gain their legal justification from 
Article 37 of the Chicago Convention, whose first paragraph requires states parties
to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, 
standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and 
auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air 
navigation.
Thereafter, ICAO (Council) is tasked with adopting and amending, as necessary, 
SARPs. Non-compliance with them triggers the obligation set forth in Article 38 
to give immediate notification to ICAO Council about the deviation. SARPs are 
not binding treaty provisions backed up by legal sanctions, yet states are obliged to 
explicitly let other states know which ones they do and do not follow.
SARPs, as legal instruments, are thus situated somewhere between hard and soft 
law. “Standards”, as distinguished from “recommended practices”, seem to fall within 
the scope of hard law, since their uniform application has been regarded by ICAO 
as necessary and since states “will conform” with them. Meanwhile, “recommended 
practices” appear to fall within the ambit of soft law because their uniform 
application is desirable and because states “will endeavour to conform” with them.163 
However, as argued by a leading treatise, since SARPs are a matter of confidence, 
non-adherence to either kind of rules will likely cause diplomatic and economic 
damage. The obligation to follow SARPs is thus strongly incentivized, being backed 
up by a fear of non-legal adversity.164
160  Schlag 1985, p. 383, fn. 18.
161  An exception to this is, naturally, when the open-endedness of a provision is the very point made 
in a scholarly analysis. Yet, even then, it depends on the purpose of the study whether it is necessary to 
explicate the rule- or standard-like character of the provision. See in this study, e.g., Huttunen 2019b, p. 
10.
162  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 288, para. 2.
163  ICAO Assembly Resolution A1-31: Definition of International Standards and Recommended Practices 
(emphasis added).
164  Havel & Sanchez 2014, pp. 60–64. See also Huang 2009, pp. 58–66; Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 
294–295.
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2.1.4. Doctrinal Legal Scholarship
In attempting to answer the research questions, this dissertation falls on one hand 
within the ambit of doctrinal legal scholarship (“doctrinal study of law”165). It 
seeks to produce information about the law and systematize legal norms.166 Being a 
doctrinal effort, the study could be characterized as also being a hermeneutical one, 
in the sense that it is mostly about interpreting textual rules on aviation safety and 
security.167 To a large extent, the study focuses on the abstract content of aviation 
safety and security law: the interpretive scheme for the practical application of 
such rules, presented as an integrated system. As hinted above with regard to legal 
realism, the study does not examine how such law is put into action in the observable 
reality.168
In the very first article, the doctrinal approach manifests itself in how the paper 
analyzes the meaning and scope of concepts employed in law. This is not to say that the 
paper is a work of the so-called jurisprudence of concepts, or conceptual jurisprudence 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz). After all, such jurisprudence essentially concerned itself with 
the derivation of legal rules from basic legal concepts (Grundformen, Grundtypen), 
like private property and liberty, resulting in a coherent and logical system of law.169 
Rather, the article comes closer to analytical jurisprudence, attempting to form “a 
logical frame built according to specifications drawn from an actual body of law.”170 
Both the legal basis, implications, and the mutual relationship of the terms is under 
focus.171
In the other articles, the doctrinal examination focuses less on the meaning and 
delimitation of concepts and more on rules that dictate how civil aviation must be 
practiced. This involves describing, interpreting, and organizing rules falling within 
the ambit of aviation safety and security law, and describing the problems in trying 
to apply the law to drones. For instance, the study discusses ICAO and EU rules on 
matters such as airworthiness, aircrew, and air operations from the perspective of 
unmanned aviation.
The given discussion forms the basis of the argument that the sociotechnical 
change caused by drones leads to several issues in relation to existing aviation safety 
and security law. The argument begins from a relatively typical doctrinal standpoint. 
It involves describing the existing system of aviation safety and security law and 
presenting a novel fact situation that traditional rules are unfit to successfully deal 
with. The doctrinal perspective is displayed in how the articles explain the system, 
165  Ross 1953/1959, p. 11.
166  Aarnio 2011, p. 19. See also Tuori 2002/2016, pp. 284 and 288–291.
167  See Aarnio 2011, p. 133; Hoecke 2011, p. 4.
168  See Ross 1953/1959, pp. 19–21.
169  See, e.g., Haferkamp 2004.
170  Stone 1964, p. 138. See originally Austin 1832/1995; Hohfeld 1913. 
171  Huttunen 2017, p. 351.
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manifesting in legal instruments like airworthiness certification, and contrast it with 
drones. Of course, before and throughout the completion of this study, national, 
European, and international legislators have already recognized the problem that 
the traditional framework of air law is insufficient in addressing the special nature of 
drones. The novelty of the argument stems from explicating just how this insufficiency 
manifests itself, which is something not discussed in detail in the public materials of 
ICAO and the EU. Naturally, some of the issues identified here will still require 
more legislative effort to be solved, despite the new rules. 
On the basis of pointing out the issues, the study presents some normative 
recommendations (legal politics172) on how drones should be regulated de lege 
ferenda (lex ferenda).173 These recommendations are not, however, very precise; the 
socio-legal opportunities174 offered by the recognition of the problems are not fully 
exploited. For instance, I simply point out that the existing rules on airworthiness 
are over-inclusive in relation to some UAS but make no attempt at devising the 
proper way of ensuring the airworthiness of drones. This is mainly because, as 
mentioned above and as described below, ICAO and the EU have already begun 
issuing specific new rules and recommendations on how to solve the problems. This 
requires continuing the doctrinal analysis on the rules that are designed to overcome 
the issues investigated previously in the study. Normative recommendations should 
concern the possible problems with the new rules.175
From the doctrinal perspective, the analysis of the new rules is about describing, 
systematizing, and evaluating their content, particularly in comparison with existing 
rules. Hence, the articles point out just how differently the field of aviation safety 
and security law deals with manned and unmanned aviation. The main interest lies 
in the shifting structures of air law: in pointing out the differences between the 
approaches that have been taken with manned and unmanned aviation, and the 
implications the latter has for the former and aviation as a whole. Less emphasis is 
on the possible benefits and shortcomings; after all, as the rules at the time of writing 
have still been under development and not applied, identifying issues with them is 
not easy without profound expertise of the aviation industry. This, as an academic 
lawyer, I sadly lack.
Despite this, the conclusions of the last three articles all take a look at some of the 
pros and cons of the new rules to the extent their evaluation is possible. For example, 
the article on the specific category of operations lists the positive and negative 
aspects of the safety approach taken in the category, addresses criticism presented 
172  Ross 1953/1959, p. 327 et seq.
173  See Peczenik 2005, pp. 2 and 4–6. See in detail Minkkinen 2013.
174  See ibid., p. 86.
175  One of such recommendations concerns the adoption of anti-drone technology. See Huttunen 
2019c, pp. 15–16.
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by other parties, and makes several recommendations on the implementation of 
the category as well as overarching policy. Similarly, the article on U-space points 
out the fragmentary state of current U-space capabilities across Europe and the 
challenges in trying to achieve full implementation. Meanwhile, the problems of 
the new European rules with regard to security are at the core of the fourth article.
Together, the recognition of the issues in existing law and the shortcomings in the 
new rules form the basis for the argument that aviation safety and security law must 
continue being developed to address the sociotechnical change caused by drones. 
This argument does not represent what is sometimes called the internal perspective. 
It is not a prescription on how to interpret a particular provision within air law to 
accommodate unmanned aviation. It does not adopt the perspective of a lawyer or 
a judge in relation to a legal case, trying to persuade the reader that a certain kind of 
decision should made. Nor is it a prescription to follow the viewpoints of authorities 
like ICAO or EASA, although the given authorities would most likely agree with 
the argument itself.176
In other words, the argument does not focus on how legal logic is developed 
through key rulings: the reasoning and critique of the application of law. Its purpose 
is not to improve the reasoning of judges.177 Rather, the argument concerns the 
approach of aviation safety and security law as a whole. In a way, it is externally 
normative. It is a prescription to re-examine the given field of law from a new 
standpoint, using prevalent rules but also coming up with new ones. The argument 
of what ought to be stands on its own, based on observations explicated in the study, 
regardless of the authority of official institutions.178
2.2. Theoretical Elements
2.2.1. The Law and Technology Enterprise
The doctrinal side of the study, including all the articles and the relevant portions 
of this synthesis, focuses on how the increase of drones compels legislators to re-
examine the adequacy of established aviation safety and security law. This is one 
of the main points of confrontation between law and science (and technology) 
identified by David F. Cavers already in the 1960s.179 The given side of the study thus 
176  See Smits 2012, pp. 20–21. 
177  See Alter 2002, pp. 114 and 116–117.
178  See Smits 2012, pp. 20–21. However, I fail to see how it would stand regardless of empirical facts, 
as demanded by Smits (ibid., p. 45, in fine). The increasing number of drones and their characteristics, 
as referenced many times in this study, are empirical facts. On the distinction between the internal and 
external viewpoint to law, see Deflem 2008, pp. 4–5 (cit. Kronman 1983, pp. 8–14; Weber 1907/1977); 
Hart 1961/2012, pp. 88–91.
179  Cavers 1967, pp. 6 and 9–10.
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largely follows what Peter Drahos in the 1980s called the conflict view. It focuses on 
the invariance or asymmetry, per Drahos’s language, between drone technology and 
the given segments of air law. This means that existing aviation safety and security 
law appears as outmoded and counterproductive in relation to unmanned aviation. 
More precisely, drones are in disagreement with existing written and specific safety 
and security rules, but also to an extent they question what kind of rules are required 
for safe aviation.180
The study is not, however, characterized by the inadequacy view, which according 
to Drahos’s typology often accompanies the conflict view. If this were the case, the 
claim would be that air law’s structures, processes, and institutions are incapable of 
dealing with the increasing amount and capabilities of drones. The study does argue 
that there are issues in trying to apply existing rules of aviation safety and security to 
drones, and that in the future the rules might also become problematic in an overall 
manner. Yet it also notes the ways in which the relevant institutions do have the 
means of tackling the risen issues.181 The issue discussed here is not with competence 
but with the state and overall approach of existing law in relation to new technology 
and its use. This is testified to by how ICAO and the EU have been able to issue 
legislative responses. Still, only the application of these responses will ultimately 
show the extent to which the established legal framework is adequate: the question 
of inadequacy, though not answered here, hence cannot be completely forgotten.
The doctrinal side of the study can perhaps more elaborately be seen as representing 
the law and technology enterprise, a pejorative term coined by Kieran Tranter. It 
begins from a specific crisis event—though, as mentioned above, crisis is too strong 
of a word here—involving technology, which in this case is the increase in unmanned 
civil aviation in European airspace during the 21st century. The study views drones 
as problematic technology that promises risks but also progress in the field of civil 
aviation. This is partly what the first research question and the first several arguments 
are about: What issues has the increase in unmanned civil aviation caused in relation 
to existing aviation safety and security law? Drones represent the future, as they are 
here to stay, but their rise entails both positive and negative possibilities.182
The problems caused by drones and the uncertain future of aviation form the need 
for legislative action. Through describing the existing framework of aviation safety 
and security law, the study finds that the rules do not sufficiently consider drones. 
On one hand, the rules are inadequate, but on the other hand they are excessive; 
the study concentrates a lot on listing inconsistencies, tensions, and gaps. There is 
also some speculation on how drones ought to be legislated and facilitated; law has 
the potential to direct how drones will be used. These build the foundations for 
180  See Drahos 1985, pp. 275–278 (cit. Kirby 1977; Weeramantry 1983). See also Cortez 2014, p. 176.
181  See Drahos 1985, pp. 280–285.
182  See Tranter 2011a, especially pp. 31–32 and 69. See also Tranter 2011b.
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justifying the positivist legislative project undertaken by ICAO and the EU, which 
is then described and assessed from a functional viewpoint—the extent to which it 
succeeds and fails to solve the practical safety issues caused by drones.183
Another notion of the law and technology enterprise, which applies to the 
doctrinal side of the study, is that drones and the law on aviation safety and security 
are viewed as relatively isolated from other fields of law. In other words, the legal 
analysis does not make notable effort to relate drones and air law with the emergence 
of other technologies or with other fields of law. This is what Tranter refers to when 
stating that, in the given enterprise, specific literatures are silos.184
As such, and as described above, the study expresses the positivist sentiment 
behind modern law. Legislating civil drones has chiefly been about choosing the 
right policy and the techniques to implement it. From such a perspective, law 
appears to be reduced to an instrument, a machine, a kind of technology in itself. 
Hence, Tranter criticizes, there is actually no law and technology enterprise, merely 
a technology enterprise: “the law championed to save humanity from technology is 
itself a manifestation of the technological mindset”.185 Prior to Tranter, Jonathan B. 
Wiener pointed out in rather a similar manner that
if technology is understood in its broad sense … then regulation is itself a technology. 
Regulation is a set of techniques for changing production functions to produce fewer 
of some outputs, such as pollution, or more of others. Regulation is the technology of 
governance.186
Tranter’s argument is correct in that much of legal scholarship on emergent 
technology has followed a similar pattern: the acknowledgment of new technology 
and its use, the description of inadequacies in existing law, the de lege ferenda 
arguments for novel legislation, and, later on, the description and criticism of the 
new law. This is also the pattern followed in this study. He is also correct in that the 
urgency to legally regulate technological change has overshadowed scholarship with 
a more historical, general, and sophisticated outlook.187
In the case of civil aviation, there is also much truth to the idea that law and 
technology are often intertwined. This is because many standards of aviation safety 
183  See Tranter 2011a, pp. 31–32 and 69. See also Leenes 2019, p. 5 (coining as “’Flawed Law Syndrome’ 
… the urge to call law or regulation [disconnected] and the desire to fix the problems by addressing the 
law, rather than using other ways to mend the assumed gaps”). In the context of courts, Jasanoff (1995, 
p. 6) has noted the tradition of “policies for science”, which focuses “on the inefficiencies of judicial 
decisionmaking as an instrument for managing technology.”
184  Tranter 2011a, pp. 33 and 71 (cit. Drahos 1985, p. 271).
185  Tranter 2011a, pp. 69–70 (cit. White 1985, p. 686).
186  Wiener 2004, p. 484.
187  Tranter 2011a, pp. 31 and 69–71.
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and security law are extremely technical; not only that, they appear as technical best 
practices in a legal form, which almost dissolves their character as legal rules. Such 
rules bring to mind Jacques Ellul’s description in which law becomes mere “judicial 
technique”:188 ensuring order (efficiency, security) rather than justice (what is right 
or fair). In accordance with Ellul’s idea, technicians of air law seem to organize their 
subjects into behaving in a rational, perfectly controlled pattern that caters to all the 
smallest details of operation, lacking any indeterminacy. Indeed, in aviation safety it 
is difficult to distinguish between law and non-legal standards.189
Accordingly, as I point out in one of the articles of this study, the development 
of a system of unmanned aircraft system traffic management (UTM, the U-space) 
is equally a technological and legal effort: interplay between the two is necessary in 
order to bring the concept to life.190 In fact, some might claim that the interplay is 
unavoidable, since law and technology are co-produced.191 This seems risky from 
Tranter’s perspective. As he argues, technology might not merely interact with law 
but seek to rival its power, being more purely modern (objective, observable, and 
rational) than law whose heritage is archaic and pre-rational. Technology, such as 
the U-space system, may symbolize an opportunity to replace aviation safety and 
security law with an even more rational technic of airspace management.192
It is quite daring of a claim that the law and technology enterprise and thus this 
study actually reduces (aviation safety and security) law to technology; that therein 
law cannot play a part in “sav[ing] humanity from problematic technology” but only 
“delivers humanity up to technology.”193 The problem of the present study is, from 
Tranter’s perspective, that it shies away from fundamental questions about UAS 
technology: anxieties about its use, the costs of the legislative project(s), and the 
technological nature of the existing and new rules. Furthermore, the problem from 
that perspective is that this study merely calls for the legislation of drones and focuses 
on how it is done instead of arguing about the technology itself.194 Its discussion on 
technological transformation does not focus on “value disputes about desired future 
states”,195 despite the values expressed by the increase in unmanned aviation.
The criticism hits the mark to some extent. As discussed above regarding law 
and values, this study has not made much of an effort to question the fundamental 
188  Ellul 1964, passim.
189  See ibid., pp. 291–300.
190  Huttunen 2019a, p. 88. See also Mandel 2009, p. 75 (“a technology cannot advance without some 
freedom in research and development, but too much freedom could lead to a calamity that forecloses 
any opportunity for the technology.”) et seq. This relates to the Collingridge dilemma, which is discussed 
below. 
191  See Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015.
192  See Tranter 2002, pp. 76–77.
193  Tranter 2011a, p. 70.
194  See ibid.
195  Sarewitz 2011, p. 98.
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values of air law or drones. Unlike Tranter appears to argue,196 these values, such as 
the freedom of movement and enterprise and the use of natural resources for the 
purpose of movement and economic progress, are embedded in air law rather than 
coming from elsewhere; some opposing values like environmental neutrality (mainly 
in terms of noise reduction) are, too. The debate on such issues is internal to the 
legal discourse. However, the observation that this is the case and the possibility of 
weighing values like the freedom of movement against values such as the protection 
of environment are not explored in the study any further. The study does not begin 
by weighing on whether drone technology should be pursued or not, and what its 
meaning on our society could be for better or worse.
This shortcoming, as it could be called from the viewpoint of Tranter’s critical197 
approach, can only be explained by the study’s implicit acceptance of the values 
espoused by air law. The freedom of movement and aerial work as enhanced by 
drone technology are viewed largely as a positive contribution to society. Their 
negative aspects can successfully be controlled, including appropriate prohibitions 
and mitigations, within the legal regime of aviation safety and security. Of course, 
legislation also occurs within other regimes, like the one(s) concerning privacy and 
data protection, which do not fall within the ambit of this study. Hence, both safety 
and security are regarded as pragmatic problems in relation to existing law.
2.2.2. The Social Construction of Technology
It is somewhat difficult to contextualize the criticism toward the law and technology 
enterprise and, by extension, toward this study. On one hand, the criticism appears 
to accept a version of technological determinism, another word for which is 
technological substantivism.198 According to that idea, technology—technique, to 
employ Jacques Ellul’s term—moves all other aspects of society, including economics, 
politics, and law. Technology holds its own laws, having “become a reality in itself ”.199 
In other words, to quote Langdon Winner’s definition of technological determinism 
in its strongest sense,
the technical base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns of 
social existence and … changes in technology are the single most important source of 
change in society.200
196  Tranter 2011a, pp. 69–70 and 76.
197  See, e.g., Boyle 1992.
198  Feenberg 2002, pp. 6–8 and passim. See also Cockfield & Pridmore 2007; Hildebrandt 2009, pp. 
451–464; Pasquale & Cockfield 2018, pp. 842–852.
199  Ellul 1964, pp. 133–134.
200  Winner 1978, p. 76. Another classic argument for determinism is presented in Heilbroner 1967. For 
a short overview, see, e.g., MacKenzie & Wacjman 1985, pp. 4–5.
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Determinism seems to lie behind the idea that the technological mindset can 
turn legal scholarship into technology. On the other hand, the criticism appears to 
accuse the enterprise itself as being a victim of determinism. Scholarship on law and 
technology allows law to be reduced to technology.
The problem with technological determinism (substantivism), as has been 
discussed at length, is that it overemphasizes the power of technology, underrating 
the power of human agency. Though technology is clearly a major driver of society, 
its social construction cannot be ignored. Technology and its use are shaped always 
in conjunction with human action, never by themselves; technology alone cannot 
dictate all things, including law.201 This criticism of determinism should be applied 
both to the law and technology enterprise to the extent such style of scholarship 
follows it, but also to the criticism of such scholarship to the extent it is implicitly 
driven by a deterministic premise.
At the other end, however, it is unrealistic to think of technology in purely 
instrumental(ist) terms. According to such accounts, any new technology is a 
neutral tool. Technology is something rational that humans have the capability to 
develop, use, and alter as they please to achieve particular ends. The values served by 
technology are not directly embedded in the technology itself, and so technology 
is indifferent toward power and politics. The discussion revolves around trade-offs 
between different interests.202 The problem with this is that it de-emphasizes the 
power of technology. It ignores how existing and future technology influences (for 
example, enables, includes, disables, or excludes) human behavior, including the 
enacting of laws. This influence has been labelled as technological normativity.203
The way out of the dilemma is synthesis. Borrowing from sociotechnical literature 
cited in the preceding paragraphs, this study sees the overall relationship between 
aviation safety and security law and technology as follows: such law is shaped by civil 
aviation technology, but the law equally shapes the technology. Neither dominates 
the other.204 This is the underlying premise despite the study focuses on legislation 
as a reaction to sociotechnical change. Shortly put, the technological changes in 
civil aviation, including the increase in drones, instigate changes in international, 
regional, and national rules: when developments occur, there is a reason to consider 
legislative action. At the same time, the rules themselves steer the development of 
aviation technology: there is no point in developing technology that can never be 
expected to comply with safety and security standards.
201  See, e.g., Bijker & Law 1992, especially pp. 8–11; Bijker 1995; Feenberg 1999; Jasanoff 1995 and 2004; 
MacKenzie & Wacjman 1985, pp. 5–24. For an overview, see Kline 2015; Smith & Marx (eds.) 1994.
202  Feenberg 2002, pp. 5–6 and passim. See also Cockfield & Pridmore 2007, pp. 479–482; Hildebrandt 
2009, pp. 461–462.
203  Hildebrandt 2009, pp. 453–454 (“the way specific technologies constrain human and non-human 
interaction”).
204  Cf., e.g., Bijker & Law 1992.
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The relationship is thus characterized by reciprocity or co-production in which 
both sides are contested and changing.205 This has also been recognized in the context 
of law and science: science drives legal decision-making, but the judicial process also 
determines, for the purposes of delivering justice, what is regarded as generally valid 
science.206 Another way to put it is to adopt a pluralist perspective: both law and 
technology are actors that are capable of shaping the world.207
This study implicitly follows the idea that law plays a vital part in supporting 
the development and use of drones, whose ultimate purpose is to improve humans’ 
social existence.208 But, it also notes that law, in legislating drones, protects interests 
other than technological progress, too. To continue with Tranter’s train of thought, 
the effort could be described as law
defensively trying to salvage a future by maintaining its normative vitality and ensuring 
the continuity of legal institutions.209
Yet this effort is not to be derided. By prohibiting the use of certain drones and 
certain ways of operating such aircraft, and by setting limitations, aviation safety 
and security law pushes against the technology enterprise.210 By doing so, it gives 
value to other interests, chiefly the safety of humans on the ground and on board 
manned aircraft.211 As noted in the article on U-space,212 although technological 
developments must be considered when drafting legal standards, the development 
of technology is equally limited by legal necessities. These necessities are sometimes 
of the technological mindset, but in many cases they are not. Equating law with 
technology is thus unrealistic even in cases where the traditional pattern of law 
and technology enterprise is followed. The present study does not seek to justify a 
rampant offense by the technological mindset over all other viewpoints, resulting in 
a (dystopian) cornucopia or (cornucopian) dystopia.213 Viewing this study as being 
driven purely by technology or being purely technology is rather a limited view of 
the entire relationship.
205  See Jasanoff 2004.
206  Jasanoff 1995, as summarized on p. 16: “law today not only interprets the social impacts of science 
and technology but also constructs the very environment in which science and technology come to have 
meaning, utility, and force.”
207  Hildebrandt 2009, pp. 452–453 (discussing, however, the overall relationship between “humans 
and non-humans”).
208  See Brownsword & Somsen 2009, p. 3.
209  Tranter 2002, p. 77 (cit. Murphy 1999, p. 275).
210  See Brownsword & Somsen 2009, p. 2.
211  Cf. Kirby 1977, p. 4 (“This leads many to suggest that the law will have an increasing role in re-
asserting against the scientist and technologist, the standards which society counts as important.”)
212  Huttunen 2019a.
213  See Tranter 2002, pp. 79–89.
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2.2.3. Beyond the Enterprise: Law and Sociotechnical Change
Although doctrinal scholarship—the law and technology enterprise—is not here 
considered as problematic as in some writings, this study also seeks to provide 
arguments that move beyond such an enterprise. In other words, the study seeks 
an understanding of civil UAS also on a theoretical level, connecting the study 
to a broader discourse. The doctrinal analysis conducted in the articles forms 
the groundwork for the theoretical arguments, but the latter are presented and 
advanced only here in the synthesis. Hence, the theoretical aspects of the topic are 
an afterthought yet a vital part of the study overall.
The theoretical side of the study does not deal with legal theory or philosophy in 
the sense those two terms are commonly understood in legal scholarship. Neither the 
articles nor this synthesis present innovations regarding jurisprudential methodical 
elements like the doctrine on the sources of law, principles of legal interpretation, or 
legal argumentation. The study does not attempt to reconstruct the deep structure 
of law in general, including its basic legal categories and principles. In other words, 
the articles and the synthesis do not constitute a new general theory of law: this is 
not a work in legal philosophy in the traditional sense of the word.214
Rather, the theoretical215 side concerns the relationship between law and 
technological change, or more precisely legislation and “a change in the socio-technical 
landscape”:216 sociotechnical change.217 It concerns written aviation safety and security 
law (legislation) and modern (21st century) civil UAS, which are a new technological 
platform that enables new activities. Drones are thus not simply understood as legal 
subjects of air law but new technology created through innovation, and not only new 
technology but part of a change that involves new activities, connections, and so forth. 
This change is impacted by law and in turn has an impact on law. To be extremely exact, 
the claim is not at this stage that aviation technology, as a whole, is changing drastically 
because of drones. Although drones can pave the way for profound changes, the focus 
is here primarily on them and their related practices as an addition to the system.218
214  See Tuori 2002/2016, pp. 284 and 291–292. Overall, I favor the term “legal philosophy” over 
“legal theory” when discussing the discipline. There is no single “theory” but several different theories, 
for example the Pure Theory of Law (Kelsen 1960/1967). Perhaps critical takes on the structure of legal 
argument, such as those presented by Koskenniemi (1989/2005), can also be regarded as theories. These 
theories, which concern the origin and nature of law, are philosophical and thus fall within the ambit of 
legal philosophy but also legal practice. Similarly, in political sciences there is, e.g., the realist theory (or 
a paradigm) of international relations and a subfield called political philosophy. Indeed, it is difficult to 
maintain the distinction between “legal theory” and “legal philosophy”, as a later piece by Tuori shows 
(2006, p. 28).
215  The concept of theory used here stems from social sciences. See generally Eckstein 1975, pp. 86–90. 
The differences in conceptions of theory in legal scholarship and social (political) sciences has been 
explicated in, e.g., Abbott 1992; Alter 2002, pp. 116–120. See also Tuominen 2017, pp. 16–18.
216  Bennett Moses 2013b, p. 18.
217  E.g., Bijker 1995. See in detail below.
218  See Bennett Moses 2017.
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In accordance with the definition of technology conceived by Donald A. Schön, 
as cited by Lyria Bennett Moses, drones represent a new entity along with new 
applications, which extend human capability in a physical manner: they enable 
overcoming particular physical constraints. The accuracy of such a definition is 
quite obvious: modern drones can indeed be used to perform tasks which used to 
be impossible or too expensive using manned aircraft, and their increasing use leads 
to new relations between natural and legal persons.219 These include legacy aircraft 
manufacturers like Airbus and Boeing; entities who manage air traffic like the Air 
Navigation Services Finland; drone manufacturers like Volocopter; drone operators 
like Zipline; and end users like natural persons and agricultural businesses.
The theoretical side of the study concerns two themes: the types of legal problems 
created by sociotechnical change and the types of legislative approaches used to 
solve the problems. This exercise, in part, aims to move beyond the silo of air law 
by examining drones as technology and by generalizing on the basis of them. This 
enables the study to engage with sociotechnical change in a more sophisticated 
manner beyond the individual legal problems of and solutions to drones. It allows 
considering technology as a category, though technology is still perceived in a 
material sense as objects rather than a way of reasoning and being.220
2.2.4. The Influence of Case Study Methodology
In its theoretical pursuits, the present study draws inspiration from case study 
methodology.221 This is visible in several aspects. For example, the study is qualitative 
rather than quantitative, since it examines a single case instead of a statistically 
representative number of cases; it is comprehensive rather than wide-ranging; it has 
been conducted in quite a flexible, improvisational, and open-ended manner; its 
primary evidence consists of texts instead of statistics or surveys; and finally, there 
is also somewhat of a narrative structure in the arguments and much description of 
facts and rules on drones.222
However, none of these is the crucial criterion.223 The key characteristic is that the 
study examines, in a detailed manner, the increase in unmanned civil aviation as a case 
of law’s relationship with sociotechnical change. The universe under investigation, 
the class of events, is thus law and sociotechnical change. Meanwhile, the event 
the study examines is the increase in unmanned civil aviation in European airspace 
219  See Bennett Moses 2007, pp. 591–592 (cit. Schön 1967, p. 1).
220  See Tranter 2011a, pp. 71–75 (cit., e.g., Drahos 1985, p. 271; Tribe 1973b, pp. 641 and 652). The 
last passage refers to Heidegger’s (technologically determinist) philosophy in which technology is seen as 
revealing the world through, inter alia, the unlocking of natural resources. See Tranter 2007, pp. 462–466 
(cit., e.g., Heidegger 1954/1977, p. 16).
221  See generally Evera 1997; George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Yin 2014.
222  See Eckstein 1975, pp. 79 and 81–85; Gerring 2007, p. 17.
223  Ibid., p. 18.
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during the 21st century and the legislative responses thereto.224 This is the case, the 
spatially delimited phenomenon that has been observed over the given timespan. 
In part, the case of drones has intrinsic value due to its practical significance in the 
present: the importance of unmanned aviation is growing. Yet the purpose of the 
case is also to increase our understanding of the wider phenomenon, the class of 
cases.225
While the study fundamentally focuses on a single case, there is plenty of variation 
within the case. The different aspects and parties of drone operation and aviation 
safety and security law form a basis for numerous non-identical observations of 
law and sociotechnical change. Naturally, there is also temporal variation, since the 
study at several points encapsulates how drones and the legislative approach thereto 
has changed over time, and what kind of changes are to be expected in near future.226 
To put it more plainly, the increase in unmanned civil aviation, though presented 
here as a single case, is not a unified phenomenon but contains observations about 
various aspects of drone operation and rules thereon: the competence of pilots, the 
authorization of operators, airspace management, prevention of misuse, and the 
different categories of operations, to simply reiterate some key topics.
The approach of this study might be untypical, since it is a legal study that 
explicitly views itself as being influenced by case study methodology and describes 
how that is the case. Legal dissertations often do contain case studies, especially 
when theoretical—whether theories in the sense of social sciences or simply in the 
sense of abstract constructions227—arguments are advanced. A fitting example of 
this is an article-based legal dissertation in which the candidate conducted case 
studies of Colombian people who have been the victims of international crimes.228 
Similarly, my colleague Tomi Tuominen’s dissertation labels his in-depth analyses of 
legal responses to the Eurozone crisis as case studies.229
Both dissertations provide justification for doing the studies and glaringly surpass 
the criteria of legal dissertation, and thus the explication of the method here may 
appear superfluous. However, by establishing a clear connection to the case study 
method as it has been practiced in social sciences, this study may provide additional 
self-reflection about discussing non-judicial cases in legal dissertations. It allows 
viewing one’s argumentation from the perspective of another field of research in 
which such argumentation is practiced in a more widespread and systematic manner. 
The way this study links itself with the case study method of social sciences should 
thus be understood as exposing a possibility: an attempt to bridge the gap between 
224  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 17–18. See also Alter 2002, p. 118.
225  See Gerring 2007, pp. 19–20.
226  See ibid., pp. 29–31.
227  See above.
228  Navarro 2020.
229  Tuominen 2017, especially pp. 12–16.
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some approaches in legal scholarship and social sciences, and possibly science and 
technology studies.
2.2.5. Theoretical Guidance, Testing, and Development
The first theoretical aspect of the study concerns the first of the two research 
questions: What issues can sociotechnical change cause in relation to existing law? 
This question concerns the types of legal problems that arise when the sociotechnical 
situation changes.230 Here, given our focus on the particular case of drones, we of 
course deal with the question in a more specific form: What issues has the increase 
in unmanned civil aviation caused in relation to existing aviation safety and security 
law? The argument combined is that 
[the rise in] the quality and quantity of unmanned aviation [has caused] a sociotechnical 
change [that] has caused the following issues in relation to existing aviation safety 
and security law: vacuity, misclassification, over- and under-inclusiveness, and 
ineffectiveness. The change may also cause some rules to become irrelevant in the 
future.231
The research question and the argument are causal. If the study were to adopt 
the vocabulary of social sciences, the increasing unmanned civil aviation (the 
sociotechnical change) would be the independent variable (the cause) and the legal 
problems the dependent variable (the outcome). Certain aspects of the sociotechnical 
change cause the issues. We are thus concerned with the relation between the two: 
the aim is to show whether and how the characteristics and increasing use of drones 
have led to the issues.232 The variables are worth pointing out, despite the fact that 
case-oriented research is not as concerned with them as quantitative research.233
The second theoretical aspect, meanwhile, concerns the legislative approaches to 
the aforementioned issues. It deals with the latter of the two main research questions: 
What legislative approaches have ICAO and the EU used to solve the issues caused 
by the increase in unmanned civil aviation? Therefore, it focuses on the argument 
according to which
[i]n solving the issues, ICAO and the EU have used the following legislative approaches: 
passivity, replication, emulation, and alternative rules. The approach of transformation 
may be used in the future.
230  Bennett Moses 2013b, p. 14.
231  See above.
232  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 79–83 and 127–149. See also Alter 2002, p. 117.
233  Ragin 1997.
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The question and the argument are descriptive. However, when read alongside the 
aforementioned argument(s), they contain another causal suggestion: that the issues 
identified above can cause the legislator to adopt one or some of the aforementioned 
approaches. If we once again employ the language of social sciences, the legal problems 
are the independent variable, while the approaches are the dependent variable.234 
To be sure, the claim is not a normative one, such as those presented as doctrinal 
conclusions. Hence, this study does not assert that that lawmakers should follow a 
particular approach, nor does it provide a comprehensive take on which approach 
is the most appropriate in which situation. While there is some discussion on the 
benefits and shortcomings of the approaches both generally and in the context of 
drones, the purpose is not at this stage to provide overarching generalizations about 
the exact relationship. The claim is simply that the listed approaches offer a valid way 
of categorizing the phenomenon, which gains support from the case of drones. In a 
sense, legislators always follow the approaches in that their responses can always be 
categorized pursuant to the typology.
In light of the literature on case studies, the theoretical part of the study may 
appear idiographic. This means that it focuses on describing, explaining, interpreting, 
and understanding a single case. More precisely, though, the study is not purely 
inductive (atheoretical). Rather, it is theory-guided (interpretative), since it 
explicitly uses generalized concepts to bring out the interesting aspects of the case.235 
The theoretical nature of the study is quite apparent at least pursuant to Eckstein’s 
classic understanding. It aims to provide statements of regularity or, at minimum, 
of probability concerning the relationship between law and sociotechnical change. 
The study seeks reliable and valid rules, which can correctly not only fit pre-made 
observations but anticipate how unknown cases turn out. Hence, it aims for 
foreknowledge about outcomes. The study is also parsimonious in that it offers a 
proportionate number of regularities.236
Yet it is probably mistaken to characterize the theoretical part of the study as 
merely idiographic, since it also involves theory (hypothesis) testing.237 Testing in this 
case partly concerns the legal issues created by sociotechnical change. This is because 
the characterization of the issues draws upon existing theories on the legal issues 
caused by sociotechnical change. Particularly, the argument refers to the typology238 
developed by Lyria Bennett Moses on the reasons why legal change is promoted as a 
234  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 79–83
235  See Levy 2008, pp. 4–5; Lijphart 1971, p. 692.
236  See Eckstein 1975, pp. 86–90. Indeed, Bennett Moses (2007a, pp. 594–595) has explicitly argued 
in favor of a theory of law and technological change, part of which is the “classification scheme” of reasons 
for legal change.
237  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 115–123; Levy 2008, p. 6; Lijphart 1971, p. 692. Cf. Alter 2002, 
pp. 117–118 (discussing the aim of political science in general).
238  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 233–262.
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response to technological (later, sociotechnical) change.239 To an extent, there is an 
attempt to examine the validity of the typology by using the increase in unmanned 
civil aviation (in relation to existing aviation safety and security law) as a case. The 
case of drones may provide further evidence for generalizations. 
On the other hand, the existing typologies are not simply tested as they are, but 
there is first an attempt to analyze their possible shortcomings and improve on them. 
On the side of legal issues, there is an attempt to develop several typologies, mainly 
that of Bennett Moses. On the side of legislative approaches, the study suggests 
a novel typology. The study thus does not merely test a theory but attempts to 
participate in the process of theory development (generation of hypotheses). The 
model suggested in the following Chapter actually combines the two theoretical 
aspects of the study into one procedural framework, a model, on how legislation 
deals with sociotechnical change. This model begins from the debated existence of 
sociotechnical change itself, considers the existence and applicability of existing rules, 
including the issues thereof, and ends with a scheme of several legislative approaches.
The model is essentially one widespread hypothesis, a tentative answer about 
legislation and sociotechnical change. This an exploratory exercise, a matter of 
conjecture, though not really guesswork or luck. It introduces a new idea or least 
a new perspective on the basis of observable action by legislators. The aim is to 
inductively develop a generalized typology on the possible issues and legislative 
reactions. To put it more exactly, the purpose is of course not to create a complete 
theory on the basis of a single case. Instead, the study and the model it presents 
should be viewed as contributing to the process of constructing a broader theory of 
the relationship between law and technology. In other words, I am here participating 
in the creation of a theory that can be developed in further studies.240
The model can be seen as falling within the ambit of regulation/regulatory 
(governance) theory.241 In this capacity, the model describes the causalities between 
sociotechnical change, legislation that predates the change, and the possible 
legislative approaches. At the same time, it prescribes a procedure a legislator can 
undertake when confronted by sociotechnical change. The ambit of regulatory 
theory, as the following Chapter shows, is of course much wider than the model 
developed here. This is because regulation, as already explained above, involves 
many more ways of influencing behavior than this study explores: besides written 
law, regulation includes social norms, economic factors, and so forth. Furthermore, 
regulatory theories often consider approaches much more broadly than this study 
does.
239  See below for details.
240  See Eckstein 1975, p. 91; George & Bennett 2005, pp. 109–124; Gerring 2007, pp. 39–41; Levy 
2008, pp. 5–6; Lijphart 1971, p. 692.
241  See generally, e.g., Parker & Braithwaite 2003. See also Drahos (ed.) 2017.
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One problem with using the present study in theoretical development is that 
there has been no predetermined strategy to guide the selection of cases or other 
aspects of the study’s design.242 In order to reliably test or develop a theory, among 
other things, the case selection would have to curb bias by considering, inter alia, 
the comparability, likeliness, or deviance of the cases. A case study that can provide 
strong evidence in favor of or against a theory may examine a number of cases that 
differ or agree in their variables; cases that should support the theory but actually 
weaken it; cases that should discredit the theory but actually support it; or cases 
that, for thus far unknown reason, do not fit the theory.243 As has been pointed 
out, testing involves falsification, requiring one to “find observations that must fit 
a theory but have a good chance of not doing so.”244 This study does not undergo 
such considerations, since the case of drones was originally selected for the purposes 
of doctrinal legal scholarship. For this reason, its ability to confirm or reject the 
theories in question is limited. In constructing the arguments, the study has not 
exercised much caution in defining the dependent and independent variables.
Although such shortcomings cannot be amended at this stage, the theoretical 
implications of the study are important to present. The study introduces a new 
and unexplored case of the causalities245 between law and sociotechnical change. 
The case provides evidence that the issues with law and technology recognized in 
certain fields of technology, as examined by prior scholars, can also occur in the field 
of civil aviation (law). Civil aviation is a useful context because it differs from the 
traditional three fields that have been the focus of the law and technology enterprise: 
biotechnology, computers, and communications.246 The generalized thinking on 
law and sociotechnical change has not previously been explored in such a context. 
Additionally, the case of drones allows developing the generalized thinking about the 
legal issues as well as extending the thinking into legislative solutions. The evidence 
provided by this study comes in the form of a number of observations, encompassing 
the most relevant characteristics of aircraft operation and the legislation thereof: 
there is sufficient reasoning behind the theoretical development. This justifies the 
fifth argument of the study:
Examining the case of unmanned civil aviation improves our understanding of the 
general relationship between law and sociotechnical change.
242  See George & Bennett 2005, pp. 83–84.
243  Levy 2008, pp. 7–14. See also George & Bennett 2005, pp. 22–25.
244  Eckstein 1975, p. 116 (advocating the use of crucial cases). See also Alter 2002, p. 118.
245  Gerring 2007, p. 42.
246  See Friedman 1986.
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Case studies such as the one conducted here often constitute the initial evidence 
in creating new generalizations and conceptualizations. They represent discovery, 
recognizing phenomena and patterns that thus far have been left unacknowledged. 
Furthermore, intensively studying the increase in unmanned aviation can help in the 
development of a comprehensive theory, since the subject matter is examined closely. 
Having a large number of cases is not a value in itself when a new phenomenon is 
first examined and regardless suits better the process of theory testing.247
247  Gerring 2007, pp. 40–43 (cit., e.g., Vandenbroucke 2001, p. 331).
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3. A Model of Legislation and Sociotechnical Change
3.1. Preliminary Questions
3.1.1. The Existence of Sociotechnical Change
The purpose of the present Chapter is to establish a model of legislation and 
sociotechnical change, which is the theoretical contribution of this study. In order to 
understand the model, it is useful to first present it as a whole and thereafter explore 
its various components in detail:
[Figure 1: Legislation and Sociotechnical Change]
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Overall, understanding the relationship between legislation and sociotechnical 
change is best described as an ongoing process rather than a collection of separate 
aspects. To this end, any model to describe the relationship will have to begin from 
certain preliminary questions that concern sociotechnical change itself instead of 
directly discussing problems or solutions. Additionally, the model will have to take 
into account some negatives: there might be no change occurring, no problems with 
applying existing rules, or reasons why we might not desire a legislative response to 
sociotechnical change. Still, the model will have to offer as its main contribution an 
understanding of the legal issues and the legislative approaches. Finally, since the 
model concerns a process it should not limit itself to cases in which there certainly 
are rules that have already caused legal issues. The model must also incorporate issues 
that would occur, according to reasoning, if existing rules were to be applied.
To begin with, the fundamental question about law and sociotechnical change 
is whether there is a sociotechnical change occurring at all. The concept of 
sociotechnical change contains three elements. It is useful to begin from the element 
of the technical, which refers to technology. Naturally, there are a great number 
of ways to define technology. As Friedrich Rapp has pointed out, technology is 
historically speaking such a widespread phenomenon that it cannot be encapsulated 
in a single definition. Essentially, he argues, the matter is a choice between a short and 
vague formulation or a formulation that specifies the individual aspects of activity. 
For example, one could define technology simply as human action that transforms 
nature, or in an elaborate way as referring to particular procedures or techniques that 
involve engineering of some kind to produce certain outcomes.248
The definition employed in this study is somewhat of a compromise, since 
it defines technology as “any tool or technique, any product or process, any 
physical equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is 
extended.”249 Such a definition balances between concreteness and abstraction, and 
it seems suitable for understanding the artefacts, processes, and relations of the 20th 
and 21st century, with which the model developed here is concerned. The definition, 
to a large extent, also incorporates the three layers of technology recognized at times 
in literature. According to that idea, technology first refers to physical objects, for 
example drones; second, to the human development, use, and altering of technology; 
and third, to the knowledge of how to carry out such activities.250
248  Rapp 1978/1981, pp. 23–24 and 31–36. The point about history is also mentioned in MacKenzie 
& Wajcman 1985, p. 3.
249  Schön 1967, p. 1. As mentioned above, this definition is also cited in Bennett Moses 2007, p. pp. 
591–592.
250  MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985, pp. 3–4. This understanding is also adopted in Bijker, Hughes & 
Pinch 1987/2012, p. xliii.
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A layered understanding of technology already implies a move from “technical” 
to “sociotechnical”, which brings us to the second element of sociotechnical change: 
the social (societal). By this addition, which I draw particularly from constructivist 
studies on technology, I emphasize that this study and the model developed 
here is about not only technological objects but also their related practices. As 
has been argued, technology should not be understood as mere artefacts. Its 
meaning, significance, development, and use are all socially constructed processes: 
technologies and their users shape each other. Technology does not act on its own. 
Rather, technological artefacts are part of society: they reproduce and demonstrate 
the interplay of technical, economic, political, and other factors.251 Accordingly, law 
rarely targets the mere technology; instead, the rules actually concern the broader 
sociotechnical landscape.252
The final element of the concept is “change”. This can mean either the “action of 
substituting one thing for another” or “succession of one thing in place of another”, 
or the “action or process of making or becoming different; alteration, variation.” 253 
In other words, sociotechnical change means that some technology or its related 
practices are replaced, or that they become different. The old sociotechnical situation 
can disappear altogether, or the situation can change due to the addition of new 
technology and its uses. Technological development can also lead to new ways of 
using old technology, which similarly can be regarded as sociotechnical change.254
This leaves open, however, what kind of evidence255 is required of sociotechnical 
change. In a way, of course, sociotechnical change is occurring constantly, causing a 
persistent stream of evidence. Additionally, many technologies fail to gain prominence 
because of technical, social, or economic factors, which means that the change is not 
linear.256 Simultaneously, as noted above, law is generally slow in its developments: on 
the side of written law, which is under focus here, drafting and enacting legislation is 
obviously a lengthy process.257 Together, these things suggest that law is not interested 
in reacting to every aspect of the constantly evolving sociotechnical landscape but 
rather to clearly distinguishable changes that actually have the potential to be 
significant. In considering the existence of sociotechnical change, therefore, we 
require evidence of change that is clearly distinguishable and meaningful. Not every 
branch of innovation needs to be considered from a legislative viewpoint.
251  Bijker & Law 1992. See also, e.g., Pinch & Bijker 1984; Law & Bijker 1992; Bijker 1995.
252  See Bennett Moses 2013b; 2017.
253  Oxford English Dictionary Online, “change, n.”, meanings I.3.a and II.12.a.
254  This is a simplification. For a more elaborate account on the meaning of change in the technological 
or sociotechnical landscape, see, e.g., Parayil 2002; Rip & Kemp 1998, pp. 346–372.
255  I use the concept of evidence here in its general sense, not in the sense of evidence in judicial activity.
256  Pinch & Bijker 1984, pp. 405–406 (cit. Staudenmaier 1983/1984); Bijker & Law 1992, pp. 3–4.
257  There are simply too many variables (inter alia, the jurisdiction, type of legislative instrument, and 
drafting procedure) to take into account in order to provide any generalized data on this.
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Another point to make is that the evidence we are looking for is primarily factual. 
By this, I mean that sociotechnical change is demonstrated by facts about technology 
and its related practices. To be sure, a change is not occurring simply because we can 
point out a disconnection between law and facts258 or because there are legislative 
projects going on. The observation of legal disconnection and the ensuing legislative 
action are rather the result of there being a change. The facts that demonstrate a 
sociotechnical change generally concern, first, the characteristics of certain new 
technologies and, second, how existing or new technologies are or will be used.259
The concept of sociotechnical change simultaneously is separate from and part 
of social change. On one hand, sociotechnical change involves the distinct element 
of technology: as defined above, it has something to do with tools, techniques, 
processes, etc. that extend human capabilities. Perhaps social change cannot occur 
wholly detached from technology,260 and in many cases the most major changes—
changes from a particular social system to another—are connected to technology. 
Still, change that is not driven by or focused on technology is possible. Human history 
provides many examples of this, including changes in the various components that 
make up societies. For instance, a new election cycle may usher in a different public 
opinion about welfare, a religious reformation can change people’s perception of the 
role of church, or a demographic shift can alter the power of societal groups vis-à-vis 
each other.261 These types of changes can cause all sorts of legal issues and responses,262 
but they cannot always and necessarily be characterized as sociotechnical changes.
However, as noted, sociotechnical change is in many cases connected to general 
societal changes, and conceptually it can be viewed as falling within the ambit of 
such.263 For instance, sociotechnical change in civil aviation to incorporate unmanned 
aviation can be regarded as part of a social change in how humans move and perceive 
mobility. In this way, examining law and sociotechnical change can be framed as part 
of law and social change, albeit this study only examines the former relationship.
 Pursuant to the model developed in this Chapter, it is important to realize that 
mistakes in recognizing sociotechnical change can easily occur. In some cases, the 
existence of sociotechnical change can be mistaken as there being no such change; 
258  See Brownsword 2008, pp. 161–167.
259  For an example of such assessments, see, e.g., Bijker 1995.
260  Ellul 1964, p. 334 (“all social changes, are located wholly within this condition of fact [‘technical 
forces and economic considerations beyond the reach of man’] unless they are purely utopian.”). This is 
a deterministic objection to pure technological instrumentalism, according to which humans have full 
control over technology.
261  For a comprehensive, descriptive overview of humankind’s social changes, see Chase-Dunn & Lerro 
2014/2016. For a theoretical overview, see Form & Wilterdink (undated). The latter authors summarize 
several key theories on social change, including for example Auguste Comte’s law of three stages (see 
Comte 1853).
262  For an overview of law’s relationship with social change, see Roach Anleu 2000/2010.
263  Schwartz Cowan 1987/2012, p. 253.
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in other cases, it might be thought that a change is occurring although, in reality, it 
is not. Our perception of this is affected by great many factors, as the model notes. 
Two important factors are our values and the public opinion, in that conservative 
estimates may downplay and liberal ones may exaggerate the change, or vice versa.264 
Another one is existing law due to the reciprocal relationship between law and 
technology.
Mistakes in recognizing change can particularly happen in the early phases of a 
particular new technology, as its implications on the overall sociotechnical landscape 
are unclear. A false perception might be formed due to miscalculations of effects by 
experts, due to political pressures by the general public, or due to values in the form 
of political standpoints. To this issue, though, there is no other fix but to call for the 
careful assessment of the facts at hand. The issue relates to the classical Collingridge 
dilemma,265 or the uncertainty paradox: legislators must respond without having 
much information about the risks and without knowing how the technology will 
further be developed.266
3.1.2. Considering Legislation
The uncertainty paradox becomes more pronounced when we consider the 
appropriate responses to there being a sociotechnical change, or there being none. 
The appropriate response to there being no change (whether this actually is the case 
or not) is, of course, passivity. As is explained below, this approach simply means 
taking no legislative action, although judicial, administrative, or other responses can 
still occur. Of course, the legislators may still be instigated to act if some stakeholders 
exert pressure on them. In these cases, the problem might be that citizens mistakenly 
believe that a change is occurring, or that there is a pressure to address perceived 
sociotechnical problems albeit it is uncertain whether a change is occurring. In this 
manner, despite there being no sociotechnical change, legislation might still have to 
be considered in more detail.
When it is determined that a sociotechnical change is taking place, the preliminary 
question is whether there are existing rules that do or could apply to the new 
technology and its use. This does not mean that there should be rules to cover every 
aspect of the sociotechnical change; instead, it means whether there are any rules that 
apply, or de lege ferenda, could be applied to a particular aspect of the sociotechnical 
change. Such aspects include, most notably, the desired characteristics or intended 
manner of using of the new technology. The standard as to what constitutes rules 
that “could apply” is loose and difficult to define. Existing studies use a threshold of 
264  Since these factors are not the centerpiece of the model, I have taken the liberty to generalize, instead 
of presenting in perfect scholarly fashion, the viewpoints that might come into play. The concepts of 
“conservative” and “liberal” are thus used purely in an illustrative manner.
265  Collingridge 1980, p. 11.
266  Asselt, Vos & Fox 2010.
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“clearly connected”,267 which could be downplayed to simply “connected” or “related”. 
Regardless, the exercise in defining connected rules should not be emphasized over 
the more important ones: recognizing and responding to the possible legal problems 
caused by them.
If there are no rules that apply or could apply, then there is vacuity: a lack of 
applicable rules. Perhaps the change should be legislated, but nothing in the present 
law is there to guide the way. In such a case, the only option is to move directly onto 
considering legislative action. The situation of there being no rules at all is framed 
below as an issue in slightly more detail.
The following questions in the process leave aside the lack of applicable rules, 
instead focusing on the use of existing rules. This leads us to question whether there 
are or would be any issues with their application. When there are no issues with 
their application, we move to consider what legislative action should be taken. If 
there are or would be issues in application, we move onto recognize which of the 
issues we are dealing with. The application of a particular rule may cause one or 
more issues, depending on what the rule states and what the sociotechnical change 
entails. These are all causes for legislative action. The typology of the issues, as the 
following section describes, largely draws on existing legal scholarship but equally 
makes some changes thereto. Chapter 4 exemplifies the meaning of the issues in the 
case of drones.
Finally, the model identifies five legislative approaches that can be taken as a 
response to sociotechnical change. First, it is always possible to remain passive. In 
addition, though, it is possible to replicate or emulate the content of existing rules 
in new rules that apply to the new technology or its use. The assumption is that 
there has already been a thorough consideration of the issues with the application 
of current rules, so reverting back to the “issue loop” is not necessary. Additionally, 
there is an option to enact alternative rules that introduce new concepts, standards, 
and procedures. Finally, there is transformation, which signifies that the existing 
rules should be changed. The meaning of these approaches is explained in this 
Chapter in abstract and exemplified in Chapter 5 with reference to drones.
The choice among the approaches is affected by several factors, for instance the 
problems in existing rules, and practical aspects and values. Practical aspects include 
things like financial resources that are required in the legislative project. Values, on 
the other hand, might affect the choice of approach in that a conservative attitude268 
by the legislator or important stakeholders may prevent adopting alternative 
rules or transforming existing ones. Of course, there are numerous values, such as 
sustainability, human welfare, security, and biodiversity that can affect the choice in 
all sorts of ways.
267  Bennett Moses 2007b, p. 260.
268  Again, this concept is used purely in an illustrative sense.
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There are some natural pathways between the identified issues (or lack thereof ) 
and the legislative approaches. For example, passivity is the most prominent choice 
when there are no issues in letting existing rules apply without any legislative action, 
but it may also be resorted to when there is a cause to ignore the issue(s). Replication 
or emulation will be used when it is necessary to expressly affirm the application of 
existing rules. On the other hand, if there are no applicable rules, the approach has to 
involve either drafting alternative ones or altering the scope of existing ones. Despite 
these connections, the primary aim of the model in its current form is to merely 
categorize, not to suggest a particular response to a particular problem. Creating 
clearer pathways can be seen as an opportunity for future studies.
3.2. Legal Issues Caused by Sociotechnical Change
3.2.1. Disconnection and Disruption
Literature noting the lasting conflict between law and technology (or science) is 
vast. As hinted above in the discussion on the law and technology enterprise, the 
observation that law lags behind scientific or technological progress is a commonplace 
one. It is repeated in many legal articles dealing with some kind of new technology 
or its use,269 and most of the articles of this study as well as this synthesis similarly 
hint at it.270 The observation is contestable because it does not seem to recognize 
the reciprocal relationship between law and technology. This study, however, is not 
interested so much in the observation alone but typologies and theories on the exact 
kind of legal issues following from sociotechnical change and existing law. Such have 
been presented during the past few decades by several authors.271
A very general way of framing the issue is the concept of disconnection, as theorized 
by Roger Brownsword on the basis of John Barlow’s idea. Disconnection, which 
could also be referred to as dissymmetry,272 simply means that there is a mismatch 
between law and technology. Technology often progresses fast and in leaps while law 
through small increments, which causes the latter to be left behind. New technology 
might also be controversial or unexpected and already in circulation when consensus 
opinion is yet to be formed. Disconnection is usually most obvious before there is 
an idea of how to regulate the new technology, but it may also present itself when 
269  E.g., Moses 2007b, p. 241.
270  See Huttunen 2017, pp. 350–351; 2019a, pp. 71–72; 2019c, pp. 85–86.
271  Scholars have exemplified the problems with cases from a wide range of topics, including the railroad, 
printing press, computer software, the internet, online shopping, state investigative searches, surveillance 
technology, in vitro fertilization, DNA profiling, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and cloning. See, 
e.g., Bennett Moses 2003; Brownsword 2008; Cockfield 2004, pp. 388–398; Cockfield & Pridmore 2007, 
pp. 505–512; Drahos 1985; Friedman 2001, pp. 75–84; Matwyshyn 2007, pp. 519–530.
272  Askland 2011, p. xix.
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the regulatory process is on its way and, of course, when the new rules have been 
adopted.273
Civil UAS could be described as a disruptive innovation, a term introduced by 
Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen. This means that drones introduce 
into civil aviation characteristics that differ from the ones of manned aircraft, as 
traditionally valued by the industry. In terms of, for instance, flight duration, air 
speed, and capacity, drones perform worse than manned aircraft, for which reason 
traditional key applications like air transport have been out of question for drones. 
The use of drones has indeed focused on new applications, as listed above. As drones 
establish themselves in such applications, sustaining innovation can lead to their 
wide acceptance in traditional applications, too.274 Since Bower and Christensen’s 
recommendations on dealing with disruptive innovation are aimed at businesses 
rather than legislators, they are not discussed in this study any further.275
Furthermore, a single technology is usually insufficient in truly disrupting a 
whole field of activity: disruption rather occurs when the world is introduced a 
cluster of technologies and technological practices.276 To apply the idea to this study, 
the fact that an aircraft is piloted from outside the aircraft is by itself not the most 
profound challenge to civil aviation. The disruption, if such is occurring, takes place 
in conjunction with other changes: the automatization of air traffic management, 
the cheapening of technology (resulting in drones), the increasing use of electric 
engines, the increased potential of using of mobile devices in aviation (to, e.g., plan 
flights or order an air taxi), resulting in increased accessibility. This study hence does 
not claim that drones alone are disrupting the civil aviation industry. The point is 
instead to identify the kind of legal problems they have created and to see whether 
these match with the problems previously identified in legal scholarship.
3.2.2. Four Reasons for Legal Change
The typology of legal issues caused by sociotechnical change, which is employed 
in this study, is based on the one introduced by Lyria Bennett Moses. The reason 
for choosing this particular typology as a basis is simply that, to my knowledge, it 
offers the most elaborate construction of the given issues to date. It explicitly seeks to 
distinguish the types of problems in a systematic manner and illustrates the problems 
by referring to real life examples. Bennett Moses’s work is also valuable because it 
273  Brownsword 2008, pp. 160–166 (cit. Barlow 1994). See also Mandel & Marchant 2013, pp. 26 and 
31.
274  See Bower & Christensen 1995, pp. 45–47; Christensen 1997/2000. See also Brownsword, Scotford 
& Yeung 2017, pp. 7–14. In the context of drones, see Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 7–20.
275  The third article of this study (pp. 15–16) does refer to drones as disruptive technology, but this is 
not intended as an argumentative point for the purposes of applying Bower & Christensen’s theoretical 
model.
276  Tranter 2017, pp. 6–7.
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seeks to address certain fundamental questions that the use of such typologies can 
entail, including for instance the meaning of technology and the distinctiveness of 
technology-related (sociotechnical) problems.277 The typology, which she has rather 
uniformly applied throughout several years of academic writing, identifies
four main reasons why advocates may urge legal change as a response to technological 
change, namely:
(A) The Need for Special Laws …
(B) Uncertainty …
(C) Over-inclusiveness and Under-inclusiveness …
(D) Obsolescence.278
The meaning of these reasons may seem quite self-explanatory but ultimately is 
not. According to the author, the first refers to the resolving of a conflict between 
sociotechnical change and social, environmental, and cultural values. Through 
the introduction of new technology and its related practices, there may be a need 
for laws to ban, restrict, or, alternatively, encourage the new forms of conduct. In 
Bennett Moses’s typology, this refers to new laws that are tailored particularly for 
the new technology. To provide examples, the author refers to railroad networks, in 
vitro fertilization, and the internet, which all raised concerns about the sufficiency 
of existing law.279
Technical uncertainty, as mentioned by another author, is about the unknown 
benefits and risks of innovations.280 Legal uncertainty, which Bennett Moses refers 
to, means that there are ambiguities about the scope of existing categories and the 
meaning of concepts. Rules might authorize the sociotechnical change or restrict 
or prohibit it; the legal consequences of the conduct are unclear. Consensus among 
experts may be lacking about the given issues, usually because there are authoritative 
contradictory arguments. While language is inherently vague, according to the 
author, uncertainty about future sociotechnical change is the kind of vagueness that 
cannot be reduced when a law is enacted. This is because such change introduces 
new, sometimes unimaginably new entities. This uncertainty is also different from 
regular uncertainties in legal practice, such as determining what has happened in a 
particular case.281
In this regard, too, Bennett Moses uses the railroad as an example, given the past 
issue in some countries about whether it should be regarded as a public thoroughfare 
277  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 243–247; 2013b, p. 10 et seq.
278  Bennett Moses 2007b, p. 248 (footnote excluded). See also Bennett Moses 2003, pp. 396–401; 
2005, p. 507; 2007a, p. 599; 2011a, p. 767; 2011b, p. 77; 2013b, p. 7.
279  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 248–250 (cit., e.g., Bernstein 2002; Ely 2001; Friedman 1986).
280  Abbott 2011, p. 133.
281  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 250–253 and 257–258. See also Mandel & Marchant 2013, p. 17.
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or private property. However, she also refers to rules on discovery whose application 
to electronic data was uncertain in the early days of computers. Uncertainty may 
equally materialize in the opposite way. This is the case when sociotechnical change 
causes ambiguity in existing categories and concepts, as was the situation with the 
concept of motherhood in the case of in vitro fertilization.282
Legal uncertainty has previously been recognized as an issue by, for example, Peter 
Drahos. He called it invariance (asymmetry) between legal rules and particular facts 
introduced by new technology. He distinguished two types of the given problem. 
On one hand, no legal rules might obviously apply to the new facts. This calls for 
completely new rules to govern them. On the other hand, rules might apply to the 
facts but lead to uncertainty or an outright undesirable result. In such cases, the 
author notes, criticisms of law as being silent, uncertain, inappropriate, or wrong are 
common.283 More recently, Roger Brownsword has dubbed the issue as descriptive 
disconnection, in which case the descriptions employed by regulations do not 
correspond with the new technology or its use.284 Uncertainty has been elaborated 
on by other authors, too. One of Gregory Mandel’s key insights about law and 
technology is that existing legal categories may not suit legal issues regarding new 
technology.285
As noticed by Michael Kirby in 1977, existing laws may become counterproductive 
through scientific and technological developments.286 Bennett Moses’s typology 
refers to this problem as over- and under-inclusiveness, which concern the purpose 
(objective, goal) of rules. Over-inclusiveness occurs when the rule applies to some 
circumstance although the application goes against or does not advance the purpose 
of the rule; under-inclusiveness occurs when the rule does not apply to some 
circumstance although the application would be in accordance with or advance the 
purpose. In both situations, the application unintendedly targets or fails to target 
the new technology or its use. Hence, rules are “targeted” to the extent they are 
designed to fulfill a certain goal and avoid over- or under-inclusiveness.287
 The often-unforeseeable nature of sociotechnical change makes the inclusiveness 
issue distinct from targeting challenges that arise when legislation is drafted. In the 
latter case, the problem is the persistent issue of how to enact rules that achieve 
their goals (have an appropriate scope) in the present situation. This is not obvious, 
282  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 253–257 (cit., e.g., Redfield 1858, pp. 1–2; Schweber 2004; Alton & 
Sangamon Railroad Company v. Baugh; Davis v. Davis; Hemingway v. Fernandes; National Union Electric 
Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Company).
283  Drahos 1985, pp. 279–280.
284  Brownsword 2008, p. 166.
285  Mandel 2017, pp. 227–234.
286  Kirby 1977, p. 3.
287  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 258–264. Over- and under-inclusiveness could also be framed as 
inconsistency. See Kaal & Vermeulen 2017, p. 184.
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since there are factors such as disobedience and activities in other spheres of life 
that reduce the probability of the rule meeting its goal. Furthermore, there are other 
considerations in drafting rules, such as the simplicity of rules as well as the total 
number of rules and institutions applying them. In the case of sociotechnical change, 
the distinct problem is that, at the time of drafting, it cannot be known what kind 
of rules would have the appropriate scope in the future sociotechnical situation.288
As one example of over-inclusiveness, Bennett Moses points out how the 
obligation of common carriers to make a delivery of goods to the premises of the 
recipient was over-inclusive in the context of railroad cargo. Railroad stations, 
after all, are not commonly located at the premises of citizens. The examples on 
under-inclusiveness are somewhat more complex. For example, the author notes 
that some United States legislation on disabilities does not (at least did not as of 
2007) protect against discrimination that is based on information about a person’s 
genetic propensity to develop a particular disease before any symptoms occur. Such 
information has only become available through genetic testing, which represents 
sociotechnical change.289
Obsolescence is another way of saying that existing rules are outmoded or 
irrelevant.290 As noted by Friedman and since elaborated on by Bennett Moses, in 
the context of sociotechnical change this means three things. First, such change may 
reduce the importance of conduct that has thus far been regulated. If some activity, 
like the recording of music at home using tapes, is no longer practiced because 
of sociotechnical change involving the internet, the rules governing it become 
irrelevant. Often, sociotechnical change enables some form of conduct that replaces 
the old one. This does not always mean that the rules should be repealed, but some 
legislative response may be necessary. The second case of obsolescence is about cost-
effectiveness: rules can become redundant if their enforcement is no longer worth 
the trouble. For example, traditional laws on sports doping can become useless if 
undetectable drugs are developed, and it has been claimed that traditional copyright 
laws have become expensive to enforce because of the Internet.291
Third, technological change may question whether some rules are justified. 
According to Bennett Moses’s first formulation, “the invention and diffusion of new 
technologies may change the underlying facts that had justified some legal rules”.292 
288  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 258–260 and 264 (cit., e.g., Diver 1983; Ehrlich & Posner 1974; Posner 
1990; Schauer 1991; Schuck 2000).
289  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 261–262 (cit., e.g., Code of Laws of the United States of America, Title 42; 
Bragdon v. Abbott; Sutton v. United Air Lines; Ely 2001, p. 182).
290  Kirby 1977, p. 3. See generally Calabresi 1982 (arguing that judges should be allowed to deviate 
from obsolete legislation); Gilmore 1967.
291  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 264–266 and 268–269 (cit., e.g., Galluzzi 2000; Melville 2001); Friedman 
2001. Please note that I have reversed the order of the cases presented by Bennett Moses.
292  Bennett Moses 2007b, p. 265.
59
Huttunen: Safety and Security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Later, she redefines the crux of this issue as follows: rules become obsolete when 
the goal they were meant to serve becomes redundant. To this end, three examples 
are given. The first example refers to an arcane Californian provision about the 
presumption of fatherhood, the purpose of which was to avoid speculation in that 
regard in convoluted cases and to protect the institution of marriage. Blood and 
DNA tests have made it redundant to follow the rule anymore. The second case refers 
to exclusive rights to certain radio frequencies, granted by states in order to avoid 
interference. There are techniques allowing the sharing of the frequencies, which 
undermines the justification for such grants. The third example goes as follows: 
In order to promote the rights of cattle drovers, some states had laws requiring 
landowners to erect high and sturdy fences if they wished to seek compensation for 
damage caused by roaming cattle. Since such fences were expensive to build, virtually 
no one did so, which benefited the drovers. The introduction of barbed wire made 
such laws obsolete, which in turn benefited the farmers.293
3.2.3. Developing the Typology
There are several ways in which the model of legislation and sociotechnical change 
developed in this study attempts to improve the coherence of Bennett Moses’s 
typology. Overall, the improvements concern the delimitation and terminology 
of the legal issues. The first problem to be addressed is the need for special laws. 
This concept does not appear to be a primary problem on its own; it arises when a 
problem with current law occurs. There may be a need for special law when there are 
no applicable rules but possibly also when the present rules are problematic to apply. 
It is a call to consider future legislation: the kind of “second level” issue to which 
Kenneth Abbott has referred to as political uncertainty.294 Indeed, Bennett Moses’s 
discussion on the need for special laws focuses on the solutions to whatever problems 
may arise out of sociotechnical change.295 Yet questions relating to solutions can 
hardly be grasped as merely the need for special laws, since there are other options 
available, such as emulating existing rules or changing the rules altogether. This is 
why there does not seem much of a reason in trying to spot where there is a need for 
special laws.
The problem with the concept of uncertainty is trying to grasp exactly what kind 
of uncertainty it refers to. Bennett Moses’s typology has rather a specific kind of 
uncertainty in mind, as it focuses on the problem of classifying new technologies 
and related activities pursuant to existing categories: that there are ambiguities 
about the scope of concepts in relation to new technology or its use. On the other 
hand, new technology may challenge existing categories. However, on the face of it, 
293  Ibid., pp. 266–268 (cit., e.g., Calabresi 1982, p. 244; Singer 2006; Werbach 2004).
294  Abbott 2011, p. 134.
295  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 249–250.
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uncertainty is more of a meta level issue that permeates the whole scope of assessing 
sociotechnical change: there are uncertainties in all stages of the process of legislating 
sociotechnical change.
One could designate the problem as “ambiguity”, but this seems even more 
misleading than “uncertainty”. Ultimately, though, the problem that some aspects 
of sociotechnical change do not find their place in existing concepts seems merely 
a preliminary issue. The actual problem that legislation has to address is the risk 
of wrongly classifying some aspects of sociotechnical change as something they 
are not, which may lead to erroneous results. This is what we must avoid if we 
are to appropriately deal with new technology and its use. Hence, the problem of 
uncertainty is here reframed as one of misclassification. Misclassification includes 
cases in which existing categories wrongly classify some aspects of the changed 
sociotechnical situation. If the existing categories appear problematic altogether due 
to sociotechnical change, instead of uncertainty the problem is the irrelevance or 
ineffectiveness of such categories, as described below.
The model developed here regards over- and under-inclusiveness in their original 
formulation as unproblematic concepts. They well encapsulate the idea that 
sometimes rules inappropriately exclude or include behavior. The inappropriateness 
has to do with the purpose of the rules, which in both cases is violated. At first, it 
may appear odd that under-inclusiveness is presented as an issue with the application 
of existing rules. After all, in that case rules do not apply to behavior they should 
apply to. However, under-inclusiveness does not really describe situations in which 
there are no rules at all. Rather, it concerns cases in which there are connected rules 
that could apply to some aspects of the sociotechnical change but, for one reason or 
another, are targeted so that they do not. Hence, it makes more sense to describe it 
as a problem with applying related existing rules instead of a problem of there being 
no rules at all.
An aspect of the original typology that could be regarded as problematic is that 
it offers three forms of obsolescence rather than explores these issues as unique 
problems. While the distinctions appear clear, it might be useful to emphasize them. 
The characterizations of the “sub-issues” could also be altered to some extent.
The first form of obsolescence is that the conduct targeted by certain existing 
rule(s) has become less important. The lessened importance of particular conduct 
itself is not, as Bennett Moses herself acknowledges, much of an issue. However, 
rules that focus on the past situation can, due to sociotechnical change, lead to 
unexpected consequences296 or make it difficult to understand law.297 While this 
problem can be characterized as obsolescence, the present study calls it irrelevance: 
296  This relates to the discussion on the concept of desuetude (in domestic law). See, e.g., Bonfield 1964; 
Calabresi 1982, pp. 17–24.
297  On legal complexity in general, see, e.g., Schuck 2000, pp. 3–46.
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the rules in question have become irrelevant (and thus possibly obstructive) in the 
new sociotechnical situation.
The second form refers to cases in which sociotechnical change has reduced the 
cost-effectiveness of (enforcing) existing rules. On the other hand, it is characterized 
as the rules having become difficult to enforce. In most cases, one aspect of the 
problem is indeed that the costs of enforcing the rules are in mismatch with the 
probable results. One of Bennett Moses’s examples concerns drug testing. If new, 
undetectable methods of doping are developed, continuing testing by existing rules 
is, to an extent, a waste of resources. However, it would seem that the cost is not the 
main issue here; instead, the problem is that doping athletes might slip through the 
system and compete. This goes against the purpose of anti-doping rules, which is 
to guarantee the integrity of competitive sport. The problem is thus that rules may 
become ineffective in advancing their purpose.298
Ineffectiveness is rather similar to under-inclusiveness. In both cases, the present 
rules in some way fall short of dealing with the sociotechnical change. However, 
in under-inclusiveness the problem is more that the new technology or its use 
fall categorically outside the scope of the existing rules. This is a targeting issue. 
Meanwhile, if existing rules are ineffective, the sociotechnical change, like new 
doping methods, does fall under the scope of the rules. The problem is, though, that 
enforcing the rules does not produce the expected effects.
The third form of obsolescence was originally defined as follows: rules become 
obsolete when their goals become redundant. It is quite rare, however, that the 
very purpose of a rule becomes redundant. This is because the goals of rules often 
represent deeply embedded values, which could be defined as criteria of desirability 
or of preference.299 Values are certainly debatable but can hardly ever be entirely 
regarded as obsolete.300 A much more common case is that rules become obsolete 
when they advance their purpose in an unjust manner: as a result of sociotechnical 
change, there is some form of injustice. Such a notion comes closer to Bennett 
Moses’s original formulation, which referred to sociotechnical change changing the 
underlying facts that justify a rule.
The examples provided by Bennett Moses testify to this. In the case of paternity 
testing, the goal of the laws (avoiding speculation, protecting marriage) has never 
become obsolete. It is just that the method of asking about impotency or cohabitation 
may have become unjust because the blood or DNA of the persons can be used to 
provide a more reliable result to determine paternity. The pre-existing rules have 
298  Meanwhile, if procedures of existing law (would) impose too heavy costs or requirements on the 
new technology, the issue is better characterized as over-inclusiveness.
299  Williams 1967; 1977.
300  Williams 1967, p. 29 (“Although extremely rare, there are some instances in which there is a quick 
extinction of a previously accepted value.”). Williams is, however, referring to a situation where the 
examined population no longer accepts the value; as an abstraction, the value still remains a possibility.
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become ineffective but also unjust, since they are unreliable and require extraneous 
inquiries into people’s lives. Similarly, the prevention of interference in the case 
of radio communication has not become a redundant goal. Instead, achieving 
it through exclusive frequency rights may have become unjust due to techniques 
allowing the sharing of the frequencies.
The example of barbed wire is, however, different from the other two. The problem 
with barbed wire was not that it made the purpose of the fence laws (promotion of 
cattle droving) obsolete. Nor was it so that because of barbed wire the fence laws 
pursued their purpose in an unjust manner. The obligation to build sturdy fences to 
seek compensation had not become unjust; it was simply that farmers could ignore 
the obligation altogether and never seek redress because barbed wire would protect 
their land. The fence laws had thus become obsolete in the sense of irrelevance: they 
targeted the preceding sociotechnical situation in which there was no barbed wire. 
The rules could be upheld or repealed: the original issue was no longer at stake.
3.2.4. Other Issues
The example of barbed wire is useful since it provides a segue to other issues. In the 
preceding section, I argued that the introduction of barbed wire made old rules on 
fences irrelevant. Independent of this irrelevance, however, barbed wire can be said 
to have had a distinct effect: its introduction challenged the value of droving and 
possibly other matters vis-à-vis land ownership. If the use of such wire is allowed, 
land ownership is valued; accordingly, forbidding it may emphasize the value of 
droving or wildlife.
This brings us to cases in which there is a possibility that the purpose of an 
existing rule—its key value—is challenged by sociotechnical change. Such situations 
often work in two directions. Not only might sociotechnical change challenge 
values but, on the basis of the purposes of some rules (values), we might question 
the sociotechnical change itself. The issue could be summed up as being one of 
value conflict. This issue is actually discussed by Bennett Moses in the context of 
the need for special laws. She refers to, inter alia, how railroad networks caused 
social disruption,301 which according to my interpretation signified a move 
toward weakening the then established, rather sedentary way of life. It resembles 
Brownsword’s concept of normative disconnection by which he refers to the case 
in which new technology and its use raise doubts about the values of the existing 
regulatory framework.302
From one perspective, a clash between values is already included in over- or 
under-inclusiveness. Inclusiveness, after all, goes back to the purpose of the rules, 
which are linked with values—in some cases clearly, in others more tediously. Over- 
301  Bennett Moses 2007b, pp. 248–249 (cit., e.g., Ely 2001). See also Bennett Moses 2013a, p. 39.
302  Brownsword 2008, p. 166. See also McMillan & Snelling 2017.
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and under-inclusiveness are not defined, however, so that the sociotechnical change 
would challenge the very purpose of the rules. For example, the purpose of the 
obligation to deliver goods to the premises of recipients was (probably) to ensure 
that the goods are not stolen and remain unharmed. The introduction of railroad 
shipping did not challenge this purpose, as goods shipped on trains should not be 
stolen or harmed either. To be sure, neither did it mean that the existing rule had 
become unjust in general. Goods were and are still being shipped by methods that 
necessitate a delivery on premises. The legislator would simply have to come up with 
rules that would fulfill the same purpose and thus uphold the value in a manner 
feasible for railroad shipping. A conflict of values is thus an issue that cannot be fully 
subsumed under the other issues.
The model developed here specifies the meaning of value conflict to two issues: 
how the values of existing rules can make sociotechnical change appear unacceptable, 
and how sociotechnical change can make the values of prevailing rules appear 
unacceptable. The conflict is a legal issue when the values are, in one way or another, 
embedded in law. As with over- and under-inclusiveness, this requires looking into 
the purpose of the rules. Beyond law, value conflict falls within the ambit of politics 
and ethics, though both of these are themselves closely linked to law.
Despite such a definition, value conflict remains rather an ambiguous issue. 
Overall, quite like uncertainty in its broad meaning, it is something that permeates 
the whole relationship between law and technology. Indeed, it permeates the whole 
relationship between technology and society.303 Value conflict appears to be the 
fundamental problem that, according to Tranter, the law and technology enterprise 
commonly ignores.304 Abbott refers to it as normative uncertainty, the difficulty in 
reconciling technology with values or social norms,305 though this appears to blend 
together with the aforementioned notion of legal uncertainty.
Still, as Bennett Moses herself has later noted, values and their priority are 
nearly always changing and contested.306 As suggested by social studies, values can 
lose their importance, become limited by other values, or become the centrepiece 
of a society.307 Such plurality of values makes it easy to display the existence of a 
conflict between certain values and certain sociotechnical change. But, because of 
the general disagreement in societies on which values matter, a value conflict may be 
hard to claim as a cause for a particular legal response.
Finally, I am obliged point out that the original typology seems to be missing one 
issue, as mentioned above: vacuity, which means there are no applicable rules. To 
303  On technology and society in general, see the discussion above and, e.g., Ellul 1964; Heidegger 
1954/1977; Schön 1967; Winner 1978.
304  Tranter 2011a, p. 70.
305  Abbott 2011, pp. 133–134.
306  Bennett Moses 2013a, p. 39.
307  Williams 1967, pp. 29–30.
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be sure, a complete lack of rules that somehow concern a situation is quite rare. In 
modern law, there are usually some rules that do apply to the changed sociotechnical 
situation. These may either stem from the preceding sociotechnical situation, but 
they also include general principles of law, human rights, constitutional provisions, 
and so forth. Naturally, the extent to which these rules are connected to the matter 
at hand can be contested. In addition, it is not unheard of that at least certain aspects 
of new technology do not fall under existing law. This is something that any theory 
of law and sociotechnical change should recognize as an issue.
3.3. Legislative Approaches to the Issues
3.3.1. Passivity
There are several ways to perceive how a legal system reacts to legal problems caused 
by sociotechnical change. These typologies discuss the issue identified by Bennett 
Moses as the “need for special laws”308 but also the use of and changes to existing 
law. On one hand, the existing typologies are extremely broad. They focus on, inter 
alia, whether regulation or governance is necessary, what kind of regulation can 
or should be pursued, and when can or should the regulators react. On the other 
hand, in terms of legislative approaches, the typologies are quite narrow: they do 
not comprehensively recognize all the different ways in which written law can 
respond to sociotechnical change. A distinct issue is that the theories are not fully 
commensurable since they arrive at their description, explanation, or normative 
argument from slightly different viewpoints.
For the given reasons, this study introduces a new typology of five approaches to 
describe legislative responses to sociotechnical change. The typology partly draws 
upon existing theoretical development but mostly employs its own terminology. 
The approaches identified by the typology are passivity, replication, emulation, 
alternative rules, and transformation. This section introduces the typology in its 
subsections, and the following section will contextualize it, examining its relationship 
with existing literature on technology governance. Applying the typology to drones 
will take place in Chapter 5 of the study, and the Conclusions will address some 
problems with the typology.
Passivity309 is the simplest of the five approaches, as it means taking no action 
to legislate sociotechnical change. This means passivity from the standpoint of 
written law: judicial or administrative response, which are not addressed here, can 
still occur. A group of authors discussing foresight in regulation has previously 
308  E.g., Bennett Moses 2007b, p. 248.
309  I would like to thank my colleague Juhana Riekkinen for pointing this out.
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called it the strata of status quo.310 Indeed, not taking any regulatory action is the 
default state of things: enacting rules requires human effort. As long as prevalent 
rules are able to fulfill their desired goals as they are, there is no need to imagine 
issues to regulate. In other words, passivity works when existing rules accommodate 
the change adequately without any action.311 Passivity is typically invisible. It only 
becomes visible once there is a shift in reality, a sociotechnical change in this case, 
which necessitates action or non-action. However, the mere recognition of passivity 
is not usually sufficient to abrupt it. The necessary impetus for action is social 
pressure. To quote Lyria Bennett Moses, 
inertia is usually only overcome in response to actual events that generate a degree of 
community or interest group pressure.312
Passivity can either be a conscious approach or reflect the unwillingness, 
inability, or apathy of the legislator, or exist as an intermediate space. By the first, I 
refer to the case in which the legislator explicitly deems it unnecessary to legislate 
a particular sociotechnical change. As a conscious approach, passivity resembles 
Brownsword’s notion of unproductive disconnection. This refers to a case in which 
new technology and its use clearly fall within the intended scope of the regulatory 
framework, thus making it unproductive to use resources to re-establish the scope 
for the new technology. In other words, it would be of little to no use to enact 
new rules that would simply restate that the existing standards apply to the new 
phenomenon.313
By inability, I refer to cases in which the legislator does not know how to legislate 
a sociotechnical change. This kind of passivity is usually of intermediate nature, as it 
takes time for the legislator to understand the new phenomenon and come up with 
an appropriate active approach (as explained below) or continue with passivity as 
a conscious approach. Although the present typology does not address the timing 
of legislative action itself, it is worth pointing out its connection to passivity: 
sometimes taking legislative action would be too early (or too late), disrupting the 
development of the technology.314 Despite this danger, in the long run passivity is 
often an untenable solution.
310  Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga 2012, p. 24.
311  See ibid.
312  Bennett Moses 2003, p. 407. See also Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga 2012, p. 24.
313  See Brownsword 2008, pp. 166–167. Productive disconnection, meanwhile, is related to the four 
other approaches, as in that case “it is entirely appropriate that regulatory resource should be committed 
to further debate and decision concerning the new technology.” (Ibid., p. 167.).
314  See below. 
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3.3.2. Replication and Emulation
Another legislative approach is replication. In replication, the legislator issues a rule 
stating that the new technology and its use must follow the rules that have existed 
prior to the sociotechnical change. In other words, the legislator extends the scope 
of existing rules and instruments to cover the changed sociotechnical situation. It 
is simply stated that an existing legal instrument or a rule must be followed, or that 
the technology or its use falls within the ambit of a certain instrument. Friedman’s 
and Kahn’s observations about the legal system dealing with new technology under 
existing rules315 is relevant here, since replication requires the minimum legislative 
effort, going beyond mere passivity. To borrow from Elen Stokes, it is about the 
continued application of inherited legislation, which has been designed for 
conventional technology.316 Replication is the obvious option when there are no 
apparent issues with the old rules.
Replication, as a legislative approach, does not refer to the application of rules 
by courts. Hence, it is not about courts applying old rules as they are to the new 
technology; instead, it is about legislators issuing rules or recommendations that 
require following existing provisions. In legislating civil drones, as is the focus of 
this study, replication means rules that directly copy the content of existing safety or 
security standards.
Replication saves plenty of legislative effort and advances a continuum in the 
treatment of technologies. As Mandel has noted, handling disputes regarding new 
technology with existing rules is administratively the simplest approach. Existing 
frameworks are also often favored because of their familiarity. His main argument 
is, however, that disputes resulting from new technology are often unforeseeable, 
which can render the existing framework unusable.317
In the context of nanotechnology, it has been similarly noted that replication 
transmits the old substantive provisions to the new technology, and the old regime 
has its limits. Simultaneously, though, the traditions and assumptions about the 
values, objectives, priorities, and application of the provisions may be transferred. 
This can result in not only a mismatch but a misplaced opportunity to deliberate 
such assumptions as the new technology is being introduced.318 The question is 
whether current legislation can deal with the sociotechnical change on a functional 
level, but also whether current legislation represents desirable values that should 
persist in the rules that follow.
Replication can be contrasted with emulation. With emulation, the sociotechnical 
change is legislated using existing rules or instruments but in a different manner. To 
315  Friedman 2001, p. 73; Kahn 2016, pp. 1–2.
316  Stokes 2012, p. 99
317  Mandel 2017, pp. 238–243.
318  Stokes 2012, p. 101 et seq; Stokes & Bowman 2012, pp. 236 and 240–241.
67
Huttunen: Safety and Security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
generalize, new technology and its use are approached from the perspective of old 
technology and related practices, yet not simply by a requirement to follow existing 
rules. Rather, existing law serves as a basis for new concepts or procedures. In one 
sense, this is what David Friedman referred to as the modification of old rules to fit 
new technology;319 Randolph Kahn called it “rounding edges”.320 Emulation attempts 
to make the most out of the rules there are without accepting all formulations in 
their original form.
Emulation involves more legislative effort than replication. Tailoring new rules 
on the basis of old ones to better fit the sociotechnical change consumes resources, 
depending on the amount of work needed. Still, it is less consuming than drafting 
alternative rules or transforming the existing ones. Furthermore, just like replication, 
emulation advances continuity in legislating technologies. This can, of course, be a 
negative aspect as continuity can also mean that the values, objectives, and priorities 
of existing rules persist to cover the changing situation.321
3.3.3. Alternative Rules
To tackle issues caused by sociotechnical change, sometimes it is necessary to create 
altogether alternative rules and instruments. Such rules may have been inspired 
by traditional legal mechanisms, but they do not attempt to replicate or emulate 
them. Instead, they introduce wholly new concepts, standards, and procedures 
into the system of law that is perceived as requiring additions. To be exact, we 
are not merely dealing with new rules;322 after all, new rules can simply usher in 
replication or emulation. Alternative rules produce a substantive difference to the 
existing ones.
Alternative rules respond to Bennett Moses’s notion of the need for special 
laws,323 or as she has later called them, sui generis rules: rules of their own kind. By 
this, the author refers to narrow legal regimes which only target a particular entity, 
activity, or relationship, as opposed to a broad category thereof.324 The idea is largely 
the same, although the concept of alternative rules—like the other approaches 
presented here—underlines the reactive part of the rules in relation to existing ones. 
Alternative rules differ from replication and emulation in which existing rules are 
relied on, but they also differ from transformation in which such rules are changed. 
In the context of civil aviation, alternative rules for drones are rules that are not 
based on the provisions of existing aviation safety and security law.
319  Friedman 2001, p. 73.
320  Kahn 2016, pp. 1–2.
321  Stokes 2012, p. 101 et seq; Stokes & Bowman 2012, pp. 236 and 240–241.
322  See Bennett Moses 2003, pp. 401 and 413–416; Friedman 2001, p. 73.
323  Bennett Moses 2007b, p. 248.
324  Bennett Moses 2011b, p. 78.
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Alternative rules are also akin to what Elen Stokes and Diana Bowman have called 
regulatory adaptation, which pursuant to their description refers to the modification 
of existing regulations through specific provisions to better accommodate new 
technology.325 Alternative rules, however, do not modify existing rules. Sometimes, 
they are not even placed in existing legislative instruments. New documents and 
instruments can be enacted specifically to address the new technology and its use. 
Both “adaptation” and “modification” could be read as representing emulation. Yet 
the authors use these terms clearly in the sense of enacting alternative rules, not 
in the sense of transferring existing provisions to cover new technology. Andrew 
Askland has explicitly mentioned “alternative legal structures and forms”,326 
though the context does not reveal whether the reference is to alternative rules or 
transformation in the sense these approaches are developed here.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to creating alternative rules. Drawing 
upon Bennett Moses’s discussion on sui generis rules, one can note that sometimes 
targeting rules at a particular entity, activity, or relationship is the only choice. This 
is so, among other circumstances, when one can convincingly argue that the new 
technology and its use are truly distinctive. Imposing the same rules on diverging 
technologies also bears uniformity costs.327 One disadvantage is that establishing 
alternative rules, whose purpose may have been to fill a gap, can actually lead to 
incomplete legislation. As explained by Bennett Moses, serious issues may arise 
when it is decided that a particular new technology does not fall within existing 
rules, but the newly enacted rules fail to address some concerns.328
Another issue is that drafting rules, as opposed to replicating or emulating 
existing ones, is costly. Legislative procedures consume resources, which may seem 
questionable if the rules under development are not very broad in their scope. 
Requiring bureaus to enforce an alternative set of rules with regard to particular 
technology (or establishing new bureaus altogether) is equally time-consuming and 
expensive. Additionally, requiring all lawyers in the field to become familiar with the 
alternative rules will increase legal costs. Finally, alternative rules will probably cause 
new legal disputes to arise.329
Alternative rules, being a reaction to sociotechnical change, risk being too tied 
to a certain state of technology. If such is the case, future technology can cause a 
re-emergence of misclassification, over- or under-inclusiveness, ineffectiveness, or 
other problems, to employ the terminology of this study. The rules may distort the 
325  Stokes & Bowman 2012, p. 237.
326  Askland 2011, p. xix.
327  Bennett Moses 2011b, pp. 81–83 (cit., e.g., Annas, Glantz & Roche 1995; Carroll 2006; Samuelson 
1986).
328  Bennett Moses 2011b, pp. 83–85 (cit., e.g., Bennett Moses 2005; Kohler & Palmer 1998).
329  Bennett Moses 2011b, pp. 85–86 (cit., e.g., Brownsword 2008, p. 152; Burk & Lemley 2003; 
Samuelson 1986, pp. 501–502).
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development of future technology, too, given how law shapes technology. A distinct 
plausible issue is biased legislation, that is, legislation that favors some stakeholders 
over others. This results from the fact that narrowly applicable rules are more 
susceptible to the influence of individual stakeholders.330
3.3.4. Transformation
The final and most revolutionary approach is what I call transformation. 
Transformation, which has also been called regulatory reform,331 refers simply to 
the alteration or repealing of traditional rules.332 This can occur at the level of an 
individual rule so that the substance of the rule is changed. However, we may also 
speak of transformation when the overall nature of the whole legislative framework 
changes. Usually, the aim is that the rules will apply to both existing and new 
technology and their use. In this case, it is deemed necessary to not only create rules 
that would address the sociotechnical change in the existing system but to create a 
system that would address the changed sociotechnical situation in the best overall 
way possible. Perhaps even future technology is considered. The point is to avoid the 
“operational and ideological baggage”,333 as referred to in the beginning of this study. 
In the case of drones, the safety and security rules would be changed so that both 
manned and unmanned aircraft could co-exist seamlessly.
Transformation may not be a realistic nor useful goal, as Gregory Mandel has 
pointed out. The enactment of completely new regimes (that replace existing ones) 
or making substantial changes to existing laws is expensive, and it is generally 
difficult to gather political support for such projects. Transformation also takes a lot 
of time and is a highly uncertain undertaking, since technology may change during 
the reform and the resulting regime may fall short of its goals vis-à-vis the existing 
one.334 From another viewpoint, however, it is precisely sociotechnical change 
that provides the opportunity to re-examine law. Transformation may provide an 
impactful legislative solution to the issues, as opposed to relying on alternative rules 
that can be fragmentary or constrained in their application by the preceding rules.335
Another way of understanding transformation, based on Cornelia Vismann’s idea 
of law as a material practice, is offered by Kieran Tranter. He argues that when law 
faces disruptive technology it does not necessarily have to follow the institutions 
and practices of modern law at all. Modern law, which is based essentially on 
written documents and human decision-making—predominantly legislation, court 
decisions, and registries—might be transformed by (or with) technology itself into 
330  Bennett Moses 2011b, pp. 86–87 (cit, e.g., Brenner 2007; Kirby 2008; Wilson 1980).
331  Mandel 2009, p. 79.
332  Hence, I use the concept differently than it is used in, e.g., Stewart 1981.
333  Stokes 2012, p. 94.
334  Mandel 2009, p. 79; 2013, pp. 48–49.
335  See Stokes 2012, p. 95.
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something else.336 This type of transformation is naturally more profound than the 
mere repealing or alteration of existing rules because it signifies a change in the 
ontological character of law.
3.4. Contextualizing the Model
3.4.1. Preliminary Distinctions
As any model, the model of legislation and sociotechnical change developed here
rests on a bet that for certain purposes some phenomena are more important than 
others. It simplifies down to what it takes to be the essentials. And whether or not it is 
a satisfactory simplification … is a matter of judgment and … of personal or disciplinary 
taste.337
Hence, the typology of approaches introduced above focuses solely on enacted 
legislative measures. The approaches are also categorized pursuant to how they relate 
to existing law. It is not a comprehensive take on how law can and does respond 
to legal issues created by sociotechnical change. The purpose of this section is to 
contextualize the five approaches in relation to a number of regulatory distinctions, 
so as to explicate the perspectives excluded by the typology.
To begin with, the approaches do not address all reactions suggested by the traditional 
separation of powers.338 In accordance with this idea, response can occur either within 
the legislative, executive, or judicial branch. It is possible for legislative bodies to create 
written legal rules (codification) and for administrative bodies to make decisions and 
apply rules. Courts have the obligation to apply rules and, in some cases, review the 
actions of the other two branches.339 Indeed, within the nation states of the world all 
such branches have been forced to tackle sociotechnical change in diverging ways.340 In 
this study, the given distinction applies on the meta level. The study acknowledges that 
legislation is not the only means by which drones have and will be regulated.
336  Tranter 2017, pp. 10–12 (cit., e.g., Vismann 2008). This has similarly been argued by Mireille 
Hildebrandt (2009). See also Gaudet & Marchant 2011, pp. 176–178; Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015, pp. 
6–8 (cit., e.g., Lezaun 2012).
337  Bijker & Law 1992, p. 7.
338  See classically Vile 1998. See modernly, e.g., Carolan 2009.
339  See Bennett Moses 2003, pp. 395 and 401–411 (cit., e.g., Hart & Sacks 1958/1994); 2005, pp. 
567–582 (also mentioning the market, which as a regulatory force is excluded from the scope of this 
study); 2017, pp. 587–588.
340  In the context of drones, for instance, in 2015 the then Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) 
issued its first OPS M1-32: Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Model Aircraft (2015). Rules of similar 
type (but not necessarily of content) had been enacted in several countries across the world. See, e.g., 
Arrêté du 11 avril 2012; Regulatory Article 1600: Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS).
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Another fundamental distinction lies between international, regional, and 
domestic approaches. Generally, direct regulation of technological innovation at 
the international level is not a realistic option. This is because international law is 
much weaker in its legislative, executive, and judicial capacity than domestic law. 
Fundamentally, the sovereignty of states allows them to control new technology 
however they want. In terms of written law, treaties are cumbersome to draft. 
Furthermore, the focus of international law is on states rather than private entities, 
which usually are the key innovators, developers, and disseminators of new 
technology.341 The regional and the national are, by default, the dominant levels of 
legislating sociotechnical change.
Still, the given distinction does not play any part in the typology of legislative 
approaches. As far as the model developed in this study is concerned, the five 
legislative approaches can occur on all three levels. Naturally, the present study 
focuses on civil aviation in which sociotechnical change is largely handled through 
international and European legislation: the ICAO regime is an important exception 
to the aforementioned limitations of international law. The study hence compares the 
international and European responses to unmanned aviation, but this comparison 
does not affect the categorization of the approaches: they are not founded upon 
the international or regional character of the examined rules. The study therefore 
does not explore, for example, whether the case of drones could serve as an example 
of international law (vis-à-vis domestic law) dealing with new technology through 
coordination.342
The typology is also not based on the differing specificity of rules. By this, I refer 
to the concepts of rules, standards, principles, and recommendations, as introduced 
in the second Chapter of this study. From a legislative viewpoint, the given 
concepts signify that sociotechnical change can be approached through more or less 
predetermined provisions. At one end of the spectrum, there are rules that set forth 
fixed figures, like the MTOM of a drone; at the other, there are rules that merely 
include requirements open to interpretation. These differences are ignored in the 
model, as all five approaches from replication to transformation can include rules of 
varying specificity. They do not concentrate on the choice between rules, standards, 
principles, and recommendations.
3.4.2. Technology Governance
There exists a lot of literature343 that aims to provide the best overall regulatory 
approach to sociotechnical change. Such literature often proposes a holistic range of 
341  Abbott 2011, pp. 127–128; Rayfuse 2017, pp. 506–509.
342  See Abbott 2011, p. 129 et seq.
343  The focus here is indeed in literature rather than firsthand documents of governmental policy. This 
is because literature, for the purposes of this study, offers a more cohesive, comprehensive, and generalized 
take on technology governance.
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measures to anticipate and ultimately deal with new technology, including not only 
legislation. Indeed, this type of literature eclipses in quantity such that deals with 
approaches on the level of rules. When written rules are concerned, the focus is on 
the whole life cycle of the rules rather than how finalized legislation itself appears in 
relation to existing rules. The literature thus concerns the administrative activity and 
field of research known as technology governance.344 Such governance, meanwhile, 
is part of the broader field of regulatory theory in which a variety of regulatory 
mechanisms have been explored for the improvement of society.345
Participating in the discussion on technology governance by using the responses 
of ICAO and the EU as a case is beyond the scope of this study. In order to provide 
arguments in that regard, it would be necessary to conduct an analysis of the 
operation of the organizations, or at least use material beyond the legal documents 
referenced here. The aim of the model developed in this study is more modest, as 
it merely involves categorizing issues and legislative approaches to sociotechnical 
change. Despite this, it is worthwhile to explore the ways of governing technology 
more broadly, so as to see which parts of the wider context the model does not 
address.
First of all, the model makes no attempt at analyzing or categorizing governance 
approaches that focus on the gathering and dissemination of information about 
sociotechnical change. This includes monitoring the research, development, and 
market entry of new technology and assessing the potential risks associated with 
the technology. On a deeper level, it involves increasing the overall expertise 
and coordination of authorities. The common argument in this regard is that 
the regulators’ early understanding of technology assists in drafting the optimal 
response.346 Since the model requires assessing the existence of sociotechnical 
change using evidence, it could certainly be improved in this aspect in future studies. 
Incorporating different approaches of gathering technology related information 
would create a more systemic basis to answer the first preliminary question.
Second, the model does not address the question of who participates in making 
the rules. This includes debates on institutional reforms and alternatives347 but, more 
prominently, public, expert, and industry participation or lack thereof. Stakeholder 
involvement has been promoted at least since the 1970s, when Laurence Tribe 
authored guidelines for technology assessment in the US Federal Government. 
344  See, e.g., Marchant, Allenby & Herkert (eds.) 2011.
345  See generally, e.g., Parker & Braithwaite 2003. See also Drahos (ed.) 2017.
346  E.g., Bennett Moses 2013a, p. 40; Ludlow et al. 2015, pp. 157–161; Mandel 2009, pp. 83–84 and 
87–88; Mandel 2013, pp. 52–54 and 57–58. On epistemic governance in regulation generally, see Raman 
2015.
347  Abbott 2013, pp. 11–13; Bennett Moses 2017, pp. 587–588 and 590–591 (arguing that the 
diversity of regulatory institutions should be recognized); Leiser & Murray 2017; Marchant 2011b, p. 
204; Marchant & Wallach 2013, pp. 142–152.
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According thereto, decision-making on technology ought to involve the broadest 
possible public participation.348 Much of the discussion on participation has 
indeed occurred in the context of technology assessment in which, for example, 
focus groups, stakeholder workshops, citizen consultation, and expert panels have 
been used.349 Another early example of participation is the idea of lawmaking by 
negotiating its content among stakeholders,350 which is contrasted by direct final 
rulemaking in which involvement is initially rejected.351 More recently, too, there 
have been calls for identifying and involving stakeholders in order to determine 
what kind of regulation should be pursued.352 Sometimes, participation is framed as 
involving the discovery of shared values353 or information exchange between private 
and public lawmakers.354 Measures such as self-regulation (codes of conduct)355 and 
cooperative regulation356 are also about participation.
The perspective of participation is something that a comprehensive theory of 
law and sociotechnical change should incorporate. As an element, participation is 
pervasive: it concerns everything from the recognition of sociotechnical change 
to the drafting of legislation. Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint a single stage at 
which choices regarding stakeholder involvement should be made. One problematic 
aspect of participation is that the possibilities thereof vary greatly on different levels 
of regulation (international, regional, and national). This simply makes it harder to 
systematically implement in a generalized model.
Third, the model does not categorize its approaches on the basis of how they 
control and incentivize sociotechnical change. Discussions of this sort sometimes 
begin from the observation that law is both a technique of managing technological 
development—both in a positive and negative sense—and an instrument of enabling 
technological innovation. Law both prohibits and incentivizes.357 Thereafter, 
writers generally argue for a regulatory approach that would best stay on top of 
348  Tribe 1973a, pp. 594–597.
349  Bennett Moses 2013a, pp. 40–42 (cit., e.g., Armstrong & Willis 1980; Decker [ed.] 2001; Decker & 
Ladikas [eds.] 2004; Dunkerley & Glasner 1998; Grin, Graaf & Hoppe 1997; Joss & Durant [eds.] 1995; 
Sclove 2010). See also Flear & Pfister 2015; Lee 2017; Malloy 2013, pp. 128–135; Sarewitz 2011, pp. 
99–104.
350  Dunlop 1976. See in detail Harter 1982. See more recently and more critically Gaudet & Marchant 
2011, pp. 169–173.
351  Levin 1995. See also Gaudet & Marchant 2011, pp. 173–176.
352  Abbott 2013, pp. 9–11; Mandel 2009, pp. 82–83 and 90–91; 2013, pp. 60–61; Ludlow et al. 2015, 
161.
353  Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga 2012, pp. 10–25 and 29.
354  Kaal 2014. See also Kaal & Vermeulen 2017.
355  Rappert 2011.
356  Marchant 2011a, p. 28; 2011b, pp. 203–204.
357  Vergès 2014, pp. 76–87 (cit. Cavers 1967, p. 6). See also Malloy 2013, pp. 108–113 (discussing how 
the US federal government advances technological change). This naturally relates to the discussion above 
on how law shapes and is shaped by technology.
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new technology instead of irrationally hindering or rampantly legitimizing it. For 
example, the approach should reduce law’s negative effects on the development of 
new products and processes, which would steer such development into a healthier, 
safer, and more environmentally conscious direction.358 Recommendations have 
been made to rely less on doctrinal analysis based on precedents359 or “command-
and-control” type of legislation and more on other tools of governance, such as 
fees, permits, subsidy programs, public procurement, government research and 
development,360 innovation waivers and standard-setting,361 and informal rather 
than formal rules.362 All in all, the call is for more “soft law”.363 Sometimes, culling 
(prohibiting) the use or sale of the technology altogether is required, sometimes 
the characteristics of the technology can be transformed to improve its social 
performance.364
This relates to the more general discussion on the flexibility or adaptiveness of 
technology regulation.365 It has been pointed out that, for instance, the regulator can 
adopt a “conservative” approach that emphasizes doctrinal analysis in its traditional 
form, relying particularly on precedents; or, it can resort to a “liberal” approach that 
pays more attention to the effects of new technology on the interests protected by 
law.366 On another note, regulation can be expressed either as standards or screening. 
The former in this case refers to rules applied uniformly to a category of technology, 
while the latter to individually tailored assessments.367 The typology also excludes 
these considerations.
The aspects of control, flexibility, and so forth are, like the aforementioned 
aspects, something that a comprehensive theory of law and sociotechnical change 
could include. However, it is worth pointing out that these distinctions do not 
address the typology of legislative approaches used here. Alternative rules, for 
instance, can be just as controlling as traditional ones, or they can be flexible, 
providing a boost to the developing industry. The aspiration to create an up-to-date 
and thus socially beneficial legal framework is not rejected but not addressed by the 
358  Stewart 1981, pp. 1277–1288.
359  Cockfield 2004.
360  Stewart 1981, pp. 1261 and 1364 et seq.
361  Ashford, Ayers & Stone 1985.
362  Kaal 2014. See also Kaal & Vermeulen 2017.
363  Marchant 2011b, pp. 203–204. See also Mandel & Marchant 2013, pp. 31–34.
364  Stewart 1981, pp. 1266–1267.
365  Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga 2012; Mandel 2009, pp. 78–82 and 88–90; 2013, pp 58–60; Marchant 
2011b, pp. 201–203; Paddock & Masterton 2013, pp. 72–75; Saner 2013. Tranter (2005, especially pp. 
844 and 855 et seq.) has argued that the legislator has a tendency to legislate “for the future”, holding a 
belief in material progress: the new technology is here to stay.
366  Cockfield 2004, especially pp. 383–384, 398–400 and 410–415; Cockfield & Pridmore 2007. 
Much of the distinction appears to boil down to whether one emphasizes the literal meaning of terms 
employed in the law or its purpose.
367  Stewart 1981, pp. 1265–1266.
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typology either. The typology focuses on responses in relation to existing rules, not 
in relation to the ability of the rules to stay abreast of, enable, induce, or accelerate 
sociotechnical change—albeit choosing between, say, replication and alternative 
rules can incidentally have such effects.
Another aspect not addressed by the model is the timing of the response to 
sociotechnical change.368 One timing issue is whether compliance should be 
ensured through ex-ante authorization of future behavior or ex-post policing of 
past behavior.369 The bigger problem is, though, when should the regulator start 
regulating a developing technology. This is commonly known as the Collingridge 
dilemma (of control):
When change is easy, the need for it cannot be foreseen; when the need for change is 
apparent, change has become expensive, difficult and time consuming.370
To elaborate, responding early when the technology is not widely disseminated 
seems unnecessary and may lead to ineffective or even harmful law, while waiting for 
the technology to establish itself may make it difficult to control. The uncertainty 
paradox is that regulators must respond without having much information about 
the risks and without knowing how the technology will further be developed.371 It 
has been asserted that the dilemma applies only to the introduction of regulation 
that specifically targets new technology, not to cases in which existing laws can be 
applied.372 However, I would argue that the dilemma is already present when the 
choice has to be made between relying on (replicating or emulating) existing rules 
and drafting alternative rules. 
There are several approaches to the dilemma. In general, the call is for agile 
and ongoing regulation,373 which links the matter of timing with the matter of 
flexibility.374 Measures vary greatly, including the ensuring of safety before allowing 
the technology to be used (the precautionary principle),375 the involvement of 
experts, the enactment of broader obligations, improving the capacity of regulators 
368  See, e.g., Abbott 2013, pp. 3–6; Askland 2011, pp. xv–xvi; Bennett Moses 2013b, pp. 8–9; Gaudet 
& Marchant 2011, pp. 168–169; Kaal & Vermeulen 2017, pp. 188–189 and 194; Kolacz & Quintavalla 
2018.
369  Stewart 1981, p. 1269. See also Bennett Moses 2005, pp. 564–565.
370  Collingridge 1980, p. 11.
371  Asselt, Vos & Fox 2010.
372  Bennett Moses 2017, pp. 588–589.
373  Brownsword, Scotford & Yeung 2017, pp. 13–14.
374  See Bennett Moses 2017, p. 590.
375  Stirling 2017. See also Marchant 2011b, pp. 200–201 (noting, however, that precaution should not 
block potential benefits); Sunstein 2003 (arguing that the principle gives no real guidance); Tribe 1973a, 
pp. 600–602.
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to manage uncertainty,376 temporary legislation (sunset provisions),377 threats of 
regulatory action,378 or legislation that enables incremental changes.379 Most of such 
approaches fall under the scope of adaptive governance.380
The approaches to the Collingridge dilemma are yet another element that a 
comprehensive theory of law and sociotechnical should take into account, as they 
involve the whole legislative process. In terms of legislative approaches, the typology 
used in the present model does not address nor exclude ideas like temporary legislation 
and regulatory threats. The choice between temporary and permanent legislation, or 
between a regulatory threat and a finalized document, is simply different from the 
one between, say, replication and emulation. Provisions that emulate existing law 
can be temporary or permanent. Hence, including these perspectives remains a task 
for future studies.
Finally, the model is not directly aimed at discerning approaches that are 
technology/technologically neutral and approaches that are not. The ideal of neutrality 
has in the EU been expressed as follows: rules should not require, promote, or 
protect the use of a particular technology but instead ensure equivalent regulation 
of services irrespective of the means their delivery.381 Sometimes, this idea has been 
promoted in literature,382 sometimes criticized.383 At times, it has been pointed out 
that since there is no true neutrality it would be more prudent to describe regulation 
as more and less technologically neutral or specific.384 The discussion on neutrality 
is related to what should be the target of regulation in sociotechnical change: the 
technology (product or process) or the people involved (manufacturers or users)?385
From a sociotechnical perspective, this question is naturally somewhat nonsensical, 
as law is seen as targeting both simultaneously. Regardless, the whole question of 
neutrality or specificity is highly contextual. Of the approaches identified in this 
study, replication and emulation seem at first to follow the ideal of neutrality. When 
existing rules are followed, it would appear that new technology is not favored over 
the old or vice versa. However, from another perspective, creating alternative rules for 
the new technology actually aids ensuring technology neutrality. This compensatory 
viewpoint argues that specific legislation may be necessary to, on one hand, enable 
376  Bennett Moses 2013b, p. 8.
377  Gersen 2007. See also Cortez 2014; Gaudet & Marchant 2011, pp 178–179; Marchant 2011a, p. 
29.
378  Wu 2011. But see Cortez 2014.
379  Kahn 2016, pp. 3–4; Mandel 2009, p. 89.
380  Marchant 2011b, pp. 201–203.
381  Commission Communication (1999) 539, pp. vi and 14–15; Directive 2002/21/EC, Preamble, para. 
18.
382  Kahn 2016, pp. 2–3; Tribe 1973a, pp. 597–599.
383  Greenberg 2016.
384  Bennett Moses 2017, pp. 585–587 (cit., e.g., Reed 2007).  
385  See Bennett Moses 2005, p. 564.
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the sociotechnical change and, on the other hand, to curb its negative impact.386 
While the typology of approaches used here can therefore aid in understanding the 
technological neutrality or non-neutrality (specificity) of legislation, its elements do 
not match the distinction in an obvious manner—indeed, the distinction itself is 
hardly obvious when put into practice.
386  See Hildebrandt & Tielemans 2013, p. 510. See also Bennett Moses 2017, p. 587.
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4. Unmanned Civil Aviation and Existing Law
4.1. Aviation Safety and Security
Pursuant to the model of legislation and sociotechnical change developed in the 
preceding Chapter, the first matter is to recognize whether a sociotechnical change is 
taking place in the case at hand. It seems that, in the course of the Introduction, the 
study has already established that the increase in unmanned civil aviation represents 
such a change. The element of technology is the civil drones themselves, and the social 
aspect is their use, development, and alteration in various different contexts and for 
various purposes. Finally, there is also a distinguishable change to the preceding 
sociotechnical situation in which the amount and quality of drones was significantly 
lower. To be sure, there is currently no change occurring in the sense that manned 
aircraft would be replaced by unmanned ones. Instead, civil aviation as a whole is 
changing so that unmanned aviation is being added into the shared airspace.
Regardless of what has been established thus far, the present Chapter seeks to 
examine more closely the ongoing sociotechnical change in civil aviation. To this 
end, it presents a more detailed set of facts about the overall differences between 
manned and unmanned aviation. Thereafter, the Chapter examines many existing 
rules of aviation safety and security that could apply to drones and the possible issues 
with their application. The following is thus an attempt to apply parts of the model 
of legislation and sociotechnical change to the present case.
Prior to delving into the argumentative narrative of the study, some attention must 
be devoted to two fundamental concepts of this study: aviation safety and security. 
Safety and security are concepts commonly employed in law; regulatory regimes 
generally focus on safety risks.387 The concept of safety is most typically used in health 
law,388 while security (excluding the term’s distinct use in insolvency law) is frequently 
invoked in the context of international law.389 However, in air law both terms hold a 
special meaning somewhat distinct from their meaning in other fields of law.
The safe and orderly development of international civil aviation is one of the 
objectives of the Chicago Convention, pursuant to the third paragraph of its 
Preamble. One of the objectives of ICAO, an Organization also established in the 
Convention, is to ensure the safe development of international civil aviation.390 
387  Ludlow et al. 2015, p. 151.
388  See, e.g., Schneid 2018.
389  See, e.g., Charter of the United Nations, passim.
390  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 44, para. 1, subpara. a.
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Aviation safety, sometimes known as flight safety, is the core principle of European 
air law, too. After all, the most important advisory body of European Union in 
aviation matters is the European Aviation Safety Agency.391 The Basic Regulation, 
which establishes the competence of the Agency in terms of aviation, calls first and 
foremost for the ensuring of “[a] high and uniform level of civil aviation safety”.392
Aviation security, though a more recent addition to the terminology of air law, 
is also important. As stated in the very beginning of the Preamble to the Chicago 
Convention, the “abuse [of international civil aviation] can become a threat to the 
general security.” Hence, one of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, including 
SARPs, is dedicated to security.393 In the EU, one of the objectives of the latest EASA 
Basic Regulation is to “contribute … to establishing and maintaining a high uniform 
level of civil aviation security”.394 Given the Agency’s primary focus on safety, the 
Regulation particularly points to cases in which there are interdependencies between 
civil aviation safety and security.395
What is, though, the distinction between the two, if any? Safety, as defined by 
ICAO for instance, is a broad concept. This is apparent from both of the definitions 
adopted by the Organization. In a 2001 Working paper, they defined it as “[t]he 
state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft 
and property”.396 In their 2013 Safety Management Manual, they described it as
the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced 
to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of 
hazard identification and safety risk management.397
The definition of safety appears to also include security, which in ICAO as well 
as the EU has commonly been defined as safeguarding civil aviation against acts of 
unlawful interference.398 This position has been held by at least Jiefang Huang, who 
has argued that safety cannot be limited to accident prevention. According to his 
reasoning, safety is about risk management in a broader sense and has a political, 
strategic, and legal dimension. He has further maintained that security is an essential 
aspect of safety rather than an individual field of regulation.399
391  Emphasis added.
392  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Preamble, para. 1.
393  Annex 17: Security.
394  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 1, para. 2, subpara. f.
395  Ibid., Art. 88.
396  ICAO Working Paper AN-WP/7699: Determination of a Definition of Aviation Safety, para. 2.2.
397  ICAO Document 9859: Safety Management Manual, ch. 2.
398  Annex 17: Security, ch. 1; Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, Art. 3, para. 2. See in detail Mironenko 
Enerstvedt 2017, 117–137.
399  Huang 2009, pp. 4–5.
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On a conceptual level, my opinion is that the distinction between aviation safety 
and security is valid in an informative sense. The distinction is common parlance 
within the aviation industry, hence its use in the title and content of this study. 
Safety is usually seen as including elements like airworthiness, pilot certification, 
and operational approval; security appears to include aspects like restricting access at 
airports, controlling hazardous materials, and preventing crime. The latter includes 
hijackings, or in other words, the unlawful seizure of civil aircraft; the placing of 
armed explosives aboard civil aircraft; the use of weaponry like air-to-air or surface-
to-air missiles against civil aircraft; and the use of civil aircraft themselves as a weapon 
or as a tool of other crime.400
An exact line between the two is difficult to draw in practice, however. It 
seems odd to draw it at “unlawful interference”, which traditionally has been the 
distinguishing feature of security-related issues. This is because it is a very broad 
term. Breaching almost any rule or recommendation issued by ICAO, the EU, or 
national legislators or authorities could be regarded as unlawful interference with 
civil aviation. Furthermore, the concept does not address the motives of the party 
doing so. For instance, if maintenance personnel fail to use approved parts to repair 
an aircraft, they most certainly unlawfully interfere with civil aviation. Yet this does 
not seem like a security issue in the way the industry generally perceives security; it 
is categorized as a safety issue.
It might be more informative to frame the distinction as concerning the intent 
of the parties causing the harm to civil aviation. From this perspective, safety would 
be about the prevention of unintentional harm, which we generally call accidents; 
meanwhile, security would be about the prevention of intentional harm, which 
generally falls within the ambit of crime. To an extent, this enables distinguishing 
what we typically regard as safety issues, such as negligent aircraft maintenance, from 
security issues, such as the placing of explosives aboard aircraft. If, in the example 
above, the personnel mistakenly use unapproved parts to repair the aircraft, it is a 
safety issue; if they do so with the intention of bringing down the aircraft, it is a 
security issue. This is the approach followed in the fourth article to this study.
Upon a closer examination, though, the distinction is hardly perfect. Not all 
intentional causing of harm is criminal, while some negligent behavior can be. 
Additionally, discovering the motivations of the parties involved can be difficult 
and seems unrelated to aviation safety and security as field(s) of law. Going back 
to the example on maintenance, it might be impossible to ascertain whether the 
use of unapproved parts was intentional or unintentional. The management of the 
airline may have intentionally acquired unapproved parts to cut down costs, but the 
maintenance personnel possibly did not know that the parts were unapproved. The 
400  See, e.g., Elias 2010, pp. 1–50; Klenka 2019; Price & Forrest 2016, pp. 45–100; Schiavo 2008; Sweet 
2008, pp. 13–36 and 55–104.
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legislative measures to prevent such problems should, regardless, not considerably 
be affected by the possible motivations of the people involved.
Furthermore, in real life, concerns tend to move between the categories and are 
regulated in a mixed manner. A negligent placing of flammable liquids in luggage is 
targeted by aviation security measures and concerned a security threat, even if it were 
unintentional. If such materials are loaded on board an aircraft, they are considered 
a safety threat. Targeting civil aircraft with anti-aircraft weaponry is another good 
example. It is certainly unlawful interference, but it can be either intentional or 
unintentional, depending on the motivations of the persons using the weaponry. 
Rules on airport security have no bearing on it, but standards on the identification 
of aircraft, which are usually regarded as falling within the ambit of safety, do. Such 
acts therefore seem a matter of both safety and security.
Another plausible way to distinguish safety and security is to label safety as concerning 
internal threats and security as external threats. According to this distinction, safety 
is about “the protection of others from one’s own activities”, while security is about 
“protecting oneself from external forces”.401 To follow our previous example, aircraft 
maintenance is about protecting others, and so negligent maintenance is a safety issue; 
rules that curb the use of weaponry against aircraft are about protecting the aircraft 
from external forces, so it is a security matter. Another way to put it is to say that 
safety is about reducing harm that arises from the operation of the aircraft itself, while 
security is about reducing harm that comes from outside the operation of aircraft.
The obvious problem with this, however, is to define who or what are the “others”, 
“one’s own activities”, and “external forces”. Maintenance is not only about protecting 
others but also the financial interests of the owners and the health of the pilots, which 
are both “insiders” in the aviation activity. Furthermore, some airworthiness rules 
are designed precisely to protect the aircraft from outside forces although such rules 
are within the ambit of safety. The same issue persists if we try to define security as 
concerning harm that comes from outside the operation of aircraft. For instance, in the 
case of air rage or hijacking, the perpetrator is inside the aircraft as a legitimate passenger, 
but their behavior does not correspond with what is expected of air passengers. Another 
illustrative example is a case in which an aircraft is purposefully maintained in a wrong 
manner, causing an accident. In both cases, the threat appears to arise simultaneously 
from within and outside the operation of aircraft (and from one’s own activities and 
external forces), causing the distinction between internal and external to collapse.
On the basis of this, Huang’s suggestion that security falls within the ambit of 
safety seems rather sound when it comes to tackling threats. Hence, in this study the 
distinction primarily serves a customary informative function, as a few subsections 
and the fourth article discuss matters that are commonly seen as being within the 
scope of security. However, in the reality of applying the rules, safety and security 
401  Scott & Trimarchi 2020, p. 5. See also Fiallos 2019, p. 171.
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are interconnected and thus not fruitful to keep apart by force. To elaborate: we 
must acknowledge that many rules of air law seek to prevent both unintentional and 
intentional—both internal and external—harm without clearly targeting either. Their 
goal is, per ICAO’s definition of safety, simply to reduce the possibility of all harm.
For example, rules concerning the licensing of aircraft pilots reduce the risk of the 
pilot making an error (which could be regarded as a safety issue) but simultaneously 
provide them with competence to deal with hijackers and establish a basis for 
airlines to audit pilot applicants (which could be considered security issues). This 
is also the approach followed in the fourth article of this study in which many rules 
traditionally regarded as safety-related are recognized as simultaneously contributing 
to security. This can be regarded as the spillover security effect of safety rules. In 
summary: in some cases it makes sense to distinguish between aviation safety issues 
and security threats, but ultimately the threats do not clearly fall within the ambit of 
either “safety” or “security” law. In the prevention thereof, the totality of air law and 
sometimes the totality of law in general must be considered.
4.2. Characteristic Differences
The most central distinction of this study is the one between manned and unmanned 
aviation. In order to contrast the two, some generalizations of the whole scene 
must necessarily be made. The references here to manned and unmanned aircraft 
aim to highlight some differences on average at the expense of encapsulating the 
heterogeneity402 of all aircraft. To substantiate the overarching arguments of the study, 
the differences between extremes (such as gliders versus airliners and camera drones 
versus human transport drones) are not repeated constantly but acknowledged at 
certain key points.
Manned aviation here refers to the use of aircraft whose pilot is on board the 
aircraft. Such aircraft are manned aircraft. The concept of aircraft includes a wide range 
of machines “that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air 
other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.”403 This includes not only 
aeroplanes (“power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving … lift in flight chiefly 
from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of 
flight”404), which are probably the most iconic type of aircraft, but also helicopters, free 
balloons, and gliders, to name a few other types. The classification issued by ICAO in 
the figure405 below provides a comprehensive picture of the diversity of aviation.
402  See, e.g., Torens, Dauer & Adolf 2018, p. 107.
403  E.g. Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, ch. 1.
404  Ibid.
405  Ibid.
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Meanwhile, unmanned aviation refers to the use of aircraft whose pilot is not on 
board the aircraft. These aircraft are unmanned aircraft, although since the operation 
of such aircraft always necessitates other components like the remote pilot station, 
they are most often called unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The concepts share the 
definition of aircraft. As argued below and in the first article of this dissertation, 
drones are by definition not “aerial vehicles”, “remotely operated vehicles”, or the like. 
This means, among other things, that the classification of aircraft presented below 
applies equally to UAS.406 For example, there are (or at least can be) unmanned 
balloons, gliders, airships, gyroplanes, helicopters, airplanes, ornithopters, seaplanes, 
and the like.407 The only definitional difference is the location of the pilot(s). UAS is 
therefore a diverse concept.
[Figure 2: ICAO Classification of Aircraft]408
1. Generally designated “kite-balloon”.
2. “Float” or “boat” may be added as appropriate.
3. Includes aircraft equipped with ski-type landing gear (substitute “ski” for “land”).
4. For the purpose of completeness only.
406  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 2.2.1.
407  See Desmond 2018, p. 182 et seq.
408 Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, Table 1. Reproduced with the permission of ICAO.
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To begin the discussion on differences from a financial standpoint, manned 
aircraft are generally expensive to acquire and operate. There are numerous factors 
connected to this,409 including the relatively limited and localized need for aircraft, 
the complexity of the technology, quality (safety) standards for each part and 
equipment, expensive and demanding pilot certification,410 as well as the extensive 
liability of manufacturers411 and operators.412 Particularly, high manufacturing 
and maintenance standards increase the cost but also mean that many models can 
operate safely for several decades.413
At the very low end of the powered airplane spectrum, we have ultralight aircraft 
like paramotors, which cost several thousand euros. A single engine aircraft sets one 
back anywhere from €15.000 to €100.000 and a multi engine aircraft anywhere 
between €75.000 and €300.000. The price of a private jet is at least several million 
euros, while an airliner sells for hundreds of millions. To this cost, in order to pilot 
the aircraft oneself, one must naturally add at least several thousand euros in order 
to train as a pilot. From the perspective of the operator, one must consider operating 
costs, such as fuel, maintenance, and storage fees at an airfield or airport, and 
insurance, too.414 The expenses of starting and operating an airline can amount to 
billions of euros.415
It is important to notice that in some cases unmanned aircraft systems are no 
different from manned aircraft in their price. Certain drones used for specialized 
purposes, such as film production, agriculture, surveying, wildlife, surveillance, 
and inspection, can cost between €15.000 and €50.000, or even over €100.000.416 
The very high-end civil drones are, as a matter of fact, as complex, costly, and large 
as some general aviation417 aircraft. This includes drones used for the carriage of 
409  It is difficult to establish a clear causal relationship between factors such as the price, complexity, and 
limited need for manned civil aircraft—they are interconnected. 
410  See below.
411  In the EU, Council Directive 85/374/EEC establishes a strict liability regime for producers for 
damages caused by defects in their products (including aviation products). See Mendes de Leon 2017, pp. 
363–382.
412  For example, Section 136 of the Finnish Aviation Act (864/2014) imposes joint strict liability on the 
owner, possessor, and user of civil aircraft for damages caused through the use of the aircraft for persons 
or property not transported on board the aircraft. Similar provisions are set forth in Article 33 of the 
German Luftverkehrsgesetz and Article 76, para. 2 of United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Act 1982.
413  See, e.g., Commercial aircraft fleet by age of aircraft.
414  See, e.g., Buehler 2018; Houston 2018; Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 16–17. See in detail Aircraft 
Cost Evaluator. In terms of training, for instance in Finland the cost of a private pilot licence is around 
€15.000, excluding the compulsory administrative fees. See BF-Lento: Private Pilot Training.
415  See, e.g., American Airlines Income Statement. See generally Doganis 1985/2019; Vasigh, Fleming & 
Humphreys 2014.
416  See, e.g., The Vanguard; Freefly Alta 8; Oswald & Lacoma 2019. Note, however, that surveillance and 
security drones, when used by the police or other authorities, may be regarded as state rather than civil 
aircraft and thus fall outside the scope of this study.
417  See below for the distinction between different categories of aviation in air operations.
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passengers and large amounts of cargo, which are two developing applications that 
(will) resemble traditional aviation in many aspects. As a prime example, the two-
seated EHang 216 passenger drone—an upgraded version of the 184 model—is 
nearly 6 meters long, carries a payload of up to 260 kilograms, has a top speed of 130 
km/h,418 and reportedly costs some €300.000.419 Operating such a drone will also 
necessitate intensive and thus costly training, as the complexity and the risks of the 
operation are no less than in traditional small scale air transport.
However, in many if not most cases drones are far less expensive than manned 
aircraft. The drone market is dominated by consumer rather than professional or 
commercial drones, though the latter are becoming more popular.420 Since the 
equipment is non-complex, cheap to purchase, and cheap to store and maintain, 
there is often little to no financial threshold to operate a drone.421 A micro-sized 
model may cost only a few dozen euros. Even equipment falling within the low 
end of the professional market segment is affordable, ranging from a few hundred 
euros upwards. Of course, the professional segment is extremely diverse, as it also 
encompasses drones used for high quality photography, which can cost several 
thousand euros.422 In terms of price, these higher-end drones thus come close to the 
very lowest end of the manned civil aircraft market. The operational and training 
costs are still much lower, though.
Another characteristic of manned aircraft is that they are usually easy to identify. 
This is simply due to the size of such aircraft. The length and wingspan of the very 
smallest manned airplane is two meters,423 while a typical general aviation plane is 
larger, being around ten meters in both measurements.424 Airliners, even the narrow-
body ones, are extremely identifiable due to their comparatively massive size.425 
Other types of manned aircraft, including helicopters, autogyros, and balloons, are 
likewise of notable size.
Identifying manned aircraft is easy also because special equipment has been 
developed for the exact purpose. The most rudimentary level of identification is 
provided by the primary service radar (PSR), which detects the distance and heading 
of any flying object within its reach. The system relies on the size and airspeed of 
aircraft, which makes them distinguishable from other flying objects, like birds. 
A more precise form of identification is the secondary service radar (SSR), which 
418  EHang 216 Autonomous Aerial Vehicle.
419  Weiss & Nicola 2019.
420  European Drones Outlook Study, pp. 14–36; EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (B), pp. 
8–12. On the classification, see Miguel Molina & Segarra Oña 2018, Table 2.
421  See Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 16–17.
422  See, e.g., Best Drones for Sale.
423  See Starr Bumble Bee.
424  See, e.g., Cessna Skyhawk.
425  See, e.g., Airbus A320neo.
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provides information about the altitude and identity of the aircraft, given that the 
aircraft is equipped with a transponder.
In contrast to manned aircraft, drones are generally difficult to identify. Obviously, 
the identity of the latter is often obfuscated by their small size. The smallest of drones 
are only a few centimeters in diameter426 and thus difficult to even notice, although 
their sound is usually a giveaway. Yet even some professional models are only some 
30 cm long when unfolded.427 This may make spotting them a challenge, and telling 
different models let alone individual drones apart is nigh impossible by mere visual 
cues. The inconspicuousness of drones is exacerbated by the lack of recognition by 
radar equipment. Unless the drone is equipped with a transponder, which thus far 
has rarely been the case, the SSR does not communicate with it. Meanwhile, the PSR 
may not be able to tell a drone from a bird because of similar size and, in some cases, 
airspeed, which differs from that of manned aircraft. Furthermore, the primary radar 
is often only an accessory for the air traffic controller because it can get cluttered 
with a large number of flying objects or fail to detect something. Clutter filters are 
often applied to counter this.428
The automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), which uses satellites 
to determine the position of the aircraft, will provide a major relief as manufacturers 
like DJI have already started installing such technology in most of their drones. 
Yet the technology in this case simply means that the drone receives signals from 
manned aircraft and warns the drone pilot (ADS-B in).429 Mutual identification 
would require the drone to have ADS-B out capability.
From the perspective of operation, manned aircraft are characterized by their 
complexity. This is closely associated with their sheer technological complexity, 
which itself results from the fact that flying for humans is much more technically 
demanding than moving across land. In comparison with the equivalent commodity 
in road traffic, the automobile, aircraft are more difficult in almost every aspect: the 
process of conducting a flight, the knowledge one must have of the surrounding 
conditions, the reading and use of flight instruments, communication with the 
air traffic control, and the actions one must take when a particular system fails.430 
Manned aircraft are also more difficult to operate close to each other than cars, 
hence the constant need for clear separation.431 Therefore, most manned aircraft are 
426  See, e.g., Best Drones for Sale.
427  See, e.g., DJI Mavic 2.
428  This remains the case although a number of studies have been conducted for the purposes of 
improving radar drone detection. See, e.g., Coluccia, Parisi & Fascista 2020; Molchanov et al. 2014; Sun 
et al. 2019.
429  See DJI Adds Airplane and Helicopter Detectors to New Consumer Drones. 
430  See, e.g., Air Pilot’s Manuals.
431  On separation rules, see internationally ICAO Document 4444, ch. 5. In the EU, see Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, SERA.8005 and 8010; Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, 
Annex V, para. 3, subpara. d and Annex VIII, para. 2.3.4.
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virtually impossible to operate successfully without training. This goes for even 
the simplest kind of aircraft, like paramotors, although such aircraft are far more 
rudimentary than airplanes or helicopters.
Operating an unmanned aircraft system is very different from operating a manned 
one. The whole perspective is different, since by definition drones are always flown 
from outside the aircraft. They can indeed be operated either within the visual line 
of sight of the pilot (VLOS) or beyond thereof (BVLOS), though sometimes it is 
possible to utilize a first-person view (FPV). The latter allows the pilot to see a real 
time video stream from the drone’s perspective. Maneuvering is different too, as it 
is done using a remote controller rather than manual flight controls or fly-by-wire. 
Drones are also often equipped with features and interfaces that are not similar to the 
ones used in traditional aircraft. For example, many drones contain an operational 
mode in which the drone follows its pilot.432 Despite these differences, UAS are 
much easier to operate than their manned counterparts. Learning the practicalities 
of flying a drone commonly requires no special training but a short process of trial 
and error. This is aided by the fact that drones can fly much more precisely and stay 
still, which is impossible or difficult for many manned aircraft. The overall approach 
of trial and error is indeed unthinkable in manned aviation.
Generally, manned aircraft require an aerodrome to operate. By this concept, air 
law refers to “defined area[s] on land or water (including any buildings, installations 
and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure 
and surface movement of aircraft”.433 At minimum, an aerodrome is simply an air 
strip but can equally be a full-fledged international airport that handles over a 
thousand flights per day. The diversity of manned aviation is thus reflected in this 
regard, too, but the overall point remains. The extreme majority of manned aviation 
concentrates at aerodromes, which leads to issues like congestion and many aviation 
institutions focusing their operation at aerodromes.
At the same time, most civil UAS can be flown from almost any location. In order 
to take off and land, drones only exceptionally require an actual aerodrome with a 
runway and facilities. Rotary wing models can often safely take off without taking 
too many precautions with the safety of the surrounding people and property. Fixed 
wing models, too, are very flexible in the given aspect. This applies especially to the 
very smallest of models but, to a notable extent, to high-end applications, too. As a 
matter of fact, this is one of drones’ key features and perceived strengths. It means 
that drones can be used at locations where operating a manned aircraft would not 
make sense.
As a consequence of their limited and localized need, high cost, and operational 
difficulties, the number of manned aircraft flying around has been relatively small. 
432  See, e.g., DJI Mavic 2.
433  E.g., Annex 14: Aerodromes, Vol. 1, ch. 1.
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At least there have been few aircraft in comparison with other mobile commodities 
like personal cars. This is the case despite the fact that both are products placed on 
the consumer market. Although passenger air transport has increased tremendously 
during the past several decades,434 general aviation has not become a commonplace 
activity. For example, in the United Kingdom as of 2019 there were some 20,000 
registered aircraft in total,435 while there were some 31 million licensed cars.436
Because most UAS are consumer or low grade professional electronics, there is 
much less emphasis on durability than with manned aircraft. They are not meant to 
last dozens of years or to undergo scheduled maintenance pursuant to a maintenance 
program. Many of their parts are not designed to be replaced and therefore cannot 
be replaced. The typical lifespan of a drone is indeed only around 30 months.437 
Accordingly, drones are being sold in much higher quantity than manned aircraft. 
As noted already in the introductory Chapter, drones are selling in millions rather 
than thousands. They are not a luxury good nor a tool of mass scale transportation, 
at least not yet.
4.3. Issues in Application
4.3.1. Terminology
The exposition above testifies to the fact that there are certain general differences 
between manned and unmanned aviation and that the amount and quality of the 
latter is increasing. This shows that civil aviation is undergoing a sociotechnical 
change. From that fact, we can move onto two matters: whether there are applicable 
existing rules and what are the possible issues with their application. To consider 
these questions, the present section begins from a terminological viewpoint and 
moves onto discuss several substantive themes that provide answers. Reference will 
be made to the issues categorized in the model developed in the preceding Chapter.
The first article of this study438 discusses, at length, the issue of finding a proper 
term to describe aircraft flown without a pilot on board the aircraft and defining the 
concept appropriately. This problem might, at first, seem of little significance. Yet, 
given the textual focus of law, the use of improper terms or definitions can easily lead 
to legal gaps, and resorting to too many terms can generate complexity, incoherence, 
and confusion. The issue with traditional air law and, to an extent, even the early 
drone-specific legislative proposals, has been that the terms used therein do not 
accurately represent the developing industry.
434  Air transport, passengers carried.
435  UK Registered Aircraft as at 1st January Each Year.
436  UK VEH0202: Licensed cars at the end of the year by keepership.
437  EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (B), p. 47.
438  Huttunen 2017.
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Consider first the concepts of model aircraft and toy aircraft. Both terms, according 
to ICAO and EU documents, have been used nationally in reference to aircraft that are 
intended solely for recreational purposes.439 Traditionally, “model aircraft” has come to 
refer to small unmanned aircraft used by hobbyists in associations and clubs. Due to this 
limited scope, neither concept appropriately classifies the rising drone industry, which 
includes not only recreational flying but aerial work (specialized operations) and air 
transport. To call UAS “models” or “toys” is, pursuant to the typology developed here, 
a case of misclassification. In fact, keeping such terms in use in any form—alongside 
the proper term adopted for drones—risks creating an artificial distinction that might 
enable operators to circumvent safety and security rules.440
Another concept that wrongly classifies UAS is unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 
which was used in some documents in the early 2000s.441 One issue with this term 
is that it implies there are no humans involved in the operation of the aircraft—an 
issue shared by the term unmanned aircraft (system), which is used here. UAV is 
worse, though, as it does not recognize drones as aircraft, which they are, but as 
aerial vehicles. Of course, the very concept of “drone” can be opposed on the same 
grounds. The latter term also risks including non-aircraft unmanned vehicles, and it 
is an unprofessional word that has negative connotations.442
Legally speaking, perhaps the biggest terminological predicament is with the 
only provision of the Chicago Convention that (allegedly) seeks to legislate drones: 
Article 8. First included as an amendment to the 1919 Convention Relating to the 
Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention) in 1929,443 the provision was 
moved verbatim into the 1944 Chicago Convention in which it was supplemented 
with the second sentence. The provision reads as follows:
Pilotless aircraft
No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over 
the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in 
accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to 
insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall 
be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.
439  EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2014-09, sec. 2.4.5.4 (cit. Directive 2009/48/EC); ICAO 
Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 1.5.2, subpara. d.
440  EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (A), p. 9; “Prototype” Commission Regulation on 
Unmanned Aircraft Operations, Explanatory Note, p. 8.
441  E.g., EASA Advance Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 16-2005: Policy for Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) Certification; ICAO Document 9854: Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept, 
Appendix B, p. 6.
442  Huttunen 2017, pp. 358–360 and 365–366 (cit., e.g., Shoaps & Stanley 2016).
443  Protocol Relating to Amendments to Articles 3, 5, 7, 15, 34, 37, 41, 42, and Final Clauses of the Aerial 
Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919, Art. 15, para. 2.
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As I have argued before, both the title and the wording “capable of being flown 
without a pilot” are problematic. The wording of the provision suggests that it 
would only include aircraft without any kind of a pilot, leaving out manned aircraft 
but equally UAS that have a pilot on the ground. Such a reading might create 
issues in applying the Convention, as drones with a pilot on the ground would fall 
under the same rules as manned aircraft. For example, they would have the right 
to non-scheduled flight without special authorization—though this matter should 
not be exaggerated, as such flights are still subject to the conditions set forth by the 
overflown state(s). Still, there would be no particular obligation for states to ensure 
the “controlled” nature of such flights, as the latter sentence of the quoted Article 
would not apply. The issue could be characterized as misclassification, since the 
provision appears to wrongly classify drones that have a pilot. Furthermore, given 
the age of the provision and the very meaning of its words, it might end up becoming 
irrelevant. If unmanned aviation becomes as sophisticated as manned aviation, there 
may be no more reason to hold onto the provision. The rule targets a sociotechnical 
situation in which UAS were dangerous aircraft that were hard to control.444
4.3.2. Air Operations
While some rules of aviation safety and security are common to all, others depend on 
the type of air operation. Internationally, ICAO governs two categories: commercial 
air transport (CAT)445 and international general aviation: aerial work, which is the 
use of aircraft for services like agriculture and photography, is excluded.446 Of these 
three, the first is subject to more demanding rules. In the European Union, safety 
rules employ operational categories such as CAT, non-commercial operations using 
complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), non-commercial operations using non-
complex aircraft (NCO), and specialized operations (SPO),447 the last of which 
means essentially the same as aerial work.
These categories, like the terminology described above, risk misclassifying civil 
UAS. While the categories may work in classifying some of the high end of drone 
operations, they fail to address the operational differences at the lower end of the 
spectrum. As I point out in the third article of this study, the categories are not 
ideal for drones.448 For now, for example the distinctions between complex and 
444  Huttunen 2017, pp. 354–358. Contra Havel & Mulligan 2015 (“the Chicago Convention … 
anticipated the need for legal regulation of unmanned aircraft”). Cf. Fiallos 2019, pp. 81–86 and 97–98. 
To be sure, ICAO’s mandate over international unmanned aviation does not depend on Article 8 at all: 
nothing in the Convention suggests that the Organization can only manage manned aviation.
445  This refers to “[a]n aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for 
remuneration or hire.” E.g., Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, ch. 1.
446  Ibid., Part II, p. xviii, in fine.
447  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
448  Huttunen 2019c, p. 2.
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non-complex aircraft suit the features of drones and their use poorly. Furthermore, 
in terms of operational risks, it does not always make sense to distinguish between 
commercial and non-commercial operation or between transport and specialized 
operation. Naturally, the substantive rules issued for the given categories are largely 
incompatible with the realities of unmanned aviation.449 Indeed, although drones 
with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of at least 150 kilograms have been within 
the ambit of EU air law since 2002,450 there has never been a clear attempt to bring 
such aircraft within the scope of the categories. There is thus a cause for lawmakers 
to come up with a new categorization scheme for civil UAS.
The issues with the substantive provisions on air operations are rather nuanced. 
According to ICAO SARPs, operators engaging in (international) commercial air 
transport must acquire an air operator certificate (AOC). This goes for aeroplane and 
helicopter operators alike.451 General aviation is exempted from such a requirement 
but some operational rules still apply.
In the EU, CAT similarly requires an AOC. Being certified is no easy task, since 
the operator must demonstrate its compliance with all relevant aviation safety and 
security law, but also finances, insurance, infrastructure, and so forth.452 Besides 
AOC, though, the law is more complex than ICAO’s rules. Operations using 
aircraft that fall outside EASA jurisdiction are under national law,453 and NCO 
operations need no permission. In three cases, the operator must specially declare 
its capability to comply with operational rules: when engaging in non-commercial 
operations using complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), when engaging in non-
commercial specialized operations (SPO) using complex motor-powered aircraft, 
and when engaging in commercial SPO regardless of the complexity of the aircraft.454 
Obligations imposed on the operation, which continue beyond the issuance of a 
declaration or an AOC, depend on the operational category but basically cover all 
relevant safety aspects.455
After being approved either through certification or declaration, the air 
operator is subject to a range of requirements regarding their operational 
responsibilities. Pursuant to ICAO SARPs, this includes elements like establishing 
a safety management system (SMS) and ensuring the airworthiness of aircraft, the 
competency of the aircrew (and its obligations before and during the operation) and 
449  Consider, e.g., applying Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Annex VIII to professional 
drone use.
450  Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002, Art. 1, para. 1; Art. 4, para. 2; Annex II, para. 1, subpara. g; 
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, Art. 1, para. 1; Art. 4, para, 4; Annex II, para. 1, subpara. i. See the 
following Chapter for details.
451  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, para. 4.2.1.1; Part III, para. 2.2.1.1.
452  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Annex III, ORO.AOC.100 and Annex IV.
453  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 2, para. 3 and Annex I.
454  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Annex III, ORO.DEC.100 and Appendix I.
455  See ibid., passim.
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maintenance staff, and the adequacy of ground facilities—the obligations are too 
diverse to list here. Many of them also apply to general aviation.456 In the EU, the 
operational requirements depend heavily on the operational category but are equally 
diverse.
In terms of international air transport, the given legal scheme does not seem 
to cause issues: such UAS activity is likely to be of a scale that necessitates safety 
standards similar to manned air transport. The domestic carriage of passengers 
and high volumes of cargo can also be subjected to air operator certification and 
high operational standards. Otherwise, the problem with certification is that 
unmanned commercial air transport is a diverse activity, also involving aircraft 
that present much less of a safety risk to their environment. The delivery of small 
packages in rural areas is not exactly comparable to airliners flying cargo, although 
both are technically CAT. In such cases, the AOC risks being an over-inclusive 
instrument.
In cases other than air transport the same problem persists: the categorizations do 
not address the whole range of drone operations. ICAO’s exclusion of aerial work is 
particularly limiting in this regard, as such flying currently offers the most use cases 
for drones. One could view this problem as an issue of under-inclusiveness, although 
ultimately the issue appears to be the Organization’s overall exclusion of any rules 
on aerial work, which has simply been highlighted by the increase in unmanned 
aviation.
In the EU, many substantive requirements pertaining to air operation would 
be over-inclusive if they were directly applied to UAS. For instance, in specialized 
operations the pilot-in-command has an obligation to ensure that the flight plan 
includes at least one alternate destination aerodrome. This doubly overstates 
the necessary safety level for most drones, as it requires both a flight plan and an 
alternate aerodrome. Naturally, the requirements are partly based on flying by visual 
or instrument flight rules, which, as the following subsections will examine, have 
several issues in relation to unmanned aviation. There are also minor provisions that 
would be over-inclusive for drones, calling for equipment like a first-aid kit, survival 
equipment, a headset, and radio communication equipment aboard the aircraft.457 
On the other hand, for some UAS operations gaining approval through declaring 
competency, as the SPO category necessitates, or undergoing certification might be 
necessary to ensure operational safety.
456  See Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft.
457  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, e.g., Annex VIII, SPO.OP.150, SPO.IDE.A.120–126, 
SPO.IDE.A.165, and SPO.IDE.A.200–215. See similarly Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, e.g., Part II, 
paras. 2.2.3.5, 2.4.3, 2.4.7, 3.6.2.1, and 3.7.1
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4.3.3. Airworthiness
One fundamental example of the high level of safety required in manned aviation 
is the airworthiness certification of aircraft, which is discussed in most articles of 
this study. On an elementary level, the Chicago Convention dictates that every 
aircraft engaged in international aviation must be provided with a certificate of 
airworthiness.458 Pursuant to Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft to the Chicago 
Convention and Document 9760: Airworthiness Manual, this fundamental 
requirement boils down to many more specific rules. First, each aircraft type used 
in international aviation and falling within the scope of the Annex must have type 
certification (TC). In other words, the design of the aircraft (and parts) is subjected 
to a thorough process to ascertain its safety and functionality. In addition, each 
single aircraft must undergo certification to obtain a certificate of airworthiness 
(CofA). Finally, each aircraft has to undergo regular maintenance to maintain 
continuing airworthiness. This is ensured by yearly or more frequent inspections 
whereby aircraft are granted an airworthiness review certificate.459
In the European Union, the starting point is that each manned aircraft (along with 
its engines, propellers, parts, and non-installed equipment) falling within the scope 
of the EASA Basic Regulation must comply with certain essential airworthiness 
requirements. These chiefly concern product integrity but also the airworthiness 
aspects of product operation and organisations that ensure airworthiness.460 Overall, 
the EU rules rely on the same instruments as the international ones: TCs, CofAs, and 
review certificates.461 There are also distinct airworthiness categories like normal-
category aeroplanes462 and large aeroplanes.463 High manufacturing standards and 
qualified maintenance are connected to the fact that aircraft are usually a long-term 
investment.
The application of EU’s essential requirements for airworthiness to drones 
seems unproblematic: most of the requirements are so general in nature that one 
might claim all aviation products should comply with them. Beyond the essential 
requirements, applying the traditional framework of airworthiness appears sensible 
in cases where the unmanned aircraft system resembles manned aircraft. When the 
underlying factual premises and risks of the operation are similar, following the 
kind of safety standards enacted for manned aircraft makes sense. The level of safety 
requirements for carrying passengers on a two-seater drone could and probably 
458  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 31. See also Abeyratne 2014, pp. 351–382.
459  Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft, Part II. See generally Florio 2016.
460  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 9, para. 1 and Annex II.
461  Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012; Commission Regulation (EU) No 69/2014; Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014.
462  Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Normal-Category Aeroplanes (CS-
23).
463  Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Large Aeroplanes (CS-25).
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should be the same as for carrying them aboard, say, a two-seater airplane or a small 
helicopter.
With regard to such commercial grade drones, there seems to be no risk of over- 
or under-inclusiveness, as the purpose of the rules meets the target of application. 
Neither are the existing rules irrelevant if the relevant aspects of the sociotechnical 
situation—in this case, the operational risks—remain in place. There is thus an 
opportunity to skirt some of the common issues and consider replication or 
emulation as the legislative action.
Still, some of the technological differences between UAS and somewhat 
comparable manned aircraft may raise various kinds of concerns. Consider, for 
example, whether and how existing rules concerning the pilot compartment (flight 
crew compartment) of a manned aircraft should be applied to the remote pilot 
station of a commercial drone. There is, naturally, a risk of misclassifying the RPS 
as being the same as the pilot compartment. The RPS is a new entity, unimaginable 
or at least unimportant to the existing legal framework. Moreover, though, one 
should question whether applying provisions, such as those on the view from the 
compartment,464 would be over-inclusive for an RPS when the operation takes place 
BVLOS. This does not mean that airworthiness rules on the cockpit have become 
irrelevant, ineffective, or unjust. It simply goes to show that even when the risks 
are commensurate, legislative action may still be required to address the divergent 
aspects of sociotechnical change.
A more unique aspect of unmanned aviation is that it is based on a command 
and control (C2) link between the drone and the RPS. According to ICAO, the 
link typically controls the data which modifies the behavior and state of the drone 
as well as the data that indicates the position and status of the drone. The link also 
covers detect and avoid (DAA) related functions, data to support the handover 
of the aircraft from one RPS to another, and data to support flight data recording 
requirements.465 In this respect, aviation safety law has been completely lacking 
applicable rules, since it focuses on aircraft controlled from inside. At the very least, 
whatever existing standards there may be are ineffective in relation to the C2 link. 
This is clearly a cause for legislative action regarding all UAS. Similarly, present 
rules lack certification standards pertaining to automation or autonomy in drones. 
While manned aircraft use many supportive systems already, autonomy in UAS 
requires more reliability due to the pilot not being aboard the aircraft as a fallback 
layer.466
Beyond cases in which the drone resembles manned aircraft, applying traditional 
airworthiness rules is troublesome. Type certification is a prime example, since its 
464  Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Large (CS-25), CS 25.773.
465  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 11.1.2.
466  Torens, Dauer & Adolf 2018, pp. 108–109.
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process is so lengthy and expensive that it is out of the question for most drones. 
Obtaining a TC would require spending a lot of time and effort for each type of 
equipment that is often of little value and might only be on the market for a year or 
two. The same goes for the airworthiness certification of individual drones.467 The 
lifespan of most drones is way shorter than that of manned aircraft; a single drone is 
sometimes only used for a few weeks before being damaged beyond repair. Forcing 
all UAS to undergo full certification process would also be disproportionate if we 
consider the risks of the operation. Ensuring the safety of drone operations thus 
requires a different approach.
Pursuant to the terminology used here, an attempt to apply existing rules on 
type and airworthiness certification to drones would be over-inclusive. It might 
seem at first that the same procedures should be followed regardless of the manned 
or unmanned character of the aircraft, but such a categorial application does not 
match the purpose of the rules. It seems like a very primitive attempt at technology 
neutrality.468 The purpose of the rules is to maintain aviation safety at a particular 
level, which most drones—though not all, as explicated above—can meet through 
less demanding rules. Besides over-inclusiveness, there is an argument to be made 
that traditional airworthiness monitoring would also be ineffective in the context of 
unmanned aviation. This stems from how drones can and do often operate outside 
aerodromes and thus avoid oversight. 
4.3.4. Aircraft Registration
Another core instrument of air law is the registration of aircraft. Already the 
Chicago Convention demands each aircraft engaged in international aviation to 
bear its national and registration marks,469 which must be shown on the aircraft in 
a particular manner.470 This implies an obligation to register every such aircraft,471 
which is also followed with regard to air carriers operating within the EU472 and, 
for most other aircraft, in national legislation.473 Although registration per se is 
not a particularly encumbering obligation, in practice the system is designed for 
a manageable number of aircraft that are operated for at least several years. For 
example, the procedure in most states is still done on paper and requires the 
applicant to provide documents testifying to the ownership, airworthiness, and 
467  Nothing in the rules suggests that procedures relating to airworthiness should inherently be 
expensive or time-consuming; however, this naturally results from the extensive obligations embedded in 
the procedures.
468  See above on technology/technological neutrality in more detail.
469  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 20.
470  Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks.
471  Abeyratne 2014, p. 260.
472  Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, Art. 12, para. 1.
473  See, e.g., the Finnish Act on Transport Services (320/2017), ch. 12, sec. 8, para. 1; Aviation Act 
(864/2014), sec. 1, para. 1 and sec. 16, para. 1; Aviation Regulation AIR M1-2.
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in some cases, insurance of the aircraft. These documents are then verified by the 
national aviation authority.474
Again, there are highly advanced UAS that can be registered through traditional 
means: these drones are low in quantity, expensive, and professional enough that 
doing so is justified. Attempting to apply the system to the bulk of drones, though, 
results in over-inclusiveness. The rules would be excessive, as already recognized in 
the United States Federal Aviation Administration’s 2015 interim final rule.475 The 
purpose of the requirements is again tied to the safety level desired for manned aircraft, 
which in the majority of drone operations can be achieved with less stringency. On 
a practical level, because of the number of drones, civil aviation authorities would 
not be able to handle registering them all like manned aircraft. Selling a drone to 
another person or scrapping it would further require notifying the national aviation 
authority, which would increase the initial workload. It seems likely, though, that 
many drone owners would fail to report changes, resulting in misleading registry 
entries. Even the initial registration is impossible to enforce, unless it is done when 
the drone is bought. One might further argue that because of sociotechnical change 
relating to digitalization and mobile devices the whole procedure may ultimate 
appear ineffective in relation to all aircraft.
The rules on registration and nationality markings, meanwhile, are ineffective 
when it comes to most UAS. The purpose of these rules is, as with registration in 
general, identification. It is desirable to visually mark aircraft so that they can be 
distinguished from one another. In the case of large drones, there is no problem 
in doing so. However, tiny registration marks on a small drone would not help its 
identification from a distance at all. It would only aid in identifying drones on the 
ground. In order to be efficient, the rules would have to come up with a distinct 
solution to enable the identification of drones.
4.3.5. Personnel Licensing
A large portion of aviation safety law is dedicated to the training and licensing 
requirements of personnel to operate aircraft—another recurring theme in the 
articles of this dissertation. The fundamental requirement, according to the 
Chicago Convention, is that the pilot and other crew members of every aircraft 
engaged in international aviation must be provided with certificates of competency 
and licenses.476 More specifically, pursuant to SARPs adopted by ICAO, only a 
person trained in a very particular way may be able to work as a pilot, crew member, 
instructor, air traffic controller, and so forth. The competency of pilots is controlled 
474  See Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks.
475  Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, Interim Final Rule, pp. 
78617–78618. See also Masutti and Tomasello 2018, p. 74.
476  Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 32, para. 2. See also Abeyratne 2014, pp. 383–405.
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through licences and ratings that concern different operational environments, types 
of operation, and types of aircraft. Additionally, the pilot must be medically fit to 
fly.477 The EU478 as well as each particular state479 monitors the competency of pilots 
similarly to ICAO but in a legally binding and more specific manner.
In the case of drone pilots, the fundamental obligation for every pilot and crew 
member to acquire documents testifying to their competency seems reasonable. Such 
an obligation is very general and can be tailored with unmanned aviation in mind. 
Yet following the standards of manned aviation in whole would be problematic. To 
begin with, it has not been quite clear if drone pilots should be classified as pilots: 
they are a new entity that does not quite fit our preconceived notion of an aircraft 
pilot. This presents a risk of misclassification, as drone pilots might face a collection 
of unintended requirements.
On a general level, traditional pilot training contains many vital theoretical and 
practical skills of airmanship that would not be over-inclusive in the context of most 
unmanned aviation. Such include, for example, the basics of air law, flight planning, 
and navigation.480 Leaving drone pilots without such knowledge would perhaps 
even be under-inclusive. When it comes to the exact level of training, however, 
attention must be paid to the difficulty and risks of operation. In the commercial 
segment, high training standards are necessary; with other drones, not so much. 
Unlike manned aircraft, many consumer grade and even professional UAS can be 
operated by laymen with no training. Indeed, due to technological developments 
the operation of drones has become very easy.481 They are often simple enough 
that flying lessons are not necessary to begin operation. From this perspective, the 
existing rules on pilot training appear over-inclusive in relation to drones. Hence, 
it does not seem sensible to apply to the pilots of such drones traditional licensing 
and certification procedures, involving dozens (in some cases hundreds) of hours 
of simulation, instructed flying, and examinations. Upholding such a standard is 
simply not necessary to maintain the safety of civil aviation.482
Yet the case is a bit more complex than that. Some particular elements of 
traditional training on aviation, such as the mechanics of internal combustion 
477  See Annex 1: Personnel Licensing.
478 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Arts. 20–28 and Annex IV. See more specifically Commission 
Regulation (EU) N:o 1178/2011.
479  Regarding Finland, see Aviation Act (864/2014), chs. 4 and 6. See more specifically, e.g., Aviation 
Regulation PEL M2-70.
480  See Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 20 and Annex IV. See in detail Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1178/2011.
481  E.g., Gilbertson 2015. See also EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (B), pp. 26–27; 
Masutti & Tomasello 2018, p. 20.
482  See Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011; Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; 
Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 19–20.
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engines,483 would be over-inclusive for many drone pilots. They target aircraft that 
use such engines, which most drones do not. Meanwhile, drone pilots would require 
training on issues that have traditionally been unknown, including the whole aspect 
of flying remotely and the technology involved therein. Drones are also commonly 
used in urban airspace, which should be taken into account in the training. In this 
sense, there is also under-inclusiveness and vacuity: no applicable rules.
4.3.6. Airspace
As described above, manned aircraft commonly need an aerodrome for operation. 
This means that guidance must be provided to aircraft that wish to operate in the 
vicinity of such congested areas.484 Hence, air law usually designates the airspace 
above aerodromes as controlled airspace where aircraft are provided with various 
air navigation services. One might go as far as to say that present air law is airport 
centric. Another common segment of controlled airspace are air corridors which 
generally extend from around flight level (FL) 90–110 (circa 3000 meters) upwards. 
Uncontrolled airspace, on the other hand, is usually located outside aerodromes at 
an altitude below such corridors. In such airspace, aircraft are largely left on their 
own devices apart from receiving certain minimal services. The exact nature of 
services in all airspace is determined by its class (A–G).485
Flights that take place in class A–C airspace are particularly controlled, since aircraft 
entering such airspace must draft a flight plan486 and obtain an air traffic control (ATC) 
clearance. The latter refers to a message by the ATC that authorizes the aircraft to fly in 
a particular direction, to land, to taxi at the aerodrome, and so forth. These clearances 
must also be obtained during the flight so as to avoid collision with other aircraft and 
obstacles. The same function is served by position reports, which the aircraft must 
issue when passing reporting points, at prescribed intervals, or when requested by the 
ATC. In controlled airspace, flights are separated from each other both vertically and 
horizontally in accordance with the requirements set by the airspace class.487
Traditionally, air traffic control has relied a lot on voice and data communication488 
between the aircraft and the controller. Pursuant to ICAO standards, aircraft 
operating internationally must be equipped for radio communication.489 The same 
483  See Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, Annex 1 (Part-FCL), AMC1 FCL.210.
484  On rules concerning aerodromes in general, see Annex 14: Aerodromes; Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 139/2014.
485  See Annex 11: Air Traffic Services, ch. 1, sec. 2.6 and Appendix 4; Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, SERA.6001.
486  A flight plan is also required when, for example, operating internationally.
487  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, ch. 1, sec. 3.6.1 and 3.6.3 and para. 3.3.1.2; Annex 11: Air Traffic Services, 
paras. 3.3.4–3.3.5; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, SERA.4001, 6001, 8015, and 
8025. See also Document 4444: Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management, sec. 4.4.
488  See Annex 11: Air Traffic Services, para. 6.1.1.1.
489  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, para. 7.1.1 and Part II, paras. 2.5.1.1–2.5.1.4.
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elementary obligation goes for almost all aircraft operating within the EU, whether 
nationally or internationally and whether commercially or non-commercially, 
although the exact equipment is dependent on the type and operational environment 
of the aircraft.490 In the EU, the aircraft, the pilot, the ground station, and the air 
traffic controller must also hold a licence to operate their radio. Transmitting signals 
on aviation frequencies without a permission is not allowed. Naturally, the operator 
of the radio must undergo radio training as part of their licensing.491
In considering the application of the given rules to drones, it is useful to begin 
from the observation that some commercial unmanned operations will be and 
perhaps already are designed to operate the same aerodromes and airways as manned 
aircraft. Most civil UAS, however, have the ability to take off from and land at almost 
any location. The majority of operations are thus not bound to concentrate around 
airports. Because of this, the designation of airspace around aerodromes as controlled 
for ATM and ATC purposes is not very productive when it comes to the whole range 
of unmanned aviation. Furthermore, since drones commonly operate in very low 
level airspace they cannot benefit from ATC provided in air corridors. There is rarely 
air traffic control in low level airspace besides near aerodromes.492 Obstacles often 
block traditional radio communication, so there are physical difficulties in extending 
traditional ATC coverage to low level airspace.493 Therefore, unmanned operations 
whose safety would benefit from ATC service may be left without. This shortcoming 
applies chiefly to urban environments where the safety of natural persons and property 
can be threatened by drones. From this angle, the existing framework appears under-
inclusive, as it excludes air operations it should include.
From the viewpoint of communication requirements, though, one might question 
whether drone traffic should really be included in the existing framework. There 
is no pilot on board, so any voice communication will have to take place between 
the remote pilot station and the ATC ground station. If taken as they are, rules on 
communication may fail to address the operation of unmanned aircraft. It is worth 
noting also that radio licences have thus far been issued only to operate a radio on 
board the aircraft (by the pilot) or a ground station licence to communicate with all 
aircraft (by personnel on the ground, like the air traffic controller)—not to operate 
an RPS. These issues apply to drones of all scales.
If these issues were resolved, commercial grade operations could be expected to 
equip their system with an aviation radio, acquire a licence for it, and train pilots 
to operate it. The same approach seems over-inclusive for other drone operators, 
490  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, CAT.DE.A.330 et seq.
491  The licensing requirement stems from International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations, 
Art. 18. See also Annex 1: Personnel Licensing. Regarding Finland, see Advisory Circular AIR T16-6, para. 
5.1; Information Society Code (917/2014), ch. 6.
492  See EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-05 (B), pp. 24 and 39–43.
493  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, p. 19.
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though. From a safety perspective, there is no need to control all drone traffic 
through voice communication, as most of it takes place far from manned air traffic 
and because drone operations can be highly automated. The bigger issue, however, 
is that it would be over-inclusive in terms of capacity to require ATC personnel to 
handle communications with all drone pilots by traditional means. As EASA has 
explicated, the existing ATC/ATM system is human-centric. This is at odds with 
future expectations, according to which the number of drone operations will be so 
extreme that manual human control is not possible.494
This is to suggest that the traditional framework of ATM and ATC is likely not 
an appropriate means of controlling mass unmanned aviation. Its territorial scope 
seems under-inclusive, but this is actually not the main issue. The framework should 
not even be applied to drones because its measures would be over-inclusive in 
that context. Another, more salient way to perceive the situation is to regard the 
traditional rules on ATM and ATC as ineffective: they do not advance safe and 
orderly air traffic in airspace that is becoming more and more populated by aircraft. 
As the amount of air traffic grows and as digitalization increases constantly, which is 
to be expected, this problem will only expand. At some point, sociotechnical change 
may create a situation in which applying the rules we have for ATM and ATC seems 
completely ineffective. This necessitates, of course, that novel technology enables 
creating a more efficient and reliable system for guiding air traffic. Ultimately, the 
traditional system may even become irrelevant if there are no longer aircraft that 
require an aerodrome for take-off, landing, and maintenance, or voice guidance.
For the purposes of identification, in international aviation all aircraft must 
be equipped with an SSR transponder.495 This requirement applies both to 
commercial air transport and general aviation.496 In aviation within the EU, 
transponder is usually required when the aircraft exceeds a particular threshold for 
take-off mass, or when the operation takes place in controlled airspace pursuant 
to instrument flight rules.497 Passenger aircraft exceeding a certain take-off mass 
must additionally be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system 
(ACAS).498 Other technical solutions include multilateration (MLAT) in which 
494  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, p. 28.
495  Transponders operate by using different communication protocols, known as modes, of which three 
are used in civil aviation: A, C, (usually together as mode A/C) and S. The performance standards of these 
devices are elaborated on in, e.g., Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunications, Vol. IV.
496  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, sec. 6.20 and Part II, sec. 2.4.13. See also Annex 11: Air Traffic 
Services, para. 2.26.
497  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011, Art. 3 and Annex; Commission Regulation (EU) No 
965/2012, CAT.IDE.A.350 et seq.
498  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, sec. 6.19 and Part II, sec. 3.6.9. The purpose of ACAS is to warn 
the pilots if their aircraft are on a collision course and provide a trajectory that will avoid the collision. See 
generally, e.g., Tooley & Wyatt 2007/2018, pp. 299–313; Eurocontrol ACAS Guide: Airborne Collision 
Avoidance.
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several beacons are used to receive transponder signals, and automatic dependent 
surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) in which satellites are used to determine the 
position of the aircraft.499
When it comes to identification, again, the higher end of drones fit the traditional 
framework of air law better. When an aircraft is large enough, it can be detected by 
the primary radar, and equipping the aircraft with a transponder is not a financial nor 
practical obstacle.500 Identifying most drones with the PSR, though, as explicated in 
the section on characteristics, is a challenge. Rules mandating PSR could therefore 
described as ineffective in the era of large-scale unmanned aviation.
For this reason, ATC is nowadays based heavily on the secondary radar. Yet this 
is also a problematic state of affairs for cheaper drones. To equip these drones with 
a transponder is a weighty requirement because the price of a transponder in many 
cases glaringly exceeds the price of the whole system. Virtually all transponders are 
still designed for manned aircraft in terms of size and connectivity.501 Some relief 
could be provided through requiring drones to feature ADS-B in and out, but this 
would increase their cost, too. To extend the obligation to all drones would thus be 
over-inclusive. Naturally, the aforementioned obstacle problems with radio signals 
apply equally to the use of the SSR in very low altitudes, which represents another 
conundrum for transponders.
4.3.7. Flight Rules
Traditionally, every aircraft must follow either of the two types of flight rules: visual 
flight rules (VFR) or instrument flight rules (IFR), which are both based on the 
fact that the pilot is on board the aircraft. Flight rules stem from SARPs issued by 
ICAO; within the EU, they have been adopted as Standardised European Rules of 
the Air (SERA). Roughly speaking, when operating under VFR, the navigation is 
based on the eyesight of the pilot(s). Hence, when flying VFR, the pilot must always 
have certain minimum visibility and keep the aircraft at a certain minimum distance 
from clouds. When operating under IFR, on the other hand, the navigation is based 
on the instruments of the aircraft and the guidance by the ATC. This means that the 
aircraft must be equipped with suitable instruments and navigation equipment and 
maintain communication with a ground station.502
499  See, e.g., European ATM Master Plan: Digitalising Europe’s Aviation Infrastructure; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011.
500  Unlike with manned aircraft, however, the transponder must be operable from the ground station.
501  On the characteristics of ATC in detail, see, e.g., Tooley & Wyatt 2007/2018, pp. 278–298. There 
are several small scale UAS transponder models available but still at a significant cost. See, e.g., Uavionix 
Ping200S (priced at nearly €3.000).
502  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, para. 2.2 and chs. 4 and 5; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No 923/2012, Annex, SERA.2005. There are also subcategories, like special VFR and controlled VFR, 
discussion on which is not relevant for the purposes of this study. See ICAO Document 9713: International 
Civil Aviation Vocabulary.
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On a very basic level, the distinction can be applied to drones. UAS can be flown 
“under VFR” if the drone is close enough to the remote pilot(s) for the latter to 
observe the surroundings of the aircraft. Alternatively, if the drone is far away, the 
system can employ technology like first-person view (FPV) to enable observation. In 
both cases, it is also possible to fly “under IFR” if the operator relies on instruments 
rather than visual observation. Still, classifying drone operations solely as VFR or 
IFR is wrong because the rules begin from the assumption that the pilot is on board 
the aircraft and always able to observe things from that viewpoint. This is never the 
case with drones, since a drone is always observed from outside either by the remote 
pilot or another crewmember either visually or via technology. This has a major 
impact on the risks of the operation. New terminology is required so that the rules 
can be targeted appropriately.
The bigger issue with applying VFR and IFR to drones are the rules themselves, 
which have been designed with the characteristics and risks of manned aviation 
in mind. One of the more controversial aspects of the rules are minimum flight 
altitudes. On manned VFR flights, an aircraft must not fly below 150 meters above 
ground or water; over densely populated areas or open-air assemblies, the minimum 
altitude is 300 meters. IFR flights must always take place 300 meters above the 
highest obstacle within 8 kilometers of the aircraft. The latter minimum altitude 
is 600 meters when flying over high terrain or mountainous areas. Only during the 
take-off and landing or when permitted by the appropriate authority may the aircraft 
descend lower. Such a permit may be issued for, for example, emergency operations, 
aerial photography, leisure flying, or training. Usually, however, air corridors for 
commercial aviation are located at a very high altitude for reasons of flight safety, 
noise reduction, and fuel efficiency.503
The given provisions do not suit the operation of UAS. While there may be some 
drones designed to operate from aerodromes and comply with the minima, usually 
drones fly at an altitude ranging from a few to a few hundred meters. This includes 
leisure flying and aerial work like photography, forestry, and geomagnetic testing,504 
but most commercial use cases like air transport are similarly based on low level 
flying.505 Although manned aircraft frequently operate in low level airspace (besides 
take-off and landing),506 this is not the default but rather the exception. The key 
aspect is that drones present less of a risk to the environment than manned aircraft 
when flying at a low altitude, so there is no reason to completely forbid them from 
503  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, para. 2.2 and chs. 4 and 5; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
923/2012, Annex, Sec. 5. See also, e.g., Masutti & Tomasello 2018, p. 16; Morris 2017.
504  See, e.g., Salmirinne et al. 2017, p. 29.
505  See White 2018; EHang Launches Guangzhou as Its First Global Citywide Urban Air Mobility Pilot 
City; SESAR JU GOF U-space project: Final demo with piloted air taxi flight successfully completed.
506  Albeit I lack the data to substantiate this, it is a point frequently brought up in discussions within 
the regulatory work of Eurocontrol, for instance.
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doing so. The default minimum flying altitudes are, therefore, over-inclusive in 
relation to UAS. Applying them consistently would signify the end of the whole 
drone industry. Furthermore, as unmanned aviation is expected to increase intensely 
in the following decades,507 we might face a situation in which the existing fixed 
limits appear altogether over-inclusive in terms of aviation safety.
While the limitations on altitude are over-inclusive in relation to drones, operating 
at a very low altitude still invokes many public and private interests that must be 
protected. For example, even small UAS can pose risks to industrial, business, 
governmental, and military activities. This highlights the fact that the issue is not 
only over-inclusiveness but vacuity, too: there are no applicable rules. As a result of 
relying on the exclusion of air traffic from low level airspace, the existing rules fail 
to provide any substantive safety requirements about flying an unmanned aircraft 
at an altitude below the minima. On another note, drones also have potential to be 
used at extremely high altitudes (of about 20 kilometers above ground). Hence, they 
colonize the airspace previously less occupied by manned aircraft.508 In this regard 
the flight rules are unproblematic since they do not issue any maximum operational 
altitude.
There are other problems in following VFR and IFR besides minimum flying 
altitudes. The former rules are, of course, quite difficult for drones to comply with 
safely because the sensory cues for the pilot are reduced or non-existent. When the 
drone is observed from outside, the remote pilot may have trouble maintaining the 
required distances and awareness about the surroundings of the drone. Identifying 
hazards and taking appropriate action quickly is more difficult, as is identifying 
and correcting piloting errors. The same applies to cases in which the pilot uses 
technology to observe the airspace from the drone’s perspective. This calls for special 
standards for detection and avoidance. In the latter situation, there is of course a 
risk of issues in the connection between the RPS and the aircraft. In order to fly 
under IFR, the aircraft has to carry navigation equipment and suitable instruments, 
the requirements of which are based on airworthiness standards and operational 
categories—both problematic for UAS, as noted above. Naturally, drones are hard 
to notice in many situations, which is problematic for manned aircraft flying under 
VFR. Means of avoiding drones must also be devised.509
507  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 5–6 and 28.
508  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 14–16 and 19.
509  See EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 34 and 42, in fine; Fiallos 2019, pp. 176–177; Torens, Dauer 
& Adolf 2018, p. 106. For the IFR requirements, see Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
923/2012, Annex, SERA.5015.
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4.3.8. Security
As explicated in the final article of this study,510 security511 related aviation issues 
are regulated in multiple ways. To begin with, they are addressed by rules that 
are outside air law altogether. Many if not all states have enacted legislation for 
the purposes of monitoring individuals identified as dangerous to national or 
international security. For example, in Finland the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service is in charge of acquiring information for the protection of national security 
as well as detecting, preventing, and exposing undertakings that may threaten the 
state or its security.512
In the context of air law, security issues are addressed first by rules that are 
traditionally viewed as falling within the ambit of safety rather than security. 
This includes rules pertaining to the airworthiness of aircraft, the approval and 
regulation of air operations, the registration of aircraft, the licensing of pilots, the use 
of airspace, and flight rules—all of which have been discussed above. For example, 
the licensing of pilots helps to prevent unauthorized personnel from using aircraft, 
and airworthiness standards advance security by subjecting aircraft to regular 
maintenance. This can be called the spillover security effect of safety rules.
In manned aviation, the given safety rules play an important part in deterring 
security threats. Flying as an unlicensed pilot, for example, is quite difficult because 
flying an aircraft requires a predetermined location where it can take off and land 
and because flying is costly and difficult regardless. Facilities for maintenance are 
also necessary, and identifying the aircraft and the pilot is often unproblematic. 
This combination of factual necessities and air law makes manned aircraft an easy 
target for civil aviation and other authorities. In unmanned aviation, one can expect 
a similar deterring effect in cases where the drone is operated similarly to manned 
aircraft. Otherwise, however, there is no deterring effect because most UAS are 
cheap and hard to identify due to their small size and lack of a transponder. They can 
also be operated without training and covertly from anywhere, and the pilot and the 
aircraft can be located far away from each other. Their distributed mode of operation 
increases the risk of them being used for illegal activities and reduces the spillover 
benefits of safety rules.513 The issue is probably best characterized as the rules being 
ineffective in advancing the security of UAS.
Besides the aforementioned rules, air law contains rules that are particularly 
designated as security related. In Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, states 
recognize their obligation to refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil 
aircraft in flight. Meanwhile, Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft includes requirements 
510  Huttunen 2019c.
511  See above for the distinction between safety and security.
512  Act on Police Administration (110/1992), 10 §.
513  Huttunen 2019c, pp. 88–89 and passim.
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in commercial air transport for the flight crew compartment, aeroplane search 
procedure checklist, training programmes, and reporting. For instance, the cockpit 
door of all aircraft that have such a door must be lockable. In aircraft with an 
MTOM above 45 500 kg, the cockpit door has to resist small arms fire, shrapnel, and 
intrusion. The aircrew must be trained to understand the behavior of terrorists and to 
respond with appropriate self-defense measures.514 Some security-related provisions 
are included in many other Annexes, too.515 Similar operational and airworthiness 
related requirements have been enacted in the EU. There is the obligation to ensure 
the security of the flight crew compartment,516 the detailed requirements of which 
are specified in certification specifications for different classes of aircraft.517
These requirements are supplemented by those of Annex 17: Security, which focuses 
particularly on security at airports. Pursuant to the SARPs issued therein, states, 
airports, and operators are expected to establish civil aviation security programs and 
to take measures to prevent any dangerous devices or materials from being allowed 
aboard aircraft. To this end, airside areas at airports must be controlled, security 
checks must be conducted, and baggage, cargo, and mail must be screened. If there is 
reliable information of a threat, the appropriate action depending on the threat must 
be taken. For instance, arrangements must be made to investigate whether there are 
dangerous devices on board, and the state must assist aircraft that are subject to 
hijacking.518 The implementation of Annex 17 is assisted by two documents that are 
only available for authorized entities and individuals.519
In the EU, security-specific rules largely deriving from Annex 17 are particularly 
included in Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, which includes the “common basic 
standards for safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference 
that jeopardise the security of civil aviation”.520 These rules focus on airports. In 
accordance with ICAO SARPs, the Regulation demands the creation of security 
programs by EU Member States, airports, air carriers, and other entities as required 
by each MS.521 Besides this, the rules require airports to designate security restricted 
areas, access to which is controlled. Security is achieved by preventing unauthorized 
people and vehicles from entering vulnerable locations, like the airside, where 
for instance only departing passengers, crewmembers, and some airport staff 
514  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part I, ch. 13.
515  E.g., Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft, Part III, ch. 11; Annex 9: Facilitation, chs. 3–5; Annex 14: 
Aerodromes, Vol. I, para. 1.5.1.
516  Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, e.g., Annex III, ORO.SEC.100.
517  Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Large Aeroplanes (CS-25), CS 
25.795.
518  Annex 17: Security, chs. 3–5.
519  ICAO Document 8973 – Restricted: Aviation Security Manual; ICAO Document 9985 – Restricted: 
Air Traffic Management Security Manual.
520  Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, Art. 4.
521  Ibid., Arts. 10 and 12–14.
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are allowed. The boundaries are monitored through, inter alia, surveillance and 
patrols.522
Another important measure is screening, which is conducted, inter alia, using 
metal detectors, x-ray machines, and hand search. The purpose is to prevent 
prohibited items, like weapons, explosives, and drugs, from being placed on board 
aircraft. The screening targets all passengers, their cabin baggage, both passengers’ 
and aircrew’s hold baggage, vehicles, mail, and cargo that enter a security restricted 
area; members of aircrew are subject to a background check before they are issued 
any identification that authorizes their access. In certain cases, aircraft themselves are 
subject to searches, and there are procedures to protect them against unauthorized 
access. For example, persons seeking access are checked, external doors are kept 
closed, and access can be detected using electronic means.523
The existing security-specific rules seem a mixed bag even for drone operations 
that resemble manned aviation. Conceptually, the rules of course have trouble with 
classifying the remote pilot station. Substantively, though, the requirement to have 
a lockable flight crew compartment door seems to make sense also for the RPS. 
Meanwhile, as of now there are—to my knowledge—no UAS that exceed an MTOM 
of 45 500 kg, which means that the provisions on the durability of the door are not 
applicable. From the viewpoint of potential application, they would regardless be 
over-inclusive for all drones as not even all manned aircraft are subject to such a 
requirement. Provisions on training the crew to deal with security threats on board 
could be suitable for high-end drone operations, albeit the provisions would have to 
be tailored to take into account the special features of UAS. Regarding the security 
of the RPS, there is ineffectiveness in the sense that the rules do not consider the risk 
of hijacking from a distance.
Airport-centric security measures naturally apply as they are to unmanned 
operations that utilize airports. The access to UAS on the airside is restricted and 
the payload of the drone is subject to screening. The problem is, however, that 
this excludes the security of the RPS unless the station is located at an aerodrome. 
Furthermore, only a minority share of total unmanned flights use airports at all. 
As established above, most drones are operated from outside aerodromes, which 
puts them outside screening and surveillance of any kind. The vast majority of 
drones have no capability to even enter controlled airspace, so they are excluded 
from airports. This suggests that the existing airport-centric security rules are under-
522  Ibid., Annex, sec. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.5. See in detail Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1998, Annex, sec. 1.1.2–1.1.3, 1.2.2, and 1.5. See also Leloudas 2017; Rossi Dal Pozzo 2015, pp. 
71–76.
523  Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, Art. 3, para. 15 and Annex, sec. 1.2–1.4 and chs. 3–6. See in detail 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998, Annex, sec. 1.4 and chs. 3–6; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 272/2009, Annex. See also Leloudas 2017, pp. 170–177; Rossi Dal Pozzo 2015, pp. 
77–81.
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inclusive in the context of drones; at the same time, they risk becoming irrelevant if 
air transportation exceedingly starts taking place outside airports.
At this stage, security issues should not be over-emphasized because there is only a 
low amount of high-end drone traffic. As drones are not being used in a widespread 
manner for human or cargo transport, there is simply little interest to hijack them 
or use weapons against them. Furthermore, not even all manned aviation is subject 
to airport security measures since much general aviation takes place at aerodromes 
without screening and surveillance. Still, there have been several events over the 
past few years, which show that even consumer-grade drones can pose a threat to 
their surroundings.524 A careful consideration of the exact risks and the measures 
necessary to tackle them is hence required in order to enact appropriate security 
rules on UAS.
524  See Huttunen 2019c.
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5. Legislating Unmanned Civil Aviation
5.1. An Outline of Developments
Thus far, this synthesis has focused on the issues that unmanned civil aviation has 
caused in relation to existing aviation safety and security law. The present Chapter 
moves onto discuss the legislative responses the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the European Union (EU) have taken in reaction 
to the issues. The discussion is constructed in accordance with the typology of 
legislative approaches developed in Chapter 3 as part of the model of legislation 
and sociotechnical change. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, the purpose is 
to illustrate the meaning of passivity, replication, emulation, alternative rules, and 
transformation in the case of civil drones.
Substantively, the Chapter deals with the lawmaking reactions of ICAO and the 
EU, which are the main legislators of aviation safety and security from a European 
perspective. Within the EU, the administrative and expert body in charge of 
substantively developing the rules is the European Aviation and Safety Agency 
(EASA). In part, with regard to the third article, the study deals with the Specific 
Operation Risk Assessment (SORA) method, which was originally developed by 
the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems ( JARUS). We are 
concerned here with the written rules and recommendations issued by these bodies: 
the steps they have taken to bring drones within the scope of aviation safety and 
security law. Before delving into the rules themselves, though, it is informative to 
provide an outline of the developments thus far.
As noted in the Introduction, ICAO’s jurisdiction and primary interest lie 
in creating rules for international unmanned civil aviation. While cross-border 
operations can be conducted using any UAS, what ICAO has in mind is regular 
air traffic using the most advanced drone technology. Although the Organization 
has not yet determined exactly which UAS525 should fall within the scope of its 
drone-related SARPs and other documents, it does not appear wanting to regulate 
consumer grade drones.526 The Organization can be seen as having begun its work on 
525  ICAO uses the term Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), but here I simply resort to the 
consistent terminology applied throughout this study. See Huttunen 2017.
526  See ICAO Working Paper LC/37-WP/2-5: Clarification of Applicability of the Chicago Convention 
and SARPs to Certain Categories of RPAS/UAS. For a criticism of ICAO’s approach and an argument on 
why ICAO should extend its scope to “small” UAS, see Havel & Mulligan 2015, pp. 114–121.
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drones in 2003 when the 11th Air Navigation Conference of ICAO endorsed ICAO 
Document 9854: Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept, which was 
later adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization.527 The document was, 
to my knowledge, the first one to mention civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
which was an early term for drones.528
In 2005, the Organization consulted states and international organizations about 
drone activities in their airspace, procedures to alleviate risks, and procedures for 
operational authorization. The first unofficial drone meetings were held in 2006 
and 2007. Therein, it was decided that ICAO was not the proper body to develop 
technical standards and that only some requirements should be included in Annexes 
to the Chicago Convention (SARPs). On the other hand, it was held that ICAO 
should have a central role in harmonizing concepts and that it should ensure safety 
and uniformity in international aviation. Hence, ICAO established the Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Study Group (UASSG).529
Pursuant to the recommendations issued by the UASSG, several Annexes to the 
Chicago Convention have been amended to incorporate unmanned aviation. The 
first one to change was Annex 13: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation in 
2010. A year later, the Study Group published the recommendatory ICAO Circular 
328: Unmanned Aircraft Systems. As a result of the Circular, both Annex 2: Rules 
of the Air and Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks were amended. 
In 2014, the UASSG was renamed the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel 
(RPASP), which in 2015 issued ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS Manual).530 The Manual outlines ICAO’s legislative 
project, affirming the positions taken in the amended Annexes but also setting forth 
more extensive guidance on all key issues relating to the safety of international drone 
operations. In 2018, Annex 1: Personnel Licensing was amended to include standards 
on the licensing of remote pilots. Since then, the Organization has focused its work 
on other Annexes, like Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft and Annex 8: Airworthiness of 
Aircraft.531
Within the European Union, drones have been on the agenda since before the 
turn of the millennium. Throughout the years, chiefly two Directorate-Generals 
of the European Commission have been responsible for the legislative project: 
527  ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-15: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices 
related to a global air traffic management (ATM) system and communications, navigation and surveillance/
air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems, Appendix B, para. 1.
528  See above and Huttunen 2017, pp. 358–360.
529  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, paras. 1.2.8–1.2.13.
530  Ibid., paras. 1.2.14–1.2.16.
531  See ICAO ASBU Documentation, Thread: RPAS; Masutti & Tomasello 2018, p. 48 (including a 
table of Annexes to be amended and the estimated year of publication, cit. Spijkert & Lozano 2016).
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the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE)532 and the 
Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
(DG GROW). The Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG 
HOME) has also been involved.
 In 1999, Eurocontrol requested the Joint Aviation Authorities ( JAA) to 
consider type certifying UAS and regulating their use.533 However, when EASA 
was established in 2002, only drones with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of 
150 kilograms or over fell within its competency.534 The special issues with drones 
were still recognized, as JAA and Eurocontrol established a joint Task-Force whose 
final report was published in 2004.535 This and several other projects formed the 
basis of Working Group 73 that focused on developing precise standards for drone 
operations.536 The EASA Basic Regulation was updated in 2008 but the MTOM 
threshold for drones remained the same.537 For the airworthiness certification 
of heavy drones, in 2009 the Agency created EASA Policy Statement E.Y013-01: 
Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).
The year 2010 marked the beginning of serious discussions within the EU about a 
common European legal framework for drones. This included public hearings, high 
level conferences, and a large consultation under the moniker of UAS Panel Process. A 
special EU strategy for UAS was drafted.538 Simultaneously, European Organisation 
for Civil Aviation Equipment (Eurocae) and Eurocontrol began developing their 
own concepts about the regulation of drones. The process was hastened by the 
European Commission, which in 2014 issued Commission Communication (2014) 
207, calling for the integration of drones into European airspace.
In 2015, the first European High Level Conference on Drones was organized in 
Riga, leading to the adoption of a declaration.539 A few months later, EASA issued 
preliminary information about the precise standards for drones in EASA Advance 
Notice of Proposed Amendment 2015-10. Therein, it suggested abolishing the arbitrary 
threshold of 150 kilograms and legislating drones in a risk-based manner in three 
categories: open, specific, and certified. After discussions in the European Parliament, 
the Commission followed EASA’s notice in Commission Proposal (2015) 613. The 
Proposal suggested, among other things, legislating all UAS on the European level. 
532  Until 2010, the DG MOVE was preceded by the Directorate-General Transport and Energy (DG 
TREN), itself only created in the year 2000.
533  Hawkes 2007.
534  Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002, Art. 1, para. 1; Art. 4, para. 2; Annex II, para. 1, subpara. g.
535  UAV Task-Force Final Report: A Concept for European Regulations for Civil Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs).
536  Hawkes 2007.
537  Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, Art. 1, para. 1; Art. 4, para, 4; Annex II, para. 1, subpara. i.
538  Towards the Development of Civil Applications of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): A Strategy for 
the European Union (Draft).
539  Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Aircraft (drones): “Framing the Future of Aviation”.
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EASA continued its work, organizing in 2016 another conference540 and delivering 
a “Prototype” Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations. The third 
conference ensued in 2017,541 leading to the publication of EASA Notice of Proposed 
Amendment 2017-05 in two parts. These documents followed in the footsteps of the 
2015 notice, however containing a more refined view of how drones in the open and 
specific category should be regulated.
The next step in the European project was to amend the EASA Basic Regulation, 
which took place in 2018. The new Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 incorporated all 
drones within its scope, setting also forth essential requirements concerning the 
design, production, maintenance, and operation of UAS. Drafts for more specific 
rules on operation542 and product regulation543 were released shortly after, the 
former being applicable to the open and specific category and the latter being 
applicable to consumer grade drones. Both drafts passed the vote within EASA 
and the European Parliament in 2019, leading to their adoption and publication as 
the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 (Delegated Regulation) and 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (Implementing Regulation). 
The applicability of the Regulations proceeds in steps set forth therein. Their 
implementation is supported by Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and 
Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 
and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Part-
UAS, which were issued in late 2019.
The present challenges of the EU with drones include enacting rules on topics 
such as the airworthiness certification in the certified category, rules of the air for 
drones, and the U-space concept. In early 2020, EASA issued its EASA Opinion No 
01/2020 on U-space, followed by a Draft Commission Implementing Regulation on a 
high-level regulatory framework for the U-space. As the draft, however, contains some 
controversial elements from the viewpoint of certain stakeholders, its adoption 
remains uncertain at the time of writing this.
5.2. Solving the Issues
5.2.1. Old and New Concepts
The first issue identified in Chapter 4 concerns the terms and phrases employed 
to describe drones. Regarding the problems with the concept of “model aircraft”, 
540  See Warsaw Declaration: “Drones as a leverage for jobs and new business opportunities”.
541  See Drones Helsinki Declaration.
542  Draft Commission Implementing Regulation on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned 
aircraft.
543  Draft Commission Delegated Regulation on unmanned aircraft intended for use in the “open” category, 
and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems.
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ICAO’s approach has been passive. The existence of the concept is implicitly 
approved at the international level, but no legislative action needs to be taken; the 
RPAS Manual merely notes that many states use such a term, that global standards 
are not necessary, and that therefore they are outside the scope of the Manual.544 
The European approach, on the other hand, has been alternative rules. While it is 
recognized that model aircraft are UAS, model aircraft clubs and associations are 
granted certain exemptions and privileges from the new rules that otherwise apply 
to drones.545 This still might lead to some operators abusing the exemptions, but at 
least the artificial terminological divide between model aircraft and other drones 
appears to have been eradicated.
To the issues of misclassification and (plausible) irrelevance concerning Article 
8 of the Chicago Convention (“pilotless aircraft” and “aircraft capable of being 
flown without a pilot”), the legislative approach has been passivity. Drones of 
the 21st century have been deemed as falling within the scope of the provision as 
it is: no changes to the wording have been deemed imperative. As I note in the 
first article of this study,546 there is simply unwillingness to take any unnecessary 
legislative action to amend the provision, which has remained the same now for 
nearly a hundred years. Instead, ICAO has resorted to an inclusive reading that 
guarantees the legal status quo by subjecting all international UAS flights to special 
authorization issued by the state(s) over which the flight takes place. The resort 
to passivity in this case is practically sound but, from the perspective of treaty 
interpretation, untenable.
One might claim, however, that ICAO has not gotten away with mere passivity as 
a response to the issue. This is hinted at by several ICAO documents in which it has 
been deemed necessary to explicate that modern drones do fall within the ambit of 
the Article: “’aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot’ … refers to the situation 
in which there is no pilot on board the aircraft.”547 The 2012 amendments to Annex 
2: Rules of the Air to the Chicago Convention, which now contains an Appendix 
containing SARPs for drones, similarly show that affirming the application has 
been necessary: pursuant thereto, international operation of UAS requires special 
authorization from the overflown state.548 The way ICAO has dealt with Article 8 
could therefore be viewed as an example of replication, too:549 the sociotechnical 
change is handled using existing rules as they are.
544  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 1.5.2, subpara. d.
545  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Preamble, para. 27, Art. 16, and passim.
546  Huttunen 2017, pp. 356–358.
547  ICAO Circular 328: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, paras. 2.1, 2.6, and 4.3–4.5; ICAO Document 
10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, paras. 1.2.1–1.2.7. See originally ICAO Document 
9854: Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept, Appendix B.
548  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, Appendix 4, para. 1.2.
549  Cf. Fiallos 2019, pp. 95–97.
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In the creation of new drone terminology, both ICAO and the EU have resorted 
to emulation. Drones are legislated using concepts that are based on the concept 
of aircraft, which derives from existing rules, but the term is slightly altered to 
account for unmanned characteristics. ICAO has adopted the concept of remotely 
piloted aircraft (RPA), which is distinguished from autonomous aircraft (AA). 
RPA refers to “unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot station”, 
and an AA is an “unmanned aircraft that does not allow pilot intervention in the 
management of the flight”;550 the umbrella term unmanned aircraft (UA) is given 
no independent significance. When the RPA is supplemented with an RPS and 
other related architecture, the term is remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). The 
trouble with these concepts, at least in the way ICAO defines them, is that they do 
not correspond with each other. The opposite of “piloted” is “not piloted” rather 
than “not allowing intervention”, which creates a risk of there being drones (not 
piloted but allows intervention) that fall in neither category. This makes it difficult 
to classify drones that operate with some automation or autonomy. Many if not 
most drones fall somewhere in between the two extremes of remote piloting and 
autonomous operation.551
The EU, as opposed to ICAO, has solely endorsed the umbrella terms UA 
and unmanned aircraft system (UAS). This avoids the given predicament on a 
terminological level, as there is no need to distinguish between RPA and AA. 
Originally, EASA’s definition of UA was equally comprehensive: “any aircraft 
operated or designed to be operated without a pilot on board”.552 However, the 
2018 Basic Regulation partly reintroduces the problem of distinction by defining 
UA in line with ICAO’s scheme as “any aircraft operating or designed to operate 
autonomously or to be piloted remotely without a pilot on board”.553 While this 
does not exclude UAS that rely on semi-autonomous operation, it does unnecessarily 
create an impression that autonomous and remotely piloted drones are two clearly 
distinguishable concepts.
A recognized issue with the term UA/UAS is that it implies that their operation 
lacks human involvement. The reference to the aircraft being unmanned might lead 
one to conclude that there is no human involved in the operation at all: not as a 
crewmember nor a passenger. The issue is, however, rectified by the actual definitions 
that acknowledge human involvement, causing only the term itself to be somewhat 
misleading.554 In this study, this compromise is accepted for several reasons. Since 
the study focuses on European legislation, following EU terminology is to be 
550  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, pp. xiv and xviii.
551  Huttunen 2017, pp. 361–362.
552  “Prototype” Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, Art. 2, para. 2, subpara. t.
553  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Art. 3, para. 30.
554  Huttunen 2017, p. 359.
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expected. Additionally, using the concept of unmanned aircraft vis-à-vis manned 
aircraft creates a useful comparative distinction.555 Finally, as argued previously, 
UAS is an inclusive concept in that all ranges of automatic or autonomous operation 
fall within its scope: although different rules may be required, separate terms are 
not.556 
Besides using the term UA/UAS, EASA has approved of using the concept of 
drone in documents that address the general public.557 In this study, that concept is 
used alongside UAS to simplify text, to avoid repeating the same abbreviation, and 
to employ the most popular term used for such aircraft. As argued before, drone is 
too popular, productive, and useful as a moniker to fade away,558 even in an academic 
context.559 The term itself is perhaps not worth categorizing in terms of approaches 
since it lacks any official status. It appears alternative to existing air law (though not 
to common parlance), but since the study defines it similarly to UA(S) its content 
can be rather seeing as emulating existing rules.
5.2.2. Restructuring Categories
The preceding Chapter noted that, besides terminology, the traditional categorization 
of air operations and aircraft airworthiness requirements is an issue for unmanned 
aviation. Categories like commercial air transport, specialized operations, complex 
and non-complex aircraft, and large aeroplanes appear to fall short when the whole 
scope of drone activities is concerned.
On the international level, thus far the approach to this issue has been mixed. After 
a long while of passivity, the amendments to the SARPs did not include any changes 
to nor made any mention of the existing ICAO distinction between commercial 
air transport and general aviation. The 2015 RPAS Manual, meanwhile, contains 
both replication and alternative rules. First, it implicitly recommends continued 
adherence to the distinction: the recommendations, unless specified otherwise, are 
to apply to commercial air transport and general aviation, including aerial work. 
Yet in another paragraph the Manual explicitly states that for drone operations the 
given distinction is not relevant; instead, the to-be-amended Annex 6: Operation 
of Aircraft will base its distinctions on operational scale and complexity.560 In other 
words, the present replication of the categories is to be replaced by alternative rules 
555  From this perspective, as an afterthought, contrasting RPA with manned aircraft, as ICAO does, 
seems slightly off. Would not the opposite of RPA be “close piloted aircraft”, “near piloted aircraft”, or 
“on-board piloted aircraft” rather than “manned aircraft”? Then again, none of the given terms seem very 
practical, and they certainly have never been used in any documents.
556  Huttunen 2017, p. 368.
557  EASA Technical Opinion: Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of unmanned 
aircraft, p. 5. 
558  Shoaps & Stanley 2016, pp. 112–114.
559  See Masutti & Tomasello 2018, title.
560  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 1.6.3.
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in the future. This is also testified to by the Organization’s UAS Toolkit for its 
member states.561
From a doctrinal perspective, ICAO’s approach is somewhat curious and 
confusing. Does the Organization ultimately aim to retain the existing categories or 
replace them with new ones just for drones? Does it wish to include all or just some 
unmanned aviation within its scope? Deviating from the categorization already 
devised by EASA562 would be counterproductive. It seems clear that ICAO wants 
to legislate unmanned aerial work. Thus far, aerial work has explicitly been excluded 
from the SARPs on Air Operations, the reasoning being that there is no need of 
inclusion as aerial work is mainly local or regional.563 Has or will the increasing 
amount of unmanned aviation also lead to more international aerial work, justifying 
the creation of new standards? How will these standards differ from the ones used 
for international unmanned air transport? This remains to be seen.
The European legislators also relied on passivity for a long while. As the framework 
only concerned drones with an MTOM of 150 kilograms or over, there was no effort 
to categorize them differently. This changed through the creation of the new legal 
framework, which establishes an alternative categorization. The EU categories are 
founded proportionately upon the risk of the operation, the characteristics of the 
UAS, and the operational environment. It follows an operation centric approach,564 
as opposed to an aircraft centric one. There are three categories—open, specific, 
and certified—which each contain elements of different legislative approaches: 
replication, emulation, and alternative rules.
The open category primarily incorporates leisure flying and simple professional 
scenarios using drones placed on the consumer market. Therein, the operation is not 
subject to a prior approval of any kind, but it must follow a set of strict limitations 
that concern particularly the features of the UAS.565 The certified category, on the 
other hand, is designed to include the most complicated and dangerous drones and 
demanding operations, such as passenger transport. More specifically, the category 
incorporates drones whose design, production, and maintenance is certified. 
Operationally, the category applies to flying over assemblies of people, human 
transport, and the carriage of dangerous goods. As such operations are similar to 
manned aviation in terms of risk, the operator has to comply with rules similar to 
manned aviation.566 Between these two extremes the European rules introduce the 
561  ICAO UAS Toolkit, sec. 2 (Development of UAS Regulation).
562  See below.
563  Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, Part II, p. xix. See also Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 138–139.
564  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Preamble, para. 5.
565  Ibid., Art. 4 and 7(1), and Annex, Part A; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex 
I, parts 1–5.
566  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Arts. 6 and 7, para. 3; Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Art. 40.
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specific category, which has been designed with professional applications in mind. 
As I discuss in more detail in the third article of this study, the specific category 
authorizes operations on an individual basis. The operator has to conduct a risk 
assessment, the details of which determine the exact conditions for flying.567 
The approach to the certification of operators has naturally followed along the 
given lines. Since it does not seem to be an issue in international commercial air 
transport, the response of ICAO has been emulation. As a counterpart to the air 
operator certificate (AOC), the 2012 amendment to Annex 2: Rules of the Air requires 
drone operators to acquire an RPAS operator certificate (ROC) in accordance with 
national law and consistent with Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft.568 This requirement 
is affirmed in the RPAS Manual, according to which the ROC is comparable to the 
AOC. Like the AOC, the ROC allows conducting drone flights in accordance with 
the specifications included in the certificate. The ROC is not limited to commercial 
air transport, though, but can equally authorize aerial work, like surveying that 
takes place internationally.569 It is thus a separate instrument based on separate 
rules but draws all its essential characteristics from existing law. Still, the concept 
also introduces a few wholly alternative standards. For instance, the Manual advices 
that the drone operator’s control and supervision—one of the things the operator 
must demonstrate for an ROC—should include the use of remote pilot stations.570
Beyond the ROC, the RPAS Manual continues with emulation. The drone 
operator must make sure that the personnel are properly competent, that the 
continuing airworthiness of the drone is maintained, that the flight crew executes its 
duties properly, and that the ground facilities are available and enable safe operation. 
Furthermore, the operator is responsible for ensuring that records of all activities 
are kept, and that it holds relevant documents at the place of management, the RPS, 
and aboard the drone itself.571 The placement of documents aboard the UA appears 
a silly requirement; however, ICAO has elsewhere noted that the documents can be 
placed on the device electronically.
The legislative approach taken in the EU is more complex. In the open category, 
to avoid over-inclusiveness, the approach is passive in that no authorization is 
required.572 This passivity is, as described above and below, compensated with 
product requirements imposed on the drone as well as restrictive flight rules.
The certified category, whose operations come close to manned aviation and 
ICAO standards, requires the UAS operator to be certified. The details for the 
certification are thus far unknown, but they will be included in existing regulations. 
567  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Arts. 5, 7, and 11–12.
568  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, Appendix 4, para. 2.2.
569  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, sec. 6.3.
570  Ibid., para. 6.3.4.
571  Ibid., ch. 6.
572  Ibid., Art. 3, para. 1, subpara. a.
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The same goes for the substantive obligations imposed on the drone operator.573 
Curiously, this means following the rules of Commission Regulation (EU) No 
965/2012, which sets forth the categorization of operations into CAT, SPO, etc. 
Whether this will entail including certified UAS into the existing Parts of the 
Regulation, which would subject them to the categorization, or creating a new Part 
altogether, remains to be seen. The legislative course taken by ICAO will likely 
influence the choice. Suffice it to say that the former option appears problematic, 
at least assuming that the category will also incorporate operations that are not 
readily classifiable pursuant to existing Parts. In terms of legislative approaches, to 
summarize, the basic idea is replication, but the actual rules may come closer to 
emulation through tailoring the procedure for drones; in some respects, alternative 
rules may have to be enacted.
The specific category, on the other hand, establishes a completely alternative way 
of authorizing operators.574 The operator does not declare its capability nor apply for 
an AOC; instead, by default, they must acquire an operational authorization (OA). 
The declaration or certification procedure, which traditionally were employed as 
individual instruments, are replaced by a holistic process of risk assessment. The risk 
assessment has been inspired by assessments conducted before, but legally speaking 
it is more fundamental and broader in its scope and works in a rather unique 
manner. In fact, the whole specific category largely boils down to the assessment, 
since it includes not only elements traditionally included in operational declaration 
or certification but also matters like airworthiness. According to an abbreviated 
description, the assessment first involves describing the purpose and complexity 
of the operation, the environment, the features of the UAS, and the competence 
of the crew. Second, the risks of the operation must be identified, which enables 
determining the appropriate requirements.575
The most prominent method of conducting the assessment is the SORA, which 
uses a unique system to calculate the mitigations and limitations that must be imposed 
on the drone operator in order to maintain an acceptable level of aviation safety. To 
briefly introduce the method, it begins with a concept of operations (CONOPS), 
which is the operator’s description of relevant information. The description reveals, 
for instance, what is the impact energy of the drone and where it operates. These and 
other factors form the basis for the ground and air risk class (GRC and ARC), which 
can be lowered using mitigation measures. The final GRC and ARC determine the 
required specific assurance and integrity levels (SAIL), ranging from low to high in 
particular aspects. The SAIL reveals the extent to which (low, medium, or high) the 
operator must comply with the operational safety objectives (OSOs) set forth in the 
573  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 3, para. 1, subpara. c and Art. 7, para. 3.
574  See Huttunen 2019b, pp. 5–8.
575  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Arts. 3, 5, 7, 11–12 and Annex, Part B.
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SORA Guidelines. The assessment is finalized by considering whether and how the 
operation may infringe adjacent areas and by writing a safety portfolio.576
The alternative character of authorization in the specific category is also visible 
in the concept of standard scenarios (STS). An STS is a type of drone operation 
that has undergone the risk assessment process, resulting in predefined conditions 
that provide an acceptable level of risk mitigation.577 It is an acceptable means of 
compliance (AMC), that is, a non-binding standard adopted by EASA to illustrate 
means to establish compliance with the drone regulations.578 If the operator 
wants to operate pursuant to an STS, it need only declare compliance rather than 
perform the risk assessment anew. The process of declaring compliance appears a 
case of emulation because it resembles the authorization process adopted for certain 
operations in manned aviation, like SPO. The concept of STS is, overall, still an 
alternative instrument, since each scenario is a single operational model rather than 
a category for a wide range of operations with varying conditions.
Besides having to acquire an OA, the operator in the specific category naturally has 
some generic responsibilities pertaining to the operation. Among other things, they 
must establish procedures and limitations with regard to the type of the intended 
operation and the risk involved; designate a remote pilot for each operation and 
ensure that all personnel comply with relevant rules on training and other aspects; 
keep a record of the operations; and maintain the UAS in a condition suitable for 
safe operation.579
The advantages, shortcomings, and criticism of the approach taken in the 
specific category are appraised comprehensively in the third article of this study. 
To summarize, however, it is worth noting the following. First of all, the category 
provides much needed flexibility in the drone framework, but this comes at the 
cost of the competent authorities having to conduct numerous assessments and 
do much of the decision-making. The concept of STS might also be abused by 
operators that do not wish to undergo an actual risk assessment, but if applied 
properly, it could also foster uniformity. Finally, the SORA method could appear 
too simplistic or complex, but it does seem capable to correctly assess the risks in 
the present setting.
Yet another set of alternative rules in the specific category concerns the light UAS 
operator certificate (LUC). While the concept appears close to the AOCs issued 
for commercial air transport operators, it is quite unlike such and thus clearly an 
alternative instrument. The purpose of the LUC is closely connected with operational 
576  See Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, AMC1; JARUS Guidelines on Specific Operations Risk 
Assessment (SORA); Huttunen 2019b, pp. 6–7; Torens, Dauer & Adolf 2018, pp. 113–116.
577  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 2, para. 2, subpara. 6.
578  See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Annex I, para. 1, subpara. 2.
579  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Annex, Part B, UAS.SPEC.050.
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authorization; namely, it grants the drone operator the privilege to authorize its own 
operations without submitting a declaration or applying for an authorization from 
the relevant authority. This unique privilege, which resembles the self-regulation 
of airlines, comes at the cost of having to comply with standards bordering those 
developed for the certified category of operations.580
5.2.3. Achieving Airworthiness
In the case of airworthiness, it was noted above that much depends on the 
characteristics of the UAS. As ICAO has focused on high-end international 
operations, its legislative approach has largely been replication. In other words, the 
rules draw heavily on standards in place for manned aviation, relying on familiar 
instruments. While Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft is yet to be amended 
to incorporate unmanned aviation, the RPAS Manual explicitly assumes that 
procedures applicable to manned aircraft, to the maximum extent practicable, 
apply to drones. This includes type certification, production approval, continuing 
airworthiness, and product modifications. Most notably, the obligation for every 
aircraft in international aviation to be provided with an airworthiness certificate, 
as included in Article 31 of the Chicago Convention, applies to unmanned aircraft 
as it is. Furthermore, the Manual notes that ICAO Document 9760: Airworthiness 
Manual should be applied to UAS in most aspects.581
It is difficult to criticize the given approach in the context of international air 
transport. Yet it might be over-inclusive when it comes to some forms of international 
aerial work, which in the EU likely fall within the specific category. An otherwise 
low-to-medium risk operation that happens to occur across the border of two states 
could be subject to more demanding rules than an operation that remains domestic. 
However, as this matter is largely governed by arrangements between nation states 
and their civil aviation authorities, no problems should be anticipated. If anything, 
the respective authorities of states should, in cooperation, determine the rules 
applicable to such border crossing unmanned aviation that need not be subject to 
the same rules as manned aviation.
Regardless, the Manual acknowledges that the distributed nature of UAS 
presents challenges in applying the traditional airworthiness system. In this respect, 
the recommendations move from replication to emulation. For instance, the aircraft 
component of the drone must be type certified, while the certification of the other 
components like the remote pilot station is subject to the aircraft’s TC. The RPS may 
be certified independently, but the holder of the aircraft’s TC will be responsible 
580  Ibid, Part C and passim.
581  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 4.2.1. See also Fiallos 
2019, pp. 164–165.
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for the safe integration of the station.582 The new rules thus make the most of 
traditional rules on type certification but in a slightly different manner, taking into 
account the features of the new technology. While the certification arrangement 
appears confusing, it seems difficult to imagine it handled otherwise in the context 
of international unmanned aviation.
Meanwhile, the substantive requirements for the RPS interface can be seen as a case 
of emulating the rules on the flight crew compartment. While the concept of RPS 
is completely new and employs the command and control link, its basic functions 
are similar to those of the cockpit of a manned aircraft. Hence, ICAO notes that the 
requirements for the RPS interface are fundamentally the same as for the interface 
used in cockpits. The recommendations in the RPAS Manual therefore follow those 
set forth in Part IIIB of Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft, which essentially require 
the design of the controls to minimize the possibility of inadvertent operations.583
The recommendations for the command and control (C2) link, as set forth in 
the RPAS Manual, are naturally alternative rules. This includes, among other things, 
rules on the type certification of the C2. In this respect, the Manual recommends 
that the certification should fall within the certification of the UAS: the link will 
not be independently certified. Given the lack of existing standards, the Manual also 
contains initial suggestions on C2 architecture and procedures for recovering the 
link in situations where it is lost. Some elements of the recommendations contain 
emulation. Most prominently, the concept of required communication performance 
(RCP) comes from the document known today as ICAO Document 9869: 
Performance-based Communication and Surveillance (PBCS) Manual. However, 
the actual RCP values will have to be determined by the manufacturer of the UAS 
with reference to parameters set forth in SARPs issued by ICAO. Such include 
communication transaction time, continuity, availability, and integrity.584
The EU’s legislative approach to airworthiness has, because of the categorization, 
been much more complex. Essential airworthiness requirements for UAS, as set forth 
in the EASA Basic Regulation, largely emulate the requirements for manned aircraft. 
These obligations are very general in nature, so there has not been a need to create 
alternative rules; reliance on replication and emulation is sufficient. One example 
of replication therein is that drones must comply with the same environmental 
performance requirements as manned aircraft.585 The provision does not seem very 
significant, since drones are generally less noisy and less polluting than all manned 
aircraft. However, as noise is a notable issue in urban environments, the example is 
worth mentioning.
582  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, sec. 4.4.
583  Ibid., ch. 13.
584  Ibid., sec. 4.5, ch. 11, and passim.
585  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Annex IX, sec. 3.
121
Huttunen: Safety and Security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Examples of emulation are more plentiful, as some modifications to the original 
requirements have been necessary. For example, the provisions on product integrity 
read as follows:
Product integrity, including protection against information security threats, must be 
assured for all anticipated flight conditions for the operational life of the aircraft.586
Unmanned aircraft must provide product integrity that is proportionate to the risk in 
all anticipated flight conditions.587
The key point in both standards is the same: that the aircraft must withstand all 
anticipated flight conditions. The provision on manned aircraft, however, emphasizes 
protection against information security threats and that the integrity must persist 
throughout the whole life cycle of the aircraft. The latter notion likely stems from 
the fact that manned aircraft are often used for decades before their decommission. 
The provision on drones buttresses the proportionality of product integrity in terms 
of risk, perhaps due to the wide scale of different drones.
Airworthiness certification is required if the drone meets any of the following 
conditions:
(a) it has a characteristic dimension of 3 m or more, and is designed to be operated over 
assemblies of people;
(b) it is designed for transporting people;
(c) it is designed for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods and requiring a high 
level of robustness to mitigate the risks for third parties in case of accident;
(d) it is used in the ‘specific’ category of operations defined in Article 5 of Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and the operational authorisation issued by the competent 
authority, following a risk assessment provided for in Article 11 of Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2019/947, considers that the risk of the operation cannot be adequately 
mitigated without the certification of the UAS.588
In such cases, which fall within the ambit of the certified category—albeit 
drones with certification can also be used in the specific category—the approach 
is replication. Since the risks of the certified category are regarded as similar to 
certain types of manned aviation, the fundamental position is that the traditional 
rules will be applied as they are: certified drones must comply with the applicable 
586  Ibid., Annex II, para. 1.1.1.
587  Ibid., Annex IX, para. 2.1.2.
588  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Art. 40, para. 1 (emphasis added). See also 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 7, para. 3.
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requirements. Airworthiness certification is handled in accordance with existing 
regulations on type certification and continuous airworthiness.589 Aircraft in the 
category must also comply with the airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) 
Regulation.590
This directly subjects certain drones to the existing airworthiness instruments 
of aviation safety law. In reality, though, it seems that the rules must be emulated. 
While the desired level of safety standards may be the same in certified category as in 
manned aviation, there are still notable technological differences between manned 
and unmanned aircraft. The airworthiness of a certified category RPS will require 
new certification specifications (CSs) to be enacted in, inter alia, Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. In this regard, reference can be made to the 2009 
EASA policy statement regarding the airworthiness certification of UAS with an 
MTOM of over 150 kg.591 More prominently, though, the necessity of emulation 
becomes apparent when looking at a JARUS’s initial CS-UAS document on type 
certification. The document concerns MTOM under 8618 kilograms for drones 
without vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) capability, and 3175 kg for VTOL 
drones. It excludes passenger transport but includes recommendations on related 
equipment.592
The rules of the open category are technically not airworthiness rules at all: they 
are rules on product conformity and mandatory features of the aircraft. As such, 
they are a mixture of replication, emulation, and alternative rules. For example, the 
obligations of drone manufacturers derive their content from Decision No 768/2008/
EC, which is a general document on ensuring the quality of products marketed 
within the EU. The same goes for product conformity assessment modules, like 
EU-type examination. In some respects, the procedures are exactly the same as with 
other consumer products; in other respects, they have been tailored for drones. For 
instance, the modules take into account the class of the UAS (C0–C4).593
Some of the rules concern fixed limitations like MTOM, maximum flight speed, 
and maximum noise level, as well as basic features like lights. For example, the 
MTOM limits of the drone classes are as follows, including payload:
 – C0: 250 grams
 – C1: 900 grams
589  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Art. 40, para. 2 (cit. Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 748/2012; Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014; Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/640).
590  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 7, para. 3 (cit. Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1332/2011).
591  EASA Policy Statement E.Y013-01.
592  JARUS CS-UAS: Recommendations for Certification Specification for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
593  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Art. 6 and Annex.
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 – C2: 4 kilograms
 – C3 & C4: 25 kilograms.594
In this regard, the rules emulate the style of existing standards but are otherwise 
alternative. For example, manned aircraft are also categorized using MTOM limits 
for the purposes of airworthiness, but the limits used for drones do not coincide 
with them.595 The requirement pertaining to safe controllability,596 being a very 
generic provision, clearly has its roots in the certification specifications on manned 
aircraft.597 Yet there are wholly alternative rules, too. This is best expressed in rules 
that mandate features that are completely unique to drones. For instance, drones of 
all classes but C4 must be designed so that they cannot reach an altitude above 120 
meters above the surface or above the take-off point. More peculiarly, for example 
class C1 UAS must have a reliable and predictable method of recovering the data 
link in cases where it is lost, a capability for direct remote identification, a geo-
awareness system, and a system that warns the remote pilot when the battery of the 
drone is running low.598 
Requiring drones to have certain features obviously has had an impact on 
the development of drones and will continue to do so. It is only logical that 
manufacturers and service providers not only wish to affect the course of legislation 
but also to organize their business in accordance with what they perceive as being 
the dominant course. Besides industry affecting legislation, the required features 
reciprocally affect the development of unmanned aviation technology. If, however, 
there is a desire to maintain a category of operations open to all without special 
authorization, the problem cannot be avoided: the requirements will have to be very 
specific and mandatory.
The approach of the specific category is discussed at length in the third article of 
the study.599 Apart from cases in which the drone is certified, the category subjects 
the airworthiness of UAS to the risk assessment procedure. In other words, the 
drone must have the technical capabilities set forth in the operational authorization, 
which is the end result of the assessment; alternatively, the capabilities must match 
those set forth in the standard scenario.
594  Ibid., Annex, e.g., Part 2, para. 1. The C2 category is not to be confused with the abbreviation for the 
command and control link (C2).
595  For example, in the EU Light Aircraft include aeroplanes with an MTOM of 1200 kg or less. See 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, Art. 1, para. 2, subpara. i.
596  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex, e.g., Part 2, para. 4.
597  See Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Normal-Category Aeroplanes 
(CS-23), CS 23.143.
598  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex, e.g., Part 2, paras. 7 and 12–14.
599  Huttunen 2019b.
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The SORA method of risk assessment incorporates many elements of traditional 
certification as operational safety objectives (OSOs). Similarly to type certification, 
SORA requires drones to be developed in accordance with recognized design 
standards, and to be manufactured by a competent and/or proven entity. The 
actual measures to ensure this depend on the necessitated level of safety. At the low 
end, ensuring material conformity is sufficient, at the medium level the operator 
must provide evidence about inspections and testing, and at the high level the 
qualifications of the manufacturers must be ensured through audits and the like. 
There are additional OSOs regarding the design of all relevant technical aspects of 
UAS. Continuing airworthiness requirements follow a similar pattern. In low risk 
scenarios, it is necessary to simply maintain the aircraft pursuant to documented 
instructions, while at the high level there must be a validated maintenance program 
and recurrent training for the staff.600 This approach, while containing familiar 
elements, is on the whole best characterized as an alternative one.
5.2.4. Registering Aircraft and Operators
When it comes to the registration of drones, the approach of ICAO has largely 
been to stay passive or replicate existing rules. With regard to Article 20 of the 
Chicago Convention, which implicitly insists on the registration of all aircraft 
flying internationally, no action has been deemed necessary. Annex 2: Rules of the 
Air does not especially state that the provision applies to UAS, too, only implying 
that it does.601 The RPAS Manual comes closer to replication, as it quotes Article 
20, implying that drones fall within its ambit.602 As ICAO’s focus is on the high 
end of international operations, it does not address the over-inclusiveness issue that 
concerns the lower end of the spectrum. In terms of registration marks, SARPs 
emulate existing rules: registration marks on a drone can be “secured in a prominent 
position near the main entrance or compartment or affixed conspicuously to the 
exterior of the aircraft if there is no main entrance or compartment.”603
The EU rules, due to their wide scope, provide a more comprehensive case of 
dealing with over-inclusiveness. Therein, the idea to register is taken from traditional 
safety law. However, the drone itself must only be registered when its design is subject 
to (airworthiness) certification. The ICAO approach of replication is thus followed 
only in the certified category, or when a certified drone is used in the specific category. 
600  JARUS Guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), Guidelines, p. 11 and Annex E, 
pp. 5–11, 15, 20, and 25–26. See similarly Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material 
(GM) to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, AMC1.
601  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, Appendix 4, para. 1.5 and para. 3.2, subpara. c.
602  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 5.1.1.
603  Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, para. 9.2, subpara. b. Air transport drones 
have a main entrance or a (passenger or cargo) compartment, which suggests the provision is targeted at 
non-transport drones.
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In these cases, the nationality and registration marks must naturally be presented on 
the drone per ICAO’s standards.604
In other cases, identification is sought by expecting the operator to register itself 
when operating a drone that passes one of the thresholds mentioned in the Basic 
Regulation and/or Implementing Regulation. For the sake of uniformity, the 
obligation to register also concerns operators of certified UAS and operations in 
the specific category.605 The way this avoids the issues identified previously is that a 
single operator may use numerous UAS through a single registration. Furthermore, 
the authorities need not be notified of transactions involving each drone. Much of 
the bureaucratic burden of the original system is hence reduced. This is emphasized 
by the obligation to establish a distinct, digital, and interoperable method of 
registration.606 The approach contains elements of emulation and alternative rules: 
although the concept of registration is employed, its target is different and its 
procedure contains unique elements, too.
The preceding Chapter argued that since registration marks on small drones 
are useful only at a close distance, the identification of such aircraft would have to 
be supplemented with other means. To this end, the European rules require the 
operator to display its registration number on its drones607 and drone manufacturers 
to ensure that the aircraft bears a type and a unique serial number that allow for 
its identification.608 Alone this emulation of existing rules appears ineffective, but 
not so when read in its proper context. According to new, alternative rules, in 
the open category drones with an MTOM of over 250 grams must be equipped 
with a capability for direct remote identification.609 This means that the UA will 
electronically broadcast its registration information, enabling identification as long 
as the remote pilot inserts their information and does not tamper with the aircraft.
Such capability is not explicitly required in the specific and certified category: it 
appears only a mandatory feature in the open one. The likely explanation for this 
is that the specific category seeks to incorporate such a wide range of operations 
that requiring a remote identification feature in all of them might be over-inclusive; 
the certified category, meanwhile, is set to rely on traditional registration and 
operational rules, which may defeat the purpose of having remote identification. 
Still, it is somewhat odd that the SORA method does not even consider imposing 
604  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Annex IX, sec. 4; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/947, Art. 14, para. 7.
605  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Annex IX, sec. 4; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/947, Art. 14, para. 5.
606  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Preamble, para. 17 and Art. 14, paras. 4 and 
6.
607  Ibid., Art. 14, para. 8.
608  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Art. 6, para. 5; Decision No 768/2008/EC, Art. 
R2, para. 5.
609  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex, Parts 2–4 and 6.
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remote identification as a means of reducing the risks of the operation—apart 
from the seemingly random case that the operator uses a UAS owned by a third 
party.610 Regardless, EASA’s preparatory work on U-space indicates that the features 
are mandatory when specific category operations utilize the U-space,611 which is 
discussed below.
5.2.5. Rules on Remote Pilots
ICAO’s approach to the licensing of UAS pilots—remote pilots—has been 
replication and emulation. Annex 2: Rules of the Air calls for their licensing in 
accordance with national rules and Annex 1: Personnel Licensing.612 This idea is 
expanded upon in the RPAS Manual, which employs concepts like the remote pilot 
licence and establishes the basic requirements for attaining such a qualification. 
The requirements are overwhelmingly derived from existing rules: Article 32 of the 
Chicago Convention, which calls for aircraft pilots in international aviation to be 
certified and licensed, remains unchanged and is applied to remote pilots. However, 
the terminology of the new recommendations consistently refers to drones and 
some of their special features.613 Making few deviations appears to make sense, given 
the Organization’s desire to legislate only international drone piloting.
The Manual’s approach is affirmed in the most recent edition of Annex 1: 
Personnel Licensing. Its provisions are applicable from 3 November 2022 onwards 
to international drone operations that follow instrument flight rules.614 In order 
to act as a PIC or co-pilot of an unmanned aircraft, a person must hold a remote 
pilot licence. The right to pilot a particular type of UAS, like a rotorcraft drone, is 
endorsed as a category rating on the licence, and class and type ratings are required in 
particular cases, too. In these aspects and in the substantive training requirements, the 
licensing draws heavily upon existing rules. The pilot must demonstrate knowledge 
on, for instance, traditional aeronautical charts, instruments, and navigation aids. 
Alternative rules are only established for aspects that are unique to drones, like the 
C2 link and to an extent the RPS.615
As explicated above, the most generic provisions on pilot competency would 
not be over-inclusive in the context of most unmanned aviation. For this purpose, 
EU’s essential requirements regarding remote pilots rely on emulation. Consider, for 
instance, the following provisions:
610  Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2019/947, AMC1 Article 14(8), para. d, subpara. 3.
611  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, p. 13 (the certified category remains unmentioned in this regard).
612  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, Appendix 4, para. 2.3.
613  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, ch. 8. See also Fiallos 2019, 
pp. 165–167.
614  See below on the application of IFR to drones.
615  Annex 1: Personnel Licensing, ch. 2, Part B.
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A person undertaking training to fly an aircraft must be sufficiently mature educationally, 
physically and mentally to acquire, retain and demonstrate the relevant theoretical 
knowledge and practical skill.616
Any person involved in the operation of an unmanned aircraft, including the remote 
pilot, shall possess the required knowledge and skills necessary to ensure the safety of 
the operation and proportionate to the risk associated with the type of operation.617
The core of the rules is the same: a person must have both theoretical knowledge 
and practical skills to operate an aircraft. The former standard, which applies to 
the pilots of manned aircraft, though, refers to educational, physical, and mental 
maturity as well as the demonstration of knowledge and skills. Drone pilots simply 
have to possess the latter two, and the provision highlights the necessity of the 
knowledge and skills in proportion to the safety and risks of the operation. This 
is to remind that many drone operations are of extremely low risk, and that not all 
operations require the pilot to undergo training.618
Following existing standards also works in the certified category, considering that 
the focus is on commercial unmanned aviation like human and cargo transport. 
While the category does not yet set out a licensing framework of remote pilots nor 
refer to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, the licensing requirement is 
mentioned in several provisions of the Implementing Regulation. Where applicable, 
the remote pilot should be licensed.619 The choice of approach is therefore emulation, 
much in accordance with ICAO standards.
In lower risk applications, the discussion above highlighted the issue of subjecting 
the remote pilot to traditional licensing and the topics covered by traditional 
training. The open category attempts to solve the issue with an alternative approach. 
In order to pilot a class C1 drone in subcategory A1, for instance, the pilot must 
complete an online training course and pass a theoretical examination in the Member 
State where the drone operator is registered. This covers topics somewhat similar to 
but also different from traditional pilot licensing, including for instance airspace 
restrictions, UAS general knowledge, privacy and data protection, and security.620 
There is hence emulation of existing requirements, but also alternative requirements.
Online training seeks a balance between the necessity of training and the over-
inclusiveness of traditional training. Furthermore, it enables tailoring the substance 
616  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Annex IV, para. 1.1.
617  Ibid., Annex IX, para. 2.3.
618  The provision on remote pilots excludes medical fitness and even the provision on regular pilots only 
hints at it, as the matter is regulated separately.
619  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 3, para. 1, subpara. c, Art. 6, para. 2, and 
Art. 18, para. 1, subpara. b.
620  Ibid., Art. 8, para. 1 and Annex, Part A, UAS.OPEN.020.
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of training to better suit the characteristics of consumer grade unmanned aviation, 
solving the issues of under-inclusiveness and ineffectiveness. Online courses are 
flexible in that their content can easily be tailored on the basis of feedback, of any 
issues that may arise, and of the development of unmanned technology. On the other 
hand, online training lacks the oversight present in traditional training in which the 
prospective pilots must attend teaching and practice sessions. Certainly, there are 
bound to be rogue pilots who simply want to get over with the course and the exam, 
ignoring the learning aspect to the extent they can. Another issue is that gaining 
knowledge or skills that are not part of the course in an accessible form will take 
additional effort from the pilot, as there is no expert from whom to ask questions.
The specific category also solves training related issues by resorting to alternative 
rules. In accordance with other safety aspects, the required competency of the 
remote pilot is set forth in the operational authorization or the standard scenario. 
In other words, the risk assessment determines the necessary qualifications. This 
must include at least, inter alia, the ability to manage aeronautical communication, 
manage the flight path and automation of the drone, and maintain situational 
awareness.621 Given the wide range of different operations in the category, the 
training requirements for pilots can be tailored in an even more detailed manner—
albeit the SORA method itself does not establish a legal framework for pilot training 
or licensing.622 In order to tackle this shortcoming, JARUS has published a separate 
recommendatory document on the competency of pilots in the open and specific 
category.623
5.2.6. Airspace and U-space
The preceding Chapter acknowledged many drone-related issues with the existing 
framework of air traffic control and management. These issues are less pronounced 
in international operations, which is why ICAO’s approach in many aspects has so 
far been replication. According to Annex 2: Rules of the Air, UAS simply follow 
the rules for the airspace where the drone operates. No special rules are issued for 
performance and equipment requirements, including matters like communication, 
identification, and separation. A flight plan must be submitted in accordance with 
the general rules of the Annex or in accordance with the rules issued by the overflown 
state.624
The way the RPAS Manual addresses the concerns recognized above is similar. It 
does not deal with the lack of ATC/ATM for drones operating outside aerodromes 
nor with the over-inclusiveness or ineffectiveness of the measures. The possible 
621  Ibid., Art. 8, para. 2 and Annex, Part B.
622  JARUS Guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), Annex C, p. 4.
623  JARUS Recommendation for Remote Pilot Competency (RPS) for UAS Operations in Category A 
(Open) and Category B (Specific).
624  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, Appendix 4, paras. 1.6–1.7.
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inability of the existing infrastructure to handle mass unmanned aviation is not 
tackled. The focus is simply on how drones can achieve compliance with the 
infrastructure in cases where it is necessary.
To this end, the Manual explicates that the requirements for ATC communications 
and ATM procedures are the same as for manned aviation in the same airspace. 
In both controlled and uncontrolled airspace, drones must not impact the status 
quo. The system must, inter alia, meet the required communication performance 
(RCP) set forth in ICAO Document 9869: Performance-based Communication and 
Surveillance (PBCS) Manual and have the required equipment. The drone itself must 
be able to move like manned aircraft, complying with markings and signals at the 
aerodrome. This requires technological and procedural advances, for it is recognized 
that that some characteristics of drones affect their ability to follow existing rules. 
To solve the issue of the pilot not being on board the aircraft, the Manual suggests 
alternative forms of communications architecture.625 The development of alternative 
rules thus merely serves the overarching goal of replication.
In terms of identification, the RPAS Manual continues with passivity and 
replication. As ICAO currently focuses on international operations that utilize IFR 
capable high-end drones, there is of course no need to address the problems with the 
primary radar. Existing transponder rules, which fall within the ambit of airspace 
equipment requirements, are equally unproblematic from the given perspective. 
They are something to which UAS, too, will have to subject. Remarkably, the Manual 
does recognize that deviations may be possible in, for example, low level airspace.626
For now, and particularly in the context of 2015 when the document was 
published, ICAO’s approach makes sense since it does not risk going too far with 
its predictions. However, in the grander scheme of things the approach appears to 
lack vision in how to actually orchestrate future manned and unmanned air traffic. 
While the Organization’s mandate is, in principle, limited to international aviation, 
it still serves as a forum for legislating both international and domestic aviation. It 
might eventually have to undertake the task of standardizing future ATC/ATM 
solutions that incorporate both manned and unmanned aviation in a sophisticated 
manner. That is, replication may ultimately turn out to be an insufficient solution. 
This is also the case if ICAO wants to enact rules for drones that are not and ought 
not to be compatible with the existing ATC/ATM infrastructure. In other words, if 
the Organization wants to include lower risk operations within its scope, it cannot 
simply follow the traditional way of doing things.
The European rules go a lot further than ICAO’s, since they aim to address drone 
operations in all airspace. Curiously, the starting point of the rules is replication 
in the certified and specific category, at least to an extent. The Implementing 
625  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, chs. 12, 14, and 15.
626  Ibid., para. 14.2.10. See also ch. 10 regarding detect and avoid (DAA).
130
Huttunen: Safety and Security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Regulation explicitly states that operations in both categories must comply with the 
applicable operational requirements set forth in the Standardised European Rules 
of the Air (SERA).627 The exact meaning of this statement is not clarified in the 
document outlining the acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to 
the regulation.628 One may only assume that, without further instructions, the rules 
apply as they are: for example, the operator must file a flight plan.629
If we take into consideration the entire legal framework, though, the application 
of SERA must be limited to situations in which the UAS is used in airspace shared 
with manned air traffic. In other cases, the new rules can be seen as lex specialis to 
the lex generali630 that the SERA represent. Particularly, the issues with ATC/ATM, 
including identification, are to be solved through the U-space concept, which is a 
form of unmanned aircraft systems traffic management (UTM). In U-space, drones 
are subject to a new system of traffic management. The concept is to be applied to 
all three categories of unmanned operations that take place in the U-space, albeit 
nothing suggests that UAS are excluded from relying on the traditional ATC/
ATM infrastructure when they can follow its requirements. Such may occur in the 
certified as well as the specific category, though the likely expectation is preference 
for U-space where such is established.
The basis of the U-space concept, the emergence of which was examined in the 
second article of this study,631 lies in mandatory technical features imposed on 
drones themselves. As already mentioned regarding airworthiness and registration, 
the open category demands class C1–4 drones to be equipped with a direct remote 
identification capability. This system broadcasts from the drone the operator’s 
registration number and the drone’s serial number, geographical position, and route 
course, as well as the pilot’s geographical position. Besides identification, the drone 
must also be equipped with a geo-awareness system that contains information on 
airspace limitations and warns the remote pilot when the drone might breach such 
limitations.632 The extent to which the given requirements apply in the specific 
or certified category has not been explicitly stated, as already noted regarding 
registration. Pursuant to EASA documents and sheer common sense, though, 
operating in the U-space will require the drones to have remote identification and 
geo-awareness features regardless of the operational category.633
627  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 7, paras. 2–3. The SERA are set forth in 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012.
628  See Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947.
629  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, Annex, sec. 4.
630  See, e.g., Lindroos 2005, pp. 35–64.
631  Huttunen 2019a.
632  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex, Parts 2–6.
633  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, p. 13 (mentioning, however, only the specific category).
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The actual rules on the concept will establish alternative rules concerning EU 
Member States, operators of UAS and manned aircraft, as well as old and new 
service providers. The idea, if the present proposals are followed, is that the MSs can 
designate volumes of controlled or uncontrolled airspace as U-space temporarily or 
permanently. Cross-border U-space can also be established. This will have as little 
effect as possible on manned air traffic, since in controlled airspace air navigation 
service providers (ANSPs) will remain responsible for providing air navigation 
service (ANS) thereto; in uncontrolled airspace, flight information service (FIS) 
will be given. At the same time, U-space service providers (USSPs) will do the same 
for drone operators in the U-space.634
Without delving too deep into the legal-technical aspects of U-space, it is worth 
pointing out that the presently proposed system is to be based on an EU-wide 
common information service (CIS). The service entails information exchange 
between ANSPs, USSPs, drones, and manned aircraft. CIS providers must be 
certified and designated to each U-space by the Member States, and they must 
be distinct from USSPs. The operation of U-space has clearly been inspired by 
controlled airspace. Drone operators must comply with the technical and other 
requirements of the space and make a UAS flight authorisation request that 
resembles a traditional flight plan. In terms of services, the concept requires four 
mandatory ones: network identification, which identifies for instance the operator, 
position, and route of the drone; geo-awareness,635 which provides information on 
UAS geographical zones;636 system for flight authorisation; and traffic information, 
which gives the drone operator information on other air traffic. There are three 
optional ones, including real-time tracking based on information from a variety of 
sources, weather information, and conformance monitoring, which examines how 
UAS operators comply with their obligations and the submitted flight authorisation 
request.637
EASA acknowledges that the present U-space proposals are only the first building 
block of the whole framework.638 As such, they are complementary and approach 
the legislative demand with alternative rules. Despite this, the concept as a whole 
may ultimately become a transformative force in ATM. As I point out in the second 
article of this study, the advanced and full services of U-space do not simply deal 
634  Draft Commission Implementing Regulation on a high-level regulatory framework for the U-space, Art. 
4. See in detail EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 11–12.
635  Pursuant to a typology suggested by my colleague Malte Krumm in a discussion, geoawareness means 
providing the pilot with information on virtual boundaries. It can be contrasted with geofencing, which 
means the creation and automatic enforcement of such boundaries through positioning technology. 
Meanwhile, geovectoring means specifying speeds and headings in a given volume of airspace.
636  See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 15.
637  Draft Commission Implementing Regulation on a high-level regulatory framework for the U-space, 
Arts. 5 and 10–16. See in detail EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 12–13 and 15–18.
638  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 6, 9–10, and 25
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with integrating drones into the shared airspace but with the creation of a seamless 
airspace. Such will necessitate solutions like automatic detect and avoid (DAA) 
and dynamic geofencing capability for all aircraft and infrastructure, so that users 
can interface with one another and be immediately and flexibly allocated slots for 
operating in a certain volume of airspace.639
The complete utilization of airspace by manned and unmanned aviation is thus 
an undertaking initiated by drones but whose scope goes beyond the legislation of 
drones. Yet some disagreement exists as to how fast the transformation should take 
place. In EASA’s view, achieving the ultimate objective of U-space, which is to prevent 
collisions and mitigate air and ground risks, requires the associated technology to 
mature.640 Some industry stakeholders, however, emphasize that U-space segregated 
from other airspace should only be a temporary step as it will, in the long run, create 
complexity and fragmentation. UTM and ATM should ultimately converge into 
an integrated operational concept, a process in which digital data sources and risk 
assessment procedures are crucial.641
From an outsider’s perspective, this simply appears a case of the Collingridge 
dilemma to which there is no right answer. Segregating U-space from other airspace 
certainly assumes that, as of now, integration is too large of a hurdle to overcome 
technologically. This is why alternative rules are enacted. Simultaneously, though, 
the rules assume that the sociotechnical situation will change in near future to allow 
a more comprehensive system of ATM. It is thus at least difficult to argue that the 
present proposals concerning U-space are too tied to a particular state of technology.
The possible transformation is naturally linked to other sociotechnical changes. 
Through U-space, the complex system of controlling and managing air traffic may, 
inter alia, become hidden (from the operator’s or pilot’s perspective) behind a mobile 
application. Such an application may allow the operator to present a flight plan and, 
basing on all data, issue a legally binding decision on whether the plan is accepted. 
Indeed, this is what the advanced and full services of the concept suggest. In light of 
what has been suggested generally regarding digitalization, the speed, rigidity, and 
automation of digital platforms may transform what is the totality of aviation safety 
law as a material practice. This creates a new challenge in ensuring the perseverance 
of essential legal values in digital law—depending, of course, on which values are 
ultimately valued.642
639  U-space Blueprint, pp. 5 and 7–8. See also European ATM Master Plan: Roadmap for the safe 
integration of drones into all classes of airspace.
640  EASA Opinion No 01/2020, p. 6.
641  ASD Position Paper: The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) Regulation, pp. 
3–4.
642  See Tranter 2017, pp. 12–13. See also Hildebrandt 2009; Vismann 2008.
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5.2.7. Similar and Distinctive Flight Rules
With flight rules, as with many other aspects, ICAO’s default position has been 
replication. According to the RPAS Manual, both VFR and IFR apply to UAS in 
all aspects. In the former case, the Manual notes, the remote pilot must be able to 
comply with the minima concerning visibility and distance from clouds. In both 
cases, the pilot must identify encounters with other aircraft and take appropriate 
action. Meteorological conditions must be assessed, and appropriate navigation 
instruments and equipment must be used.643
Above it was noted that existing flight rules do not take into consideration the 
position of the drone in relation to the remote pilot. To this end, both ICAO and the 
EU have given legal significance to the distinction between flying within or beyond 
the visual line of sight (VLOS, BVLOS) of the remote pilot. The concept of VLOS 
was already included in Annex 2: Rules of the Air, but the RPAS Manual expands 
thereon and also uses the latter concept. In specific terms, VLOS, according to the 
Organization, refers to “[a]n operation in which the remote pilot or RPA observer 
maintains direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft.”644 A 
slightly different definition is used in the EU where VLOS signifies
a type of UAS operation in which, the remote pilot is able to maintain 
continuous unaided visual contact with the unmanned aircraft, allowing the 
remote pilot to control the flight path of the unmanned aircraft in relation to 
other aircraft, people and obstacles for the purpose of avoiding collisions645.
Despite the divergent wording, the core of both definitions is the same: the pilot 
is able to maintain unaided visual contact with the drone. The meaning of BVLOS, 
at least in the EU, is simply an “operation which is not conducted in VLOS”.646
The distinction solves the misclassification problem with the existing rules. This 
is important since BVLOS is a crucial factor in making many drone applications 
economically viable.647 Recognizing its existence enables developing rules that 
achieve a sufficient level of safety. Indeed, the RPAS Manual employs it within 
nearly all fields of aviation safety law, including pilot qualifications (though the 
Manual does not go into detail in this regard), communications, the RPS, and 
ATM procedures.648 The same goes for the EU where the distinction is used as 
one indicator in the risk-based approach. For example, the open category almost 
643  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, paras. 2.3.7 and 14.2.7–
14.2.8.
644  Annex 2: Rules of the Air, ch. 1.
645  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 2, para. 7.
646  Ibid., para. 8.
647  European Drones Outlook Study, p. 10.
648  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, chs. 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14.
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exclusively includes VLOS operations,649 while the risk assessment in the specific 
category considers whether the planned operation is VLOS or BVLOS.650
As explicated above, the European rules seek the replication of SERA651 in the 
specific and certified category.652 This means compliance with either VFR or IFR 
and with other requirements set forth in the standardized rules. Still, this approach 
seems only to make sense for cases in which the operation takes place among manned 
air traffic. Otherwise, flying drones would be subject to several rules, such as those 
concerning minimum altitudes, that have not been designed to control unmanned 
traffic. One seems obliged to interpret the provision on applying SERA so that, for 
instance, the new drone-specific rules represent lex specialis653 or a permission from 
the competent authority654 to deviate from the standardized minimum altitudes.
 Otherwise, when operating in U-space, it can only be assumed that both categories 
will follow new, alternative flight rules as opposed to the SERA. The U-space is a 
distinct volume of airspace designed for unmanned aviation, and it utilizes its own 
set of services.655 Replicating SERA would transplant the characteristics of the 
traditional system, defeating the purpose of the concept. At the very least, it seems 
ambiguous which SERA rules remote pilots ought to follow in U-space; the SERA 
ignore many key aspects, like the difference between VLOS and BVLOS, and 
things like IFR equipment requirements seem out of place, as U-space necessitates 
the use of drone-specific identification and geo-awareness features. Certainly, 
U-space will entail breaching traditional altitude limitations. The true integration 
of these separate systems, as discussed above, is still far ahead. What is needed, for 
instance, is a system that can translate between different altitude reference systems, 
standards for vertical and horizontal separation, a navigation specification,656 and 
the incorporation of VLOS and BVLOS into SERA.657
The approach in the open category is clearer, since the category avoids integrating 
drones into the same airspace as manned aviation, at least for now. Because of this, 
drones therein comply with a fixed set of very restrictive flight rules. To be exact, 
these alternative rules are not designated as flight rules but operational limitations. 
649  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 4, para. 1, subpara. d.
650  Ibid., Art. 11, para. 4, subpara. a.
651  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012.
652  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 7, paras. 2–3.
653  See, e.g., Lindroos 2005, pp. 35–64.
654  See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, e.g., SERA.5005, para. f.
655  Cf. EASA Opinion No 01/2020, pp. 11–12.
656  This refers to the instruments and procedures used by an aircraft (and the ATM architecture) to 
navigate from one point to another. Examples include area navigation (RNAV) and performance-based 
navigation (PBN). See ICAO Document 9613: Performance-based Navigation (PBN) Manual; Tooley & 
Wyatt 2007/2018, pp. 207–222.
657  The observations stem from attending Eurocontrol discussions on the issue. They are presented in 
more detail in internal documents, such as UAS ATM Flight Rules: Discussion Document.
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Some of them are general and apply to all open category flights, while some depend 
on the operational subcategory (A1–A3). The rules, for example, forbid flying 
over assemblies of people and limit the MTOM, operating speed, and maximum 
altitude and distance of the drone. Generally, the altitude is limited to 120 meters 
from the closest point on the surface of the earth, whereas limitations on distance 
may concern the distance from residential areas or from the remote pilot.658 In some 
aspects, the operational limitations are bound to the product requirements included 
in the Delegated Regulation as hard-coded features. They are hence connected to 
the class of the drone.
For now, the alternative rules of the open category appear sensible. Yet, in the 
bigger picture, they give a rather static picture of the drone industry. They assume 
that the fixed limitations, based on the features of today’s unmanned technology, 
provide the appropriate level of safety also in the future. If the safety and automation 
of drones develops rapidly, however, the rules risk being too tied to drone technology 
as it was around the year 2020. They might hence become over-inclusive, which 
means that amendments to what is allowed in the open category may be necessary 
in the future. Of course, this problem should not be overstated at this stage, as it 
applies to any technology-related legislation.
5.2.8. Ignoring Security?
With regard to security-related issues, such as the use of drones for criminal purposes 
or acts targeting the UAS itself, the approach of ICAO has chiefly been a mix of 
passivity, replication, and emulation. In terms of passivity, the Organization has 
made no changes to Annex 17: Security or other Annexes that contain SARPs on the 
prevention of security threats. As a matter of fact, at least one ICAO information 
paper cited in a treatise displays no intention to amend Annex 17 at all.659 Despite 
this, the RPAS Manual contains some recommendations on security.
In accordance with airworthiness recommendations, the Manual notes that the 
remote pilot station is similar to a cockpit in purpose and design. For this reason, 
it must be secured from unlawful interference just like a cockpit. Furthermore, one 
must also acknowledge that the RPS is a fixed and exposed structure, which might 
imply that extra protection is necessary. Access to the RPS should regardless be 
restricted, the measures of restriction depending on the size and capabilities of the 
UAS. Standards for systems that control access to the station should be at least as 
good as in commercial manned aviation. In terms of physical security, the aircraft 
ought to be stored and prepared for a flight so that any tampering will be detected 
and prevented, while remote pilots should be subjected to the same background 
checks as the aircrew of manned aircraft. Overall, security procedures should be 
658  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Art. 4, Art. 7, para. 1 and Annex, Part A.
659  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, p. 48 (cit. Spijkert & Lozano 2016).
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included in the flight manual.660 The RPAS Manual’s recommendations have since 
been repeated in the proposal for Part IV of Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft.661
To summarize, some of the recommendations seek to replicate existing law as it 
is, while others aim to tailor the requirements for UAS. The Manual, however, also 
enacts an alternative rule by recommending that the C2 link and related services 
must be free from all forms of interference or hijacking. The protective requirements, 
it is noted, must also be harmonized.662
The European approach on security, as examined in the fourth article of this study, 
so far largely relies on measures that traditionally fall within the ambit of safety. 
This includes the new framework presented above, which deals with airworthiness, 
air operations, licensing, flight rules, remote identification, and so forth. Besides 
safety, the rules aim to advance security, mixing all approaches from replication to 
transformation. There are no special provisions that seek to protect the surroundings 
of the drone from its intentional misuse. It is worth noting that the SORA method 
of risk assessment in the specific category excludes most security considerations,663 
and the security specifications for the certified category are yet to be developed.664 
The provisions on airport security, which are perhaps the most important aspect of 
traditional aviation security, remain unchanged.
The suitability of the given rules on the security of drones depends on the type 
of drone operation and on which rules one decides to examine. In cases where the 
UAS is operated from an airport subject to security requirements, the approaches of 
passivity, replication, and emulation appear reasonable. Even in such cases, however, 
some issues might still require further legislation. For example, the RPAS Manual 
does not consider UAS-specific SARPs for the protection of passengers, baggage, 
cargo, and mail. This has prompted one author to suggest legislative action.665
The security effects of authorization and licensing requirements depend on the 
compliance of the end user. Already from the perspective of existing rules, it was 
acknowledged above that overseeing drone operators is challenging due to the 
660  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, sec. 9.11, and paras. 4.6.2 and 
13.4.5–13.4.6.
661  Masutti & Tomasello 2018, pp. 173–174.
662  ICAO Document 10019: Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, para. 9.11.6. See also sec. 
11.5.
663  Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2019/947, AMC1 Article 11, para. 1.3, subpara. d; JARUS Guidelines on Specific 
Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), para. 1.3, subpara. d (it only applies to security aspects of the 
airworthiness of the systems).
664  See, however, JARUS CS-UAS: Recommendations for Certification Specification for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, e.g., CS-UAS.2522 and GM-UAS.2522 (requiring UAS systems to be protected from 
intentional unauthorized interactions) and CS-UAS.2605, para. c and GM-UAS.2605, para. h (requiring 
physical security requirements to be considered for the RPS).
665  Fiallos 2019, p. 175.
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distributed nature, small size, and poor identifiability of UAS. Although the new 
drone-specific rules on airworthiness, air operations, licensing, and so forth differ 
beneficially from existing ones, in terms of security the key problem remains the 
same: compliance. Hard-coded limits on operational altitude, geographical location, 
and airspeed depend less on the end user but are still subject to hacking. Besides, 
there are already millions of low-security drones flying around. Solving the issue is 
not as simple as subjecting drones to airport security, as the very benefit of drones is 
that they can be immediately used at remote locations. The security shortcomings 
of the existing law in relation to drones has thus been largely ignored, mostly due to 
the focus on creating the framework for benign operators. To this end, the last article 
suggests adopting anti-drone technology at airports and other critical locations.666
The described rules are supplemented with rules that oblige the operator to 
protect their drone from interference. In the open category, the command and 
control link of class C2 and C3 drones must be protected against unauthorized 
access.667 Otherwise, though, the category does not oblige the operator to secure 
the drone. In the specific category, on the other hand, the operator must establish 
measures to protect the UAS against unlawful interference and unauthorized 
access. Additionally, the operator has to establish procedures ensuring that the 
security requirements applicable to the area of operations are complied with. Both 
obligations must be adapted to the intended operation and its risk.668 These rules 
are alternative as they do not replicate or emulate existing standards on securing 
the aircraft. Since the intended security rules for the certified category, which seems 
the one most threatened by interference, are yet to be drafted, there is not much to 
criticize about the approach.
666  Huttunen 2019c, pp. 96–98.
667  Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Annex, Parts 3 and 4.
668  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Annex, UAS.SPEC.050, para. 1, subparas. ii and iii.
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6. Conclusions
6.1. General Contributions
6.1.1. Purpose and Approach
The purpose of this study has been, on the general level, to discuss the following 
main questions:
I. What issues can sociotechnical change cause in relation to existing law?
II. What legislative approaches can be used to solve the issues caused by 
sociotechnical change?
To discuss the general questions, the study has examined the increase in unmanned 
civil aviation in European airspace during the 21st century as a case. Hence, the 
questions have chiefly been dealt with in the following, more specific form:
I. What issues has the increase in unmanned civil aviation caused in relation to 
existing aviation safety and security law?
II. What legislative approaches have ICAO and the EU used to solve the issues 
caused by the increase in unmanned civil aviation?
This synthesis and the articles have sought to answer the questions first on the level 
of legal doctrine. As a preliminary matter (the first article), this has entailed analyzing 
the meaning and scope of concepts used to describe unmanned aircraft systems. For 
the most part (the other articles), it has involved creating a concise and systematized 
presentation about the key aspects of existing international and European aviation 
safety and security law, and analyzing how drones fit the framework. Furthermore, 
the study has created a similar presentation about the developing international 
and European drone-specific aviation safety and security law, comparing it to the 
legislation that precedes it and examining some of its strengths and weaknesses.
Besides legal doctrine, the synthesis of this study has attempted to answer the 
overarching questions on a theoretical level. This aspect of the study draws upon case 
study methodology. It views UAS not only as subjects of aviation safety and security 
law—the targets of such legislation—but instead a case of sociotechnical change 
in civil aviation. Theoretically speaking, drones are a case of the typical legal issues 
caused by sociotechnical change and a case of the typical legislative solutions to the 
issues. In this regard, the study has involved theoretical guidance in that it has used 
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generalized typologies to bring out the relevant aspects of the case. Additionally, 
though, the study has involved theoretical testing and development. This is because 
it has attempted to examine the accuracy of existing typologies about the legal issues 
and to develop those typologies and, finally, to develop a new typology about the 
legislative approaches to sociotechnical change.
From a theoretical standpoint, the study shows that existing typologies of legal 
problems caused by sociotechnical change are applicable also in the context of civil 
aviation. However, the study equally shows that the typologies can be developed 
from both an abstract perspective (and using the examples given by earlier authors) 
as well as from the perspective of the present case of drones. This has led to the 
adoption of an enhanced typology that includes eight issues. The first possible issue 
is vacuity (the lack of applicable rules), while the other seven can occur when trying 
to apply existing rules: misclassification, over- and under-inclusiveness, irrelevance, 
ineffectiveness, injustice, and value conflict. These all represent a possible cause 
for legislative action. The testing and development of the new typology in other 
contexts of sociotechnical change remains, of course, a task for future studies.
As legislative approaches, the model recognizes five: passivity, replication, 
emulation, alternative rules, and transformation. The choice between different 
approaches depends on the issues with existing rules but also on other factors, like 
practical aspects and values. Practical aspects may include time, resources, and the 
prevalent political situation, while the concept of values includes matters such as 
safety, sustainability, economic equality, and so forth.
By combining these two aspects, the study has sought to develop a model of 
legislation and sociotechnical change, using the case of drones to highlight both. 
Since the relationship between legislation and sociotechnical change is better 
understood as a process, the model is not merely limited to describing issues and 
solutions. Instead, its purpose has been to participate in the development of a 
broader theory of law and sociotechnical change. For this purpose, the model moves 
into the territory of regulatory theory by introducing certain preliminary questions 
that should be appraised whenever the legislator considers enacting rules on new 
technology and its related practices.
6.1.2. Sociotechnical Change
The starting point of the model is to ask whether a sociotechnical change is truly 
occurring. This is a difficult question, since it requires gathering factual evidence of 
three elements: the technical, the social, and the change. In other words, the existence 
of for example legislative projects does not by itself mean that a change is occurring. 
Other factors that can also affect our perception of there being a change include 
values, the public opinion, and existing law. Due to such reasons, the existence of 
a sociotechnical change can be mistaken as there being none, or vice versa, which 
suggests that the legislator must carefully assess the facts. The present study has 
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approached the question by building a factual case in the Introduction and Chapter 
4 on the sociotechnical change created by the increase in unmanned civil aviation.
The first element of sociotechnical change refers to technology. While the 
concept of technology is contested, one useful way of defining it is to refer to tools, 
techniques, products, or processes that extend human capability. In the context of 
unmanned civil aviation, as examined in the study, the technical naturally refers to 
unmanned aircraft systems, which extend the human capability to operate in the 
airspace. Consumer grade drones are most accurately characterized as products, 
while drones designed for professional flying can be regarded as tools. In either case, 
the possibility of doing things such as sheer flying, photography, or transporting 
goods is expanded.
By itself, modern conceptions of technology already recognize that technology is 
something more than mere objects. However, this is emphasized by the conceptual 
move from technical or technological to sociotechnical, which means that changes 
never concern only artefacts but also the related human behavior. The development 
and use of technology are socially constructed processes: technologies and their 
users shape each other. In the case of drones, the element of the social is already 
present in how drones enable certain new forms of aviation and enhance existing 
ones. The new aircraft alone are not the objects of interest; instead, the change takes 
equally place in the activities allowed by them. The study has also noted the ways in 
which the developing rules on drones can affect the technology, which demonstrates 
a reciprocal relationship.
The final element of sociotechnical change is, of course, change. Change can 
either refer to substituting existing technology, altering it, finding new ways of using 
it, or introducing new technology. As there is a persistent stream of technological 
progress, meaningful discussion necessitates the existence of a change that is clearly 
distinguishable. In the present study, such a change has clearly been demonstrated 
in Chapter 4 by factual evidence on how unmanned aircraft systems (and thus 
unmanned civil aviation) differ from their manned counterparts. Besides the 
obvious difference concerning the location of the pilot, drones are generally cheaper, 
simpler to operate, more plentiful, harder to identify, and they can be flown from 
any location. Of course, it must equally be recognized that some drones are quite 
similar to manned aircraft in their characteristics.
Since this study has examined a sociotechnical change, it has not elaborated 
on cases where no change is occurring or is perceived to occur. In these situations, 
the model developed here regardless suggests that the legislator should adopt a 
passive approach. Naturally, some factors like as stakeholder pressure can still cause 
the legislator to act in such situations, and future sociotechnical developments 
necessitate re-examining the factual side of things. This simply means that the 
process is never exhausted by resorting to passivity at some point.
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6.2. Legal Issues
6.2.1. Misclassification
The acknowledgement of a sociotechnical change requires the legislator to consider 
the application of existing rules. In doing so, the legislator must take into account 
legal rules that are connected to the sociotechnical situation in question and thus 
could apply. Given the focus of the present study on the safety and security of UAS, 
it has naturally analyzed the possibility of applying existing law on aviation safety 
and security to such aircraft. These are rules that are connected to drones, albeit their 
exact relationship has necessitated a more detailed analysis.
The overall conclusions concerning this analysis are manifold. In certain limited 
respects, the study has found no issues in applying existing rules as they are. This 
goes mostly for unmanned aviation that utilizes high end aircraft and operates 
from aerodromes, resembling manned aviation in most of its characteristics. 
In many ways, however, the increase in unmanned aviation has caused issues of 
misclassification, over-inclusiveness, under-inclusiveness, and ineffectiveness 
in relation to the existing rules on aviation safety and security. These issues may 
not have actualized in legal practice, but from the perspective of legislating the 
technology the issues reveal themselves regardless: an attempt to apply such rules to 
would lead to the given problems. Furthermore, the increase in unmanned aviation 
suggests that, down the line in the development of drones, some of the existing 
rules risk being increasingly ineffective and perhaps even irrelevant, losing their 
justification altogether.
The issue of misclassification means that existing rules wrongly classify some 
aspect of the changed sociotechnical situation. This has been perhaps the most 
recognizable issue in the legislative project concerning drones. The most obvious 
example of the problem lies on the terminological level: there has been a challenge 
to find a proper term to describe aircraft flown without a pilot on board the aircraft, 
and to define the term appropriately. This study recognizes that many traditional 
terms have failed to classify modern drones. Concepts like model and toy aircraft 
are insufficient because they exclude non-recreational purposes, such as agriculture, 
geology, and professional filmography, for which drones are increasingly developed 
and used for. The concept of unmanned aerial vehicle fails because drones are aircraft, 
and we should not generally employ the term “pilotless aircraft” of Article 8 of the 
Chicago Convention, since drones are nearly always piloted.
Besides terminology, the categorization schemes for air operations have risked 
misclassifying unmanned aviation. While the categories might work for the largest 
and most demanding kind of activities and/or at the international level, they fail 
at classifying the most popular types of drones and their uses. This includes drones 
with an MTOM of a few dozen kilograms or less, which are in many cases used in 
semi-professional settings. ICAO’s exclusion of aerial work has itself been a problem 
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for drones. Meanwhile, EU’s original operational categories use distinctions like 
complex and non-complex aircraft, which are usually not as crucial for unmanned 
as they are for manned aviation. The concept of CAT, in the case of drones, involves 
scenarios that are very different from traditional ones.
The case of airworthiness is also relevant in this regard. Not even the airworthiness 
of the most high-end drones is completely addressed by traditional rules, since there 
are new components to safe operation: there has hence been a lack of applicable 
rules. The risk of misclassification chiefly concerns the remote pilot station, since 
existing rules seemingly fail to classify it. The RPS is a curious thing, though, as one 
may equally claim that the existing rules on the flight crew compartment can be 
applied to an extent.
Present flight rules, too, seem to wrongly classify unmanned aviation. The 
traditional distinction between VFR and IFR can, in principle, be applied to the 
operation of drones. One can fly by visual cues by observing the drone from the 
ground, or by using a first-person view. Flying solely by instruments is also possible. 
Still, VFR/IFR cannot serve as the only distinction, as both rulesets have been created 
with manned aviation in mind. They are, by default, based on the idea that the pilot 
is on board the aircraft. Most importantly, VFR and IFR fail to acknowledge the 
distinction between the drone being VLOS or BVLOS, which has a dire impact on 
the overall nature, technical specifications, and risks of the operation.
6.2.2. Over- and Under-Inclusiveness
Substantively, the biggest issue in applying existing rules has been the threat of 
subjecting drones to rules that are disproportionate to the risks of most unmanned 
aviation. In accordance with Bennett Moses’s typology and the one used here, the 
problem qualifies as over-inclusiveness: the rules (would) include behavior they 
should exclude. In the case of air operations, for example, most existing requirements 
can be followed in cases where the operation of the UAS resembles manned aviation. 
In the case of commercial passenger transport using drones, for instance, there is no 
reason to deviate from regular operational standards when they make sense despite 
the technical differences. UAS carriers can be certified just like other air operators, 
apart from cases in which the transport is so low risk that it does not necessitate 
certification. In most aerial work, however, the actual rules would be over-inclusive if 
applied to all UAS simply because they are designed for manned aviation. Of course, 
the legislation also lacks applicable rules for drone-specific aspects of the operation.
The issues with airworthiness, though rather complex, also illustrate the threat of 
over-inclusion. There are certainly UAS that could and should follow the existing 
system of type and airworthiness certification and continuing airworthiness. This 
goes for drones whose operation comes close to manned aviation in terms of risk 
and purpose, including for instance human transport. Furthermore, EU’s essential 
airworthiness requirements are not over-inclusive, since they are so generic. The whole 
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scope of unmanned aviation, however, includes operations for which the traditional 
airworthiness instruments would be vastly over-inclusive. The risks presented by 
many drones do not necessitate the system to be subjected to a full certification 
procedure nor to comply with comprehensive rules on aircraft maintenance.
Over-inclusiveness is equally a risk in the registration of aircraft. There are simply 
too many drones around and purchased all the time to be registered by traditional 
means. The lifespan of drones is also much shorter than that of manned aircraft, 
and they are traded frequently, which would create additional work and could cause 
misleading registry entries. This would be an issue even if the registration procedure, 
which currently is rather encumbering, were changed entirely. Besides, unless the 
purchase of drones is controlled somehow, there is no way to ensure that the aircraft 
is registered. Most importantly, though, safe aviation does not require them all to be 
registered as individual aircraft.
The same issue exists with the licensing of pilots and other personnel operating 
the drone. Many of the existing requirements concerning the competency of the 
crewmembers are reasonable, and many remote pilots certainly need several of the 
theoretical and practical skills necessitated by existing rules. For instance, there 
is no problem in applying rules that require pilots to go through training in the 
basics of flight planning. It is not, however, sensible to apply the whole spectrum 
of existing standards to all remote pilots. Pilots who fly certain types of commercial 
drone operations do require training similar to pilots of manned aircraft, including 
simulation, instructed flying, and examinations. At the same time, most drones, 
even many professional ones, are easy and safe to operate without training. While 
this does not mean that they should be exempted from all training, traditional 
procedures appear over-inclusive particularly when the operational risks are much 
lower.
Problems with ATC/ATM display a mixture of under- and over-inclusiveness. 
Drones have obvious issues with the existing rules on airspace, which are both aircraft 
and airport centric. Although some commercial unmanned aviation is and will be 
designed to operate using the same aerodromes and airways as manned aircraft, most 
UAS are not. Their ability to take off from and land at almost any location and their 
preference for flying low means that they cannot benefit from ATC services provided 
at airports and in air corridors. The existing rules thus seem under-inclusive, as they 
exclude unmanned aviation like they should. Yet one cannot simply solve this issue 
by extending traditional control measures to airspace populated by drones. This is 
because UAS mostly lack the communicative capabilities of manned aircraft, and 
requiring them to acquire such capability would be over-inclusive in terms of cost. 
Besides, the human-centric ATC/ATM system would not be able to handle all drone 
traffic, resulting in over-inclusiveness from a practical standpoint. To control mass 
unmanned aviation, particularly in urban areas, the issue has to be solved through 
new technology and rules.
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Over-inclusiveness is also a threat in several other issues. For instance, requiring all 
drones to be equipped with a regular transponder would be over-inclusive given the 
size, price point, and operational environment of most drones as well as the desired 
level of aviation safety. On a related note, other navigation equipment and instruments 
required to comply with IFR rules are also out of reach for most UAS, as such 
requirements are largely based on the traditional framework of ATC/ATM. There 
are explicit problems, too, with provisions like minimum flight altitudes, which range 
from 150 to 600 meters depending on the followed rules and location. Such minima 
are over-inclusive in relation to UAS, since drones are usually designed to fly precisely 
at low altitudes, and since they pose less of a ground risk than manned aircraft.
In some respects, like aviation law that particularly deals with security threats, 
existing rules actually appear under-inclusive. This law is notably airport centric, 
since it includes measures like security restricted areas, security checks, the screening 
of passenger, baggage, and cargo, and camera surveillance. The core objective is to 
prevent dangerous persons and items from entering into civil aircraft in the first place, 
but the rules also enhance the capability of the aircrew to deal with security threats 
during the flight. Rules on the latter aspect are somewhat applicable to unmanned 
aviation, too, as the RPS has to be protected from malicious interference. Security 
checks and screening, however, only improve the security of drones that operate 
from airports. They do not help prevent malicious acts in cases where the drone 
operates outside airports, which goes for the vast majority of cases. Since the vast 
majority of drone operations are also of much lesser risk than the manned operations 
subject to the given security measures, the issue ought not to be exaggerated. Still, 
the issue is worth pointing out with regard to UAS passenger transport, as such 
application does have its risks and is mostly (at least for now) carried out outside 
aerodromes.
6.2.3. Ineffectiveness and Other Problems
Many of the issues caused by the unique characteristics of UAS and their operation 
highlight the ineffectiveness and lack of existing rules. Among other aspects, there 
has clearly been a lack of rules applicable to the data/C2 link(s) used to control 
and command UAS, since such a feature is not present at all in manned aviation. 
Ineffectiveness is also the core issue with UAS and the existing framework on ATC/
ATM. There is not exactly a complete legal vacuum, since we do have a system for 
the purpose. However, the framework we have fails to advance safe and orderly air 
traffic in low level airspace where it is needed for drones, and it does not address the 
interfacing between drones, manned aircraft, and existing aviation infrastructure. In 
this regard, there is both vacuity and ineffectiveness.
The manner in which visual flight rules ensure safe aviation could also be regarded 
as ineffective when drones are concerned. In drone operation, the sensory cues during 
the flight are reduced or non-existent, which challenges the ability of the remote 
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pilot to maintain awareness, identify hazards, and take appropriate action in due 
time. This goes for all UAS, not just the most typical ones. Again, there basically are 
existing applicable rules in the form of ICAO rules of the air and SERA. However, 
these VFR and IFR are not simply under-inclusive but ineffective in enabling the 
safe operation of drones below the given altitudes, since they do not consider the 
characteristics of unmanned aviation.
Rules on the identification of aircraft are also ineffective in the context of drones. 
Above, this study has observed that registration and nationality markings do not 
actually aid in identifying most drones, since both the aircraft and the markings 
are so small. Similarly, conventional primary radars can mistake drones for birds 
and regardless filter out clutter like birds and drones, as small airborne objects can 
distract the air traffic controllers from their primary task. Naturally, these problems 
do not concern the most advanced drones and demanding operations in which the 
drone is large enough to be identified and is equipped with the devices that enable 
it. But, in most cases, rules that rely on visual recognition and radars are ineffective 
and ought to be supplemented with other measures.
Existing rules that advance aviation security are also ineffective when it comes 
to unmanned aviation, since they rely quite a lot on the operational characteristics 
of manned aviation. To begin with, this applies to the spillover security effect of 
safety rules. For instance, rules on air operations, airworthiness, and pilot licensing 
deter the misuse of aircraft because manned aviation commonly necessitates a 
predetermined location for take-off, landing, and maintenance, and because flying 
is expensive and difficult. Manned aircraft are also readily identifiable. In unmanned 
aviation, the rules only deter misuse when the characteristics of the operation are 
similar. In most cases, though, the rules yield few to no security benefits because 
UAS are hard to identify and can be operated without training, covertly, and from 
nearly any location. In other words, the rules are not very efficient in securing the 
environment from the misuse of drones.
The increasing use of civil UAS in European airspace has not yet caused existing 
rules to appear irrelevant or unjust. This is largely because the legacy framework 
of aviation (law) is still extremely paradigmatic: the great majority of aviation is 
manned aviation, and the greatest benefits of aviation still lie in that framework. 
The sociotechnical change taking place does not presently threaten the hegemony 
of manned aviation. Yet there are hints that, in the future, some aspects of the 
legacy legal framework may fade into irrelevance. These hints, for the most part, 
concern how air traffic is controlled and managed. If sociotechnical change leads 
to a possibility for a more efficient system through digitalization and automation, 
as is expectable, conducting traditional ATC/ATM may at some point become less 
important. Ultimately, the traditional system may face irrelevance if there are no 
longer aircraft that require an aerodrome for take-off, landing, and maintenance, or 
human guidance in air navigation.
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In the discussion in Chapter 4, no observation was made of a value conflict 
between drones and existing aviation safety and security law. This is because the 
characteristics of drones do not ultimately challenge the very values of such law: 
safety (including security), which serves the freedom of movement, as well as the 
use of natural resources for the latter purpose. These notions retain their importance 
in spite of the sociotechnical change caused by the increase in unmanned aviation.
Drones can and do raise new and well-known threats to the everyday safety and 
security of civil aviation, and they may inadvertently advance new values such as the 
importance of data. However, their increasing use does not question the existing 
values themselves. Safety is still the cornerstone of air law, whether it concerns 
manned or unmanned aviation. The matter is mostly about deciding what kind of 
legislation can achieve the desired level of safety, considering the risks presented 
by drones. A distinct issue, which is not discussed here due to the study’s focus on 
aviation safety and security law, is whether increasing urban mobility can challenge 
other values embedded in other legislation. This theme is naturally worth exploring, 
and not only in the context of law.
6.3. Legislative Approaches
6.3.1. Passivity
In addition to further improving our understanding of legal issues caused by 
sociotechnical change, the case of drones also provides a basis to improve our 
understanding of the legislative solutions adopted to manage sociotechnical change. 
The latter development falls within the broader context of technology governance, 
representing a subset of it. The study has partly utilized existing efforts to categorize 
legislative solutions but mostly has developed its own terminology to that effect. 
This is because the existing efforts appear either too broad, concerning the whole 
scope of regulating technology, or too narrow, not recognizing certain types of 
legislative approach. To reiterate, the approaches identified and exemplified (using 
the case of drones) in this study include passivity, replication, emulation, alternative 
rules, and transformation.
To answer the second research question, historically speaking, passivity has been 
the most prevalent approach in legislating the safety and security of UAS—at least if 
we focus on written law. At the international level, for a long while since the adoption 
of the Paris and Chicago Convention, it was considered unnecessary to issue any 
rules on the topic. No Annexes to the latter Convention were amended to address 
unmanned aviation. At the European level, drones with an MTOM of less than 150 
kg were excluded from the scope of EU rules until 2018, and there were few or no 
rules for those exceeding the threshold. The legislative project at both levels has only 
started since after the year 2000 and in a serious manner only during the 2010s.
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The historical point, however, is somewhat moot because the sociotechnical 
change involving drones has only begun recently. Hence, passivity can only be 
regarded as an approach to such change in the context of the past two decades. In 
this context, the recent legislative project has contained elements of passivity as 
inability. This simply means that the issues caused by drones, particularly in relation 
to the use of airspace, are so complex that it has not been possible to solve them right 
away. This has nothing to do with the competence of the legislators but rather the 
fact that the sociotechnical change in mobility is still ongoing. While the typology 
of legislative approaches does not incorporate the question of appropriate timing 
(of legislative action), one must acknowledge its impact: the dangers of issuing new 
rules too soon are well-known.
Besides inability, passivity has been employed as a conscious approach. The most 
obvious example is ICAO’s decision to leave the formulation of “pilotless aircraft” as 
it is, claiming that all UAS fall within the scope of Article 8. ICAO’s reading is quite 
fragile in terms of treaty interpretation but makes practical sense, as it avoids the task 
of amending the provision for the purpose of drones. On another note, the concept 
of model aircraft has been implicitly accepted as a national category of recreational 
drone use but excluded from the scope of ICAO’s SARPs. This can also be regarded 
as a passive response on behalf of the Organization.
Security questions have been treated with some passivity both at the international 
and European level. Albeit rules to protect the UAS itself have been issued and are still 
being developed, neither ICAO nor the EU has chosen to enact standards that would 
curb the misuse of drones. ICAO has, for instance, no plans to make amendments to 
Annex 17 that particularly concerns security. The European approach, on the other 
hand, relies on safety rules to simultaneously improve security, while the core of 
security remains attached to the airport context. This means that drone operations 
using airports will be as secure as manned aviation but others not. The matter has 
been left to be solved at the national level, possibly outside the context of air law.
6.3.2. Replication and Emulation
Both ICAO and the EU have approached many of the aforementioned issues through 
the replication and emulation of existing rules. Terminological choices demonstrate 
emulation. ICAO has differentiated between remotely piloted and autonomous 
aircraft as two subcategories of UA, thus far including only RPA(S) within its scope. 
There are reasons to criticize such an approach, as the distinction between RPA and 
AA is not clear-cut at all. Regardless, we are dealing with the tailoring of the existing 
concept of aircraft to acknowledge the characteristics of unmanned aviation. The 
EU’s preferred new term is UA(S), which includes both RPA and AA of all grades 
of autonomy. While the idea of “unmanned” aircraft seems misleading, it is a simple 
concept that avoids setting definitive thresholds for remote piloting and autonomy. 
Sensibly, it also serves as a counterpart to “manned” aircraft. The present study thus 
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endorses UAS as the general concept along with the concept of “drone”, which is 
mostly utilized because of its popularity and conciseness.
Substantively, replication and emulation have been especially popular at ICAO, 
since the Organization has implicitly limited its scope to such unmanned aviation—
international and BVLOS (IFR)—that comes closest to manned aviation. Hence, 
the RPAS Manual for instance seeks to understand drone operations in terms 
of commercial air transport and general aviation, as before. Substantively, the 
Organization has resorted to emulation by introducing the concept of RPAS 
operator certificate. The ROC, while comparable to the AOC, is intended to be 
issued not only for commercial air transport but for international aerial work, too. 
Other responsibilities imposed on the operator are also emulated from existing 
aviation safety law and are very generic in nature, essentially demanding no more 
and no less than in manned aviation.
Airworthiness-wise ICAO has thus far recommended the replication of existing 
airworthiness rules. Indeed, the Chicago Convention leaves little room in this regard 
because it requires every aircraft in international aviation to hold an airworthiness 
certificate. To the maximum extent practicable, the rules on type certification, 
production approval, continuing airworthiness, and product modifications should 
be applied. Distinct certification schemes are envisioned for other components like 
the remote pilot station and the command and control link, mixing emulation and 
alternative rules. Neither the RPS nor C2 are to be independently certified but 
rather as part of the aircraft’s certification. As the RPS resembles the cockpit, the 
rules on the latter can be emulated.
Essential airworthiness requirements of the EASA Basic Regulation, due to their 
generic disposition, are replicated and emulated in the rules on UAS. The drone 
rules contain elements of traditional requirements, which have slightly been tailored 
to, inter alia, take into account the broad scale of drone operations. The rules on 
airworthiness certification are emulated in the context of drones, but in a limited 
manner. Only drones passing one or some of predetermined thresholds are subject 
to certification: this includes, for example, drones with a characteristic dimension of 
3 meters or more and drones designed for human transport. The operation of such 
UAS falls within the scope of the certified category, although the specific category 
allows the use of certified drones, too. The idea is to base certification on existing 
regulations, but naturally the unique characteristics of drones necessitate some 
alterations. The exact nature of the changes is yet unknown, although JARUS has 
already drafted a proposition thereto.
The obligations imposed on UAS manufacturers in the open category are also 
a case of replicating and emulating existing obligations. These obligations derive 
their content from a general decision that seeks to ensure the quality of products 
marketed within the EU. Meanwhile, some of the operational limitations imposed 
on drones also bear resemblance to the ones used in manned aviation, as manned 
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aircraft are also categorized using MTOM limits. The limits used for drones are 
different, but the idea is the same. In the specific category, apart from cases in which 
a certified drone is used, airworthiness aspects are handled as part of the overall risk 
assessment. While this assessment is an alternative instrument, many operational 
safety objectives of the assessment find their basis ultimately in traditional 
airworthiness certification.
ICAO’s approach to the registration and marking of UAS has been the replication 
and emulation of existing rules. Internationally, this is quite the only choice, as the 
Chicago Convention requires aircraft flying internationally to carry markings that 
indicate their registration and nationality. According to the new SARPs, markings 
themselves can be placed on the UA slightly differently, which signifies emulation. In 
the EU, registration of the drone and markings thereon are only required when the 
airworthiness of the aircraft is certified. Outside such cases, the UAS operator must 
register itself in all categories, apart from when they use the very smallest of drones. 
Since a single operator can operate a number of drones, the problems of traditional 
registration are avoided. The registry is also designed as digital and interoperable, 
forming the basis for remote identification. This approach contains elements of both 
emulation and alternative rules.
With regard to pilot licensing, ICAO has decided that the pilot-in-command 
must hold a remote pilot licence in international unmanned flights that follow IFR. 
This approach is unsurprising, given that the Chicago Convention requires pilots 
in international aviation to be certified and licensed. The right to pilot a particular 
type of UAS is determined by ratings. Emulation is also the approach regarding the 
substantive training requirements, like knowledge of air law and navigation aids. 
The EU also relies on emulation with the essential requirements on remote pilots. 
In a generic manner, any person involved in flying drones must possess the required 
knowledge and skills proportionate to the risks of the operation. The certified 
category of operations appears to continue this approach, as the new rules dictate 
that the remote pilot should be licensed where applicable. On the other hand, the 
open category requires no licensing, but the training covers topics like airspace 
restriction, so there are elements of existing rules. The exact competency required 
in the specific category is determined through the risk assessment procedure and 
set forth either in the operational authorization or the standard scenario. While the 
SORA method does not explicate the exact training requirements, another JARUS 
document does and may be used as a basis for future legislation. Enacted EU rules 
explicate certain minimum requirements, such as that the pilot must be able to 
manage aeronautical communication.
Since the issues of low level airspace use are less prominent in international aviation 
and because enacting standards on a developing technology is risky, ICAO has not 
really undertaken the task creating a UTM system. By means of replicating rules, 
UAS are required to follow the existing performance, equipment, communication, 
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and procedural requirements of the airspace where they operate. Alternative 
rules need to be devised and drone technology needs to be developed merely so 
that drones can comply with the given requirements. Changes in the system itself 
have not been considered. The approach has naturally been the same in terms of 
identification measures
The validity of the VFR/IFR distinction has been replicated both at the 
international and European level. ICAO recommends applying both VFR and IFR 
to UAS in all aspects, including obligations like the use of appropriate navigation 
instruments. As the Organization is not concerned with low level domestic operations 
at the moment, the approach is understandable. The EU’s approval of the SERA in 
the certified and specific category follows the same approach, although again one 
must acknowledge that EASA is simultaneously pushing for the development of the 
U-space concept.
6.3.3. Alternative Rules and Transformation
The approach to enact alternative rules has been just as common as replication and 
emulation, though such rules have thus far been mostly devised by EASA rather 
than ICAO. Alternative rules have, first of all, been drafted for legacy model aircraft 
clubs. These clubs are, pursuant to EU rules, allowed to continue operating quite 
as they have done due to exemptions from rules otherwise applied to drones. This 
represents a sound compromise between two ill-advised extremes: retaining model 
aircraft as a separate category or subjecting them to exactly the same rules as all 
drones.
ICAO’s RPAS Manual notes that an alternative risk-based categorization of 
unmanned operations is necessary, suggesting that the aforementioned replication of 
the distinction between CAT and general aviation will not hold. Meanwhile, EASA 
has already responded with its tripartite categorization of unmanned air operations 
into open, specific, and certified, which attempts to solve many drone-related issues. 
The first two categories tackle the issues of misclassification, over-inclusiveness, 
ineffectiveness, and vacuity by enacting new rules for the lower end of the spectrum. 
The third category mostly responds to the cases where applying existing rules is not 
problematic.
The open category follows an alternative set of operational limitations that 
supplant the obligation for any kind of approval in the form of AOC, ROC, or 
declaration. The specific category has its own, alternative method of approval, as the 
operator must either declare its compliance with a standard scenario or acquire an 
operational authorization through risk assessment. The SORA method by JARUS 
is the most well-established and perhaps thus far the only structured way of doing 
the assessment, having been designated as an acceptable means of compliance by 
EASA. Naturally, many elements of the method, like distinctions between different 
risk classes and safety levels, are alternative rules themselves. The certified category 
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maintains a place for commercial use cases like passenger and cargo transport. 
Whether, however, existing categories like CAT, SPO, and NCC should be replicated 
in the rules on certified category operations remains to be seen. It is possible that a 
wholly alternative ruleset will be established for such operations.
In terms of airworthiness, there are alternative rules, too. Internationally, ICAO 
has established that the airworthiness standards for the C2 link will have to be 
devised separately as alternative rules, despite the link will be certified as part of the 
UAS. In the EU, many mandatory features required of drones in the open category 
are unique to drones. Among other things, drones are required to be equipped with 
systems for data link recovery, remote identification, and geo-awareness, which are 
not present features of manned aircraft. In the specific category, the risk assessment 
similarly addresses elements that are unique to unmanned aviation.
The same goes for the training of remote pilots. Although the main approach 
in this regard has been emulation, ICAO has issued alternative training rules for 
aspects that are unique to drones, like the C2 link and the RPS. At the same time, 
EASA has re-imagined some basics, too. The open category requires the remote 
pilot to complete an online training course and pass a theoretical exam instead of 
undergoing traditional licensing. Some of the topics covered by the course, such as 
data protection and UAS general knowledge, are alternative also.
An alternative element introduced into flight rules is the distinction between 
VLOS and BVLOS. Both ICAO and the EU have adopted the latter two terms 
in nearly all aspects of drone legislation. In the EU, for instance, the open category 
is almost exclusively restricted to operations within VLOS. The flight rules—or, 
more accurately, operational limitations—of the EU’s open category are overall 
alternative to existing ones. These are much more restrictive than other rulesets. 
Inter alia, it is forbidden to fly over assemblies of people, and the MTOM (ranging 
from 250 g to 25 kg, depending on the class) and maximum altitude of the drone 
(120 meters above ground or take-off point) are limited. The latter two limitations 
naturally correspond with the mandatory features of the drone design, as explicated 
in the context of airworthiness, creating a system of premade operational concepts. 
Whether the present rules of the open category are future proof remains to be seen, 
as developments in safety and automation can significantly reduce the risks posed by 
off-the-shelf drones.
The U-space concept of managing drone traffic is, naturally, a collection of 
alternative rules. This is a new volume of airspace where, instead of traditional 
ATC, a special set of identification, geo-awareness, flight authorization, traffic 
information, and other services are provided to facilitate unmanned aviation. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the rules in that space will be sui generis, given that 
the whole volume is designed for drones and has its own services. At the very least, 
it seems questionable to start with the idea that the traditional SERA should be 
complied with in U-space. IFR equipment requirements, for instance, surely are not 
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followed as the space necessitates the use of drone-specific identification and geo-
awareness features.
EASA MSs, alone or together, can designate U-space wherever they want, and 
services therein will be provided by U-space service providers. Controlled airspace 
remains the realm of traditional air navigation service providers. The U-space 
operates on the basis of a common information service in which ANSPs, USSPs, 
drones, and manned aircraft exchange information. These are all distinct rules.
The basis of U-space lies in the aforementioned provisions that impose certain 
mandatory technical features on UAS. This includes, most importantly, direct remote 
identification and geo-awareness, which should solve the problems in identifying 
drones. The former means that the UA broadcasts constantly information about its 
operator, its position, route course, and the pilot’s position; the latter means that 
the system warns the pilot when the aircraft is about to enter into airspace which 
it should not. These features are required across the open category, apart from the 
very smallest of drones. Similar features will naturally be required in the other two 
categories, when such operators wish to operate in the U-space.
The present proposals on U-space are alternative rules, as they establish the 
airspace alongside the existing segments of airspace. Regardless, in the future, the 
concept has potential to transform the entire approach to air traffic control and 
management. This is evident from how EASA envisions the advanced and full 
services of the concept as involving automatic DAA and dynamic geofencing, which 
would be embedded into the present infrastructure, too. If and when the technology 
matures sufficiently, U-space allows itself to develop accordingly, perhaps at some 
point merging into or overtaking the existing framework. Such changes are, of 
course, linked to general sociotechnical developments.
Security-wise, ICAO has made some alternative recommendations. These suggest 
securing the RPS and the C2 link themselves from any interference, calling for 
measures that control access to the station and the link. The rules ought to cover both 
the physical and cyber security of the system. To the same end, the EU has required 
class C2 and C3 drones in the open category to be protected against unauthorized 
access; in the specific category, the operator has an overarching obligation to protect 
the UAS against unlawful interference and access and to ensure compliance with 
security requirements pertaining to the area of operation. Security in the certified 
category will likely follow ICAO standards.
In terms of protecting the surroundings from the drone, the European approach 
largely relies on the spillover effects of certain safety rules, which are alternative or 
based on existing ones. For example, the open category employs the mandatory 
remote identification feature and hard-coded limits on operational altitude, 
geographical location, and airspeed. The problem with these measures is that they 
depend largely on the compliance of the end user. For example, it is up to the 
operator to register itself and to input its registration information into the drone, 
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and rogue pilots may be able to bypass the limitations as they have done before. 
Furthermore, such limitations can only be imposed on future drone products, not 
existing or self-assembled ones. Ultimately, the only way to protect airports and 
other critical locations from the misuse of UAS is to adopt anti-drone technology 
either on a voluntary basis or through novel alternative rules.
The legal documents drafted by ICAO show virtually no attempt at transformation. 
The basic position is that drones must either conform with existing rules for 
international flight, or that alternative rules (concepts, procedures, and instruments) 
must be established. This is visible in all amendments to the Annexes of the Chicago 
Convention, as well as in the RPAS Manual. In fact, one of the guiding principles 
for the Organization has been that UAS must be integrated into existing rules 
without negatively affecting manned aviation. Hence, for example the integration 
of UAS at aerodromes should not place new burdens on manned aircraft. One of 
the few “transformations” the Organization recommends is providing changes and 
additions to terrain and obstacle databases.
The difficulties of transformation are apparent at least in the case of drones. The 
traditional system of aviation safety and security law contains numerous layers built 
since the adoption of the Chicago Convention in 1944. Indeed, there exists a kind of 
sedimentation—an ancestral spirit—in the rules, which makes it hard to reimagine 
the system entirely. Overcoming this sedimentation, if such is ultimately necessary, 
will require significant legislative efforts. 
6.4. Final Remarks
6.4.1. Conflating Issues
As elaborated on above, this study provides evidence that supports generalizations 
about the legal issues created by sociotechnical change. In accordance with the 
typology developed here, there has been a lack of applicable rules (vacuity), the risk 
that the existing law wrongly classifies some aspects of drones or their operation 
(misclassification), the risk of applying to drones rules that should exclude them 
(over-inclusion), the risk of existing rules not applying to drones even if they should 
(under-inclusion), and the problem of existing rules being ineffective in the new 
sociotechnical situation that includes unmanned aviation (ineffectiveness). With a 
view to future, the study also shows that there is a clear risk that some rules will either 
become less important or even irrelevant through further sociotechnical change in 
aviation. Such categorizations enable contextualizing the case of drones, connecting 
it to other cases of sociotechnical change. This, I argue, will help recognizing issues 
and legislating them appropriately.
Despite this, the study equally demonstrates that the distinctions between various 
issues are not always clear-cut but blurry. Additionally, certain new technologies 
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or particular aspects thereof can cause multiple legal issues at once. Consider, for 
instance, the case of the remote pilot station. The RPS is something which existing 
rules seem to fail to classify: it is not quite the same as a cockpit. At the same time, it 
is quite similar, which is why applying some rules on cockpit appears unproblematic. 
On one hand, the rules misclassify the RPS as a cockpit, but on the other hand they 
do not. Recognizing the real problem might therefore not be as simple as one might 
first assume, which questions the value of the typology—indeed, any typology in 
this context.
The case of air traffic control and management displays a similar problem with 
the categorization of issues. The lack of any service in low level uncontrolled 
airspace and the lack of services available to most drones in general suggests that 
the problem is under-inclusiveness: present ATC/ATM excludes activity it should 
include. However, this is not really the main issue, since the lack of services cannot 
be solved by including drones within the scope of the traditional human-centric air 
traffic system. The problem ultimately is that the legacy system is overall ineffective 
in handling large amounts of low level and low risk unmanned traffic, particularly in 
urban environments. Simultaneously, there is a lack of applicable rules. On the basis 
of this example, too, it is clear that employing the typology is not as straightforward 
as one might expect.
In many respects, the study also shows that the problem of misclassification is 
usually related to other issues. Categories like VFR and IFR are not superficial 
conceptual distinctions, but they contain many substantive rules that can appear 
problematic or non-problematic from the perspective of new technology. The same 
applies to operational categories. It might not be questionable to classify certain 
drone operation as commercial air transport, but the existing rules following from 
such a classification can bring about various issues. The common problem with 
misclassification is, indeed, that it results in over- or under-inclusiveness rather than 
a mere mischaracterization of facts.
6.4.2. Combining Approaches
The case of drones examined in the study equally supports constructing a new 
typology of the legislative approaches to the problems created by sociotechnical 
change. This is the second half of the complete model. The overall shortcoming 
of the typology is that it does not aim at developing the most optimal—in terms 
of adaptiveness, participation, efficiency, transparency, or timeliness—way of 
regulating UAS or any sociotechnical change for that matter. Its purpose is merely 
to map out the different ways in which legislation can respond to new technology, 
which is inevitably a limited perspective.
Another problem is that the differences between the approaches are not always 
as distinguishable as it may appear: it can be difficult to categorize a particular 
legislative choice. This applies to all the approaches. On one hand, for example, 
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ICAO has displayed passivity in relation to Article 8 of the Chicago Convention. 
Using the provision as a starting point is passive in the sense that its creation was 
not related to the current influx of unmanned aircraft systems. Given the wording 
of the provision, it is obvious that the state parties to the treaty could not foresee the 
new drone technology either. It is not a reaction to increasing unmanned aviation 
during the 21st century. From another viewpoint, though, the use of Article 8 is a 
case of replication. This is so because ICAO has taken explicit steps to affirm that 
the provision applies to current drones, too. The inherited rule that the international 
flying of an “aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot” requires authorization 
from the overflown state is transferred into the context of modern drones.
As one might expect, some legislative choices tread the line between replication 
and emulation. One case of this is EU’s certified category of operations. The default 
approach in the category is replication. Rules on airworthiness, operations, rules of 
the air, and so forth, are to be applied as they are to drones in the category. To the 
extent new rules have been enacted, they merely state the given dictum. Yet this 
approach is hardly enough, as transferring the rules will necessitate some adjustments 
in the rules that are not perfectly receptive to unmanned aviation. The certified 
category hence ultimately becomes a case of emulation. The traditional rules will 
be suited to drones through the creation of provisions that transfer the substance 
to apply to the new technology, and replication appears merely as a general starting 
point. Since ICAO’s legislative effort focuses on a similar level of operations (though 
the organization does not refer to the categories), the international rules so far also 
mix replication and emulation.
Sometimes it is questionable whether certain legislative action should be 
categorized as involving emulation or alternative rules. ICAO’s RPAS operator 
certificate is a viable example of this. Above, I characterized it as a case of emulation. 
There are good reasons to do so because the concept essentially transfers the concept 
of air operator certificate to unmanned aviation. Still, when examined in detail, 
the concept also introduces a few wholly alternative standards that are based on 
the unique features of UAS. The certified category of operations is also relevant 
in this delimitation. Most notably, the certification specifications for drones with 
airworthiness certification can include alternative rules. This is so when the CSs do 
not borrow from existing specifications but instead set forth requirements that are 
completely unique in their substance. Some such specifications are to be expected 
with regard to, among other things, the C2 link, which is not used in manned 
aviation.
 Transformation is clearly at odds with both replication and emulation. If the scope 
of an old rule is extended to cover an aspect of new technology, no transformation 
occurs. The same can be said of a situation in which the core substance of such a rule 
is transferred, with some modifications, to cover new technology. With regard to 
individual rules, then, there is no overlap in the approaches. Yet when transformation 
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occurs on the level of the whole system, the scope of some old individual rules may 
simply be extended as a part of the overall new legal framework. In such cases, it 
is possible to view the overall change as a transformation that, regardless, contains 
cases of replication and emulation. One must thus notice when the overall approach 
is of some type and when the approach of an individual rule is of another type. This 
could be viewed as weakening the descriptive power of the typology.
The relationship between transformation and alternative rules is also rather 
clear-cut. The former involves changing old rules or the system overall, while the 
latter involves the enactment of additional rules to the system. From a temporal 
perspective, though, the case of drones shows that some legislative developments can 
mix the approaches. The U-space is the best and perhaps the only example thereof. 
In its current form, the U-space developed, tested, and employed by various service 
providers across Europe is simply an addition to the current system of air traffic 
management. The regulations proposed thus far also testify to its alternative character. 
Yet the concept has the potential to ultimately transform our entire approach to 
air traffic control and management. This goes to show that transformation should 
not mainly be understood as involving just one overhaul. Instead, smaller changes 
can take place here and there in the legislative framework, slowly transforming the 
system into a different one.
6.4.3. Optimizing Legislation?
As acknowledged, the model of legislation and sociotechnical change developed 
here does not aim at developing the most optimal way of identifying legal issues 
and providing solutions thereto. Its primary purpose is to establish some systematic 
elements to discuss the given matters. The value of doing so can naturally be questioned, 
but the study insists that developing these kinds of theoretical vocabularies is a 
worthwhile exercise—even if the benefits thereof do not manifest themselves in an 
obvious and instant manner. They can be employed in broader discussions about the 
flexibility, timing, incentivization, participation, and neutrality of regulation.
Regardless, the model may aid in drawing normative implications also concerning 
the most optimal manner of legislation. At the very least, it shows that sweeping 
arguments about using or not using existing rules, generating new rules, or changing 
rules, are generally mistaken. In order to deal with new technology and its use, 
a divergent range of legislative measures can and should be adopted. Drawing 
on drones as an example, it is clear that no single approach is sufficient, and that 
approaching particular sociotechnical change as a singular entity is mistaken, too. In 
any change, there are aspects that can be ignored, that can be handled using existing 
rules, that require different rules, and that can necessitate purging existing laws or 
executing a complete makeover.
On a more particular level, the study does not attempt to form definite pathways 
from certain issues to certain legislative solutions. Doing so would simply risk 
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ignoring the broad range of choices that legislators have in relation to the issues. Still, 
the model offers a basis for such an analysis. For instance, misclassification clearly 
cannot be solved through replication because the existing rules demonstrably fail 
at properly applying to some aspect of the sociotechnical change. Meanwhile, the 
optimal response to under-inclusiveness appears either replication or emulation, 
since the problem is the narrow scope of the existing rules. Irrelevance and injustice, 
on the other hand, obviously suggest transformation, given that they signify faults 
in present rules. Over-inclusiveness and ineffectiveness can either spark alternative 
rules or transformation, depending on the extent of the sociotechnical change, 
but they cannot be solved by replicating old rules. The construction of pathways 
between the two sides of the model thus remains a theoretical opportunity for 
future studies.
The model also compiles some of the benefits and disadvantages of different 
legislative approaches. Passivity allows the legislator to observe whether a 
sociotechnical change is really occurring or worth legislating in the first place, but it 
can be untenable in the long run. Replication and emulation require less effort, can 
sometimes produce justified uniformity, and make less assumptions about future 
changes. The choice between these two is determined by whether modifying the 
rules is necessary. Replication merely extends the scope of familiar rules to new 
technology; emulation requires transposing the rules to meet the characteristics 
of the new technology. The downside is, though, that using old rules perpetuates 
their disadvantages and perhaps even questionable values. It may also hinder the 
development of more suitable legislative solutions in the long run.
The task of drafting alternative rules is more burdensome, since it compels the 
legislator to use their imagination and work closely with the developing technology 
itself. This close relationship can simultaneously risk law being too closely influenced 
by technological viewpoints. However, in many cases creating new concepts, 
standards, and procedures is necessary to appropriately deal with the sociotechnical 
change. The most difficult approach is transformation, since rather than building on 
existing rules it seeks to either repeal them or change them. Transformation might 
indeed only be appropriate when new technology challenges the whole character of 
a particular system.
One aspect largely ignored by the present model is that legislative approaches 
themselves may create new kinds of issues that are encapsulated by the model. As 
the issues identified by the model are inextricably linked to the idea of existing 
law, the issues caused by the new rules, which do fall within the ambit of the same 
sociotechnical change, can be different. The character of the present study does not, 
however, allow extending the model further into such issues. The types of issues 
caused by the new rules on drones, for instance, cannot be fully explored until there 
is an attempt at their application. Such exploration can of course take place in the 
future, as the more or less problematic nature of the new rules is exposed through 
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application. In its current form the model simply assumes that the issues will be 
similar: in other words, the model is cyclical.
6.4.4. Past and Future Drone Law
The present study was written between the years 2016 and 2020 at a time when some 
of the earliest safety and security rules on modern civil UAS were being developed 
and enacted at the international and European level. The study provides a broad 
outlook, grasping many related topics, so it is not an encyclopedic one. Many rules 
falling within the ambit of aviation safety and security have been left uncited, as the 
purpose has been to highlight key aspects at the expense of completeness. Indeed, 
presenting every single detail of safety law on manned and unmanned aircraft would 
have been both counterproductive and vain, especially in relation to drones. As 
such, the study represents an abbreviated, generalized take on a legal framework that 
is still in many respects under development.
The main purpose of the present study has not been to issue precise legislative 
recommendations that would alter the present framework. From the viewpoint of 
de lege ferenda, the discussion above regardless points to several aspects in which the 
present framework—including the new drone-specific rules—should be developed. 
Airworthiness standards for the command and control link, the remote pilot 
station, and the means by which drones will communicate vis-à-vis each other and 
other aircraft are still required to facilitate safe integration, and the whole certified 
category in the EU remains largely a mystery. The specific category is thus far mostly 
a blueprint that must be put into action and supplemented with requirements on, 
for instance, pilot training. The U-space is only in its early stages, requiring the EU 
to, inter alia, decide on the competition and security aspects of providing services 
therein. This study calls for the legislators to continue their efforts in solving the 
given problems in a manner that is sensitive to the present and future sociotechnical 
situation.
Making generalizations about the past and predicting the future of aviation 
industry, indeed any industry, is difficult due to the persistency, unpredictability, 
and speed of all sociotechnical change. The present study has sought to look both 
into the past and the future in a rather moderate manner. The arguments are tied to 
concrete facts and legal documents, and there is an attempt to preface them with 
caveats: sociotechnical change is not unique to this moment and this case, and the 
changes and issues are diverse rather than monolithic. In more concrete terms, there 
is no singular type of manned aviation nor unmanned aviation. At the same time, 
the study argues that there are ways in which the present change is unique, and 
that there are significant differences between manned and unmanned aviation. The 
technology we do not have at the time of writing this is a possibility: sometimes a 
likely one, sometimes less so.
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In order to close the circle, we must consider that
[a]ll interpretation, all psychology, all attempts to make things comprehensible, require 
the medium of theories, mythologies and lies; and a self-respecting author should not 
omit, at the close of an exposition, to dissipate these lies so far as may be in his power.669
Here, this refers to the possibility that the change dealt with in this study is but 
the beginning of a greater coalescence in mobility, or but the death throes of a system 
misclassifying such coalescence. I mean by this that the idea of sociotechnical change 
should not only be understood as the development of better UAS or the increase in 
unmanned civil aviation. Presently, we are concerned with a division between cases 
in which the pilot is on board the aircraft or on the ground: this was the very starting 
point of this study. But, as the overall automation in aviation increases, we may no 
longer be able to meaningfully uphold such a distinction. Whatever concerns we 
have of legislation unjustly favoring one or the other might come to pass.
Furthermore, sociotechnical change is not limited to the context of aviation at all 
but includes a wide range of forces acting in relation to one another. It encapsulates 
all mobility, as ultimately the most important purpose of aviation—whatever one 
may think of it—is to move things around. At the same time, sociotechnical change 
encapsulates all technology, as ultimately the purpose of technology is to extend 
human capabilities. There is hence change and Change. The problem, however, is 
that we can barely see the former, and the latter appears as almost pure fiction: they 
are almost untouchable. This brings a meaning to exercises, such as the present study, 
which are irrevocably limited but concretely tied to a particular time and place.
669  Hesse 1927/1969, p. 65.
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